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In this dissertation, I investigate the determinants of labor force exits and 
entrances among married mothers with children under 15 considering work, family, 
and demographic characteristics, using the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation 1996 panel data.  Three theoretical streams guide the research and 
interpret the findings—neoclassical economic theory, the life course perspective, and 
the gender perspective.
Using discrete-time event history analysis, I find that wives who outearn their 
husbands are more likely to exit the labor force.  An interaction with other family 
income (excluding the wife’s earnings) reveals that the main effect of the wife as a 
primary provider is negative, and primary provider wives are more likely to exit the 
labor force as other family income rises.
I also find that married mothers who delay childbearing are more likely to exit 
the labor force.  An interaction with personal earnings lends support to the life course 
perspective’s argument that delayed childbearers may believe that they can reenter 
the labor force without suffering downward mobility, as high earners who delay 
childbearing more likely to exit labor force.  However, an interaction with education 
level does not, as delayed childbearers with a college degree are less likely to exit the 
labor force.  
It appears that entrances are driven more by the human capital attributes and 
labor force commitment of the mother than by family considerations.   The effect of 
predicted wages on entrances into part-time employment is positive, suggesting that 
married mothers who are predicted to attain higher wages may be able to use their 
higher market value to negotiate part-time employment.
Labor force exits do not appear to differ by the reason for the labor force 
exit—the determinants of labor force exits appear to be similar regardless of whether 
the mother exits to care for children and family or for other reasons.  However, full-
time mothers seem to be less inclined to enter the labor force than other mothers as 
full-time mothers with high predicted earnings are not more likely to enter the labor 
force and the introduction of a new baby is not related to a labor force entrance. 
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Chapter 1: Statement of the Problem
On all accounts, women have made great strides in achieving equality with 
men since the 1950s.  Women’s labor force participation and attachment have 
increased, more women than men in recent cohorts have college degrees, and 
women’s earnings have risen relative to men’s.  Yet, evidence of a stalled revolution 
is mounting.  A steady drumbeat of research finds that the sweeping changes in the 
work and family lives of Americans ushered in during the 1970s and 1980s have, for 
the most part, stalled in the 1990s (Cotter, Hermsen, and Vanneman 2004; Hochchild 
and Machung 1989; Sayer, Cohen, and Casper 2004; Smith, Downs, and O'Connell 
2001; Williams 2000).  Women, it seems, have reached a limit on the amount of paid 
work they can take on, by decreasing their housework to a minimum level and 
cajoling their husbands to increase their domestic responsibilities, but this new 
“equilibrium” falls short of full market equality with men (Sayer et al. 2004).  Despite 
their increasing time spent in market work, women still are primarily responsible for 
the care of children and other housework (Coltrane 2000).  In fact, a shift to more 
part-time work among women is visible among first-time mothers before and after the 
birth (Smith et al. 2001); and for the first time in decades, a decline in the labor force 
participation rate of mothers with infants was documented (Bachu and O'Connell 
2000; Downs 2003).  It appears that some of the women who are poised to compete 
evenly with men in the market place are “opting out,” rather than breaking glass 
ceilings or finding ways to balance their work and family responsibilities (Belkin 
2003). 
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Labor force exits of high-earning women, and particularly among women who 
outearn their husbands, raise questions about gender equality in the home and the 
workplace.  Why is it that men can have high-earning, demanding careers and have a 
family too, whereas women seem to have to choose between the two?  
This dissertation aims to answer the question, “which women shed their 
worker role, and which married women take on employment”?  Some point to the 
current social organization of work, one that marginalizes those who have care-giving 
responsibility by reinforcing men’s position of power and authority in the home and 
workplace (Moen and Yu 2000; Williams 2000). The cultural template of the family 
has undergone significant change since the middle of the 20th century.  No longer do 
the majority of American families resemble the breadwinner/homemaker model, 
characterized by a gendered separation of spheres, with men responsible only for paid 
market work and women responsible only for unpaid domestic work (Casper and 
Bianchi 2002; Moen and Yu 2000; Tilly and Scott 1978).  Moen and Yu (2000) argue 
that because work and society remain structured around this outdated model, we are 
left in the midst of a structural lag.  The breadwinner/homemaker model is predicated 
on the notion of the ideal worker who can devote endless time to work because there 
is a family member (typically a wife) at home devoted to the care of children, the 
preparation of meals, and all other family functions (Moen and Yu 2000; Williams 
2000).   The entrance of women into paid market work has been accompanied by 
some change on the part of men and the organization of work, but some question if it 
has been enough.  Women—especially mothers—are still saddled with the “second 
shift” (Hochchild with Machung 1989).
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There is ample evidence that contemporary families are feeling squeezed by 
the demands of their work and family responsibilities.  Few workers have family 
members at home to manage their family responsibilities and personal involvements, 
thus freeing them up to concentrate exclusively on market work (Moen and 
Wethington 1992; Moen and Yu 2000; Spain and Bianchi 1996).  The widespread 
entrance of women into the market place has reduced the back-stage support that men 
historically have received, and most employed women, are either divorced, never 
married, or married to men who work full time.  Thus, women receive little or no
back stage support (Hochchild with Machung 1989) and take on the second shift 
often single-handedly.  Some find that the typical hours worked per week has 
increased, with workers putting in more hours on the job (Jacobs and Gerson 1998; 
Schor 1991) and workers experience a general feeling of being overworked and 
rushed (Robinson and Godbey 1997).  While others have found that the average hours 
have not increased, the number of weeks worked has increased and the percent 
working very long hours has increased (Bianchi 2000; Gerson and Jacobs 2001).  
Success at work is often times equated with high amounts of time spent on the job, 
and the culture of occupations rewards those employees that put in overtime at the 
expense of family involvement (Hochchild 1997).  These overloads are particularly 
apparent among two-earner families, and especially among married employed 
mothers.
At the same time, socially prescribed gender roles in the home have remained 
for the most part unchanged.  Attitudes of acceptable behavior for women and men 
are slowly changing, but it is still socially more acceptable for women to be primarily 
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responsible for domestic tasks and men to be the breadwinner.  Blair-Loy (2003) 
explains that the conflict experienced by mothers employed in time-intensive 
occupations is due to the collision of two cultural schemas—the work devotion 
schema and the family devotion schema—that compete for a mother’s time and soul.  
Research on family balance and the time bind reveals that it is female workers, and 
particularly working mothers, who are doing the balancing and feeling the most 
squeezed and rushed (Hochchild with Machung 1989).  Research also shows that 
employed mothers do more combined paid and nonpaid work than employed fathers 
(Hochchild with Machung 1989; Robinson and Godbey 1997), which likely 
contributes to the reason women feel more imbalance than men (Milkie and Peltola 
1999).  Although men’s time spent doing housework has increased, the nature of 
typical male and female housework requires different time allocation and leads to 
differing levels of stress and overload.  For example, Milkie and Peltola (1999) find 
that male tasks tend to be less frequent and flexible (yard work and car maintenance), 
while female tasks are more routine and time dependent (child care, meal 
preparation), leading women to feel imbalanced and stressed from the overload.  
Further, married men more often have a wife who works fewer hours than they do 
(either part time or not at all) who take care of the home front and ease the burden of 
work and family life; whereas married employed women often have a husband who 
works full time, resulting in no one at home to do the back stage support required to 
enable her to be an ideal worker and ease her double burden.  Thus, women are 
feeling the squeeze or imbalance.  In response to this sense of imbalance, many 
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women, and particularly mothers, seek strategies to balance their work and family 
lives (Becker and Moen 1999; Spain and Bianchi 1996).  
Given the overload that working mothers experience, the still prevalent 
gendered notions of acceptable women’s and men’s roles, the structural lag manifest 
in the organization of work and home, and the general tendency of employers, 
husbands, and policy to pin the problem of the double burden on women alone, it is 
not surprising that some mothers decide to leave market work altogether and fully 
concentrate on the domestic sphere. 
However, it is important to keep in mind the price mothers pay for periods of 
nonemployment.  Several studies document a wage penalty for motherhood (Budig 
and England 2001; Felmlee 1995; Lundberg and Rose 2002; Waldfogel 1997b; 
Waldfogel 1998a; Waldfogel 1998b), yet there seems to be no such penalty for men, 
instead having children seems to increase their wages (Lundberg and Rose 2002).  
Working part-time, a common work-family balance strategy used by many mothers, 
reduces the penalty for one child from 6 percent to 4 percent, but a penalty remains 
(Waldfogel 1997c).  Lifetime earnings are lower for mothers because of periods of 
nonemployment (Joshi 1990), and in turn their private pensions are lower.  Lower 
earnings may affect married mothers bargaining power with their husband and 
contribute to dependence and inequality within the home (Crittenden 2001; England 
and Kilbourne 1990; Ferree 1990); and in the case of divorce, low-earning mothers 
and those with less work experience are more apt to fall into poverty.  Women’s 
economic marginalization has negative ramifications for children too, since mothers 
tend to spend more of their earnings on children and children of divorce often spend 
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periods of time in poverty (Cherlin 1992; Furstenberg and Cherlin 1991; McLanahan 
and Sandefur 1994).  Since most women are mothers, and most mothers do the bulk 
of child rearing, the price of motherhood contributes to gender inequality (Budig and 
England 2001).  
This dissertation focuses on married mothers with children under age 15 and 
examines their labor force transitions.  By looking at the determinants of married 
mothers’ labor force exits and entrances, I attempt to discern whether theories of 
neoclassical economics, stage in the life course, and the gender perspective explain 
married mother’s labor force transitions.  Using the 1996 panel of the Survey of 
Income and Program Participation (SIPP) longitudinal data, discrete-time event 
history models are run exploring labor force transitions.
The objective of this dissertation is to add to the current body of research on 
the decision making process surrounding mother’s employment in married couple 
families.  By including information on both spouses, I pose questions about gender 
equality in the home, and inform policy concerned about the ability of parents to 
balance work and family responsibilities and child well-being.  Using longitudinal 
data, I study full-time homemaker mother families, specifically looking at labor force 
exits into and from this family type.  This is an important family type to study 
because of the link between parental employment and child and family well-being, 
and because of the implications of periods of nonemployment for gender equality in 
the work place as well as in the home.  The dissertation addresses several research 
questions:
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1) What are the determinants of married mothers’ labor force exits or 
entrances?  
2) What is the role of the wife’s relative earnings on a married mother’s labor 
force participation? 
3) What is the role of the age at first birth on a married mother’s labor force 
participation?
4) How do the different theoretical streams interpret the findings?
5) Does the reason for nonemployment influence the determinants of married 
mothers’ labor force participation?
This research goes beyond prior studies of the relationship between gender 
and a mother’s work and family decision-making in important ways.  First, the bulk 
of the literature on mother’s labor force exits concentrates on labor force exits either 
around the time of the first birth or a subsequent birth.  The value of time in the home 
greatly increases with the first birth, as caring for a young child is labor intensive.  In 
addition, the greatest changes in various activities have been demonstrated with entry 
into the parenthood role rather than with additions to an established family (Desai and 
Waite 1991; Elder and Rockwell 1976; Hofferth and Moore 1979; Hogan 1981; 
Sorensen 1983).  While it is likely that the birth of a child is a turning point for many 
women, and motivates some to exit the labor force, not all mothers exit at this time 
and for this reason.  Little research has been conducted on the labor force transitions 
into and out of full-time motherhood as a whole regardless of the age of the youngest 
child.  This research will take a broader look at the timing of women’s labor force 
exits than in previous research. 
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Second, this study is unique because the rich SIPP data set allows me to 
include several new measures to explain labor force transitions and explore the 
interpretations of results relying on several theories, broadening the discussion and 
understanding of the determinants of married mother’s labor force participation.  I 
draw on neoclassical economic theory, the life course perspective, and the gender 
perspective simultaneously.   
Additionally, the SIPP panel is a representative sample of the entire 
population, unlike the NLSY which as Rosenfeld (1996, page 204) points out “over 
represents young mothers and understates the degree of labor force attachment as 
women have postponed child bearing and increased their work experience before 
having the first child.”  This dissertation allows the inclusion of a representative 
sample of women who began child bearing at young, on-time, and older ages and 
provides insight into how these different life course trajectories based on age at first 
birth influence labor force attachment.  One drawback, however, is that by using the 
SIPP, this research only tracks labor force transitions over a four-year period.
Third, this research concentrates on married mothers, rather than all mothers, 
because the intent is to examine family dynamics surrounding gender specific 
specialization of family roles.  I study married couples because I am interested in 
issues of gender equality in the home and couple-level responses to work and family 
balance.  However, as more fathers take on parental and home responsibilities, they 
too feel the squeeze and imbalance associated with work and care-giving (Coltrane 
2000).  It is important to examine the labor force behavior of married mothers, 
because work and family balance policy is often conceptualized around the 
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challenges facing these women, yet these same challenges exist for fathers with 
significant care-giving responsibility and for single mothers who have the dual role of 
primary economic provider and primary care-giver.
Finally, this dissertation takes a modest first step toward a better definition of 
full-time mothers than previous research in that I compare mothers who exit the labor 
force for any reason with those who exit specifically to care for family and children.  
I examine a rich longitudinal data set, the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP), to track changes in labor force status and income, concurrently 
with changes in family composition and job characteristics.  Estimates of the number 
and characteristics of full-time mothers have relied on cross-sectional data only and 
have not been able to capture the dynamic nature of work and family decisions.
In sum, this research contributes to the debate on the relationship between 
gender equality and the child care and work decision-making processes.  The results 
have policy implications for child well-being, family well-being, and gender equality 
in the work place and the home.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Between 1970 and the late 1990s there was a steady uptick in the labor force 
participation rate of mothers with infants.  Then for the first time in decades, we 
witnessed a slight, but statistically significant, decline in the labor force participation 
rate of mothers with infants.  Simultaneously, recent research documents a stalling 
out of women’s market equality1 with men, despite women’s impressive gains in 
other work-related measures including education and earnings, maternity leave 
legislation, and job continuity.  One might have thought that by the year 2000 more 
married couples would have found egalitarian ways to balance the demands of work 
and family, given the advances made due to the feminist movement, the steady move 
toward more father involvement in the family, and family friendly changes instituted 
in the work place.  But that does not appear to be the case.  Rather, it appears that 
something very strong continues to push a sizable proportion of mothers to opt for 
nonemployment.  Perhaps it is driven by economics, or maybe it is cultural, or 
perhaps the answer lies in unbending gender roles.  We need to understand which 
women exit the labor force for full-time mothering because of workforce issues—the 
labor market is losing some of the best and brightest workers—but also because of 
continued inequality in the workplace and the home.  This dissertation takes a 
different approach to the old question of women’s labor force participation by 
flipping the way we look at this phenomenon.  Rather than focusing on women’s 
1 Cotter, Hermsen, and Vanneman (2004) define market equality by three dimensions (labor force 
participation, occupational segregation, and earnings) and track changes in these from 1950 to 2000.
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labor force participation and who is working, I focus instead on why women leave the 
labor force.
Organization of the chapter
This chapter begins with an examination of the trends in the labor force 
participation of mothers and then discusses mother’s labor force patterns around the 
time of childbirth.  Next, it reviews several different types of married couple families, 
paying specific attention to issues of gender equality and power.  A discussion of 
other cultural currents and how they might influence mothers’ labor force 
participation ensues.  Finally, the chapter reviews the previous literature on the 
determinants of labor force participation.
Trends in the labor force participation of mothers
Historically, formerly married mothers had higher labor force participation 
rates than did married mothers (Casper and Bianchi 2002).  This is not surprising 
given that these mothers did not have a husband’s earnings to rely on and thus were 
compelled to combine work with child rearing.  Likewise, minority and low-income 
married mothers have always had substantial levels of paid work.  Since the 1960s 
however, we have seen a dramatic increase in the proportion of married mothers who 
are working for pay, particularly among mothers of preschool-age children.  In 1960, 
only 19 percent of married mothers with children under 6 were in the labor force, by 
2001 that proportion had increased to 63 percent (US Census Bureau 2002).  Clearly, 
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more married women today simultaneously combine work outside the home and 
raising young children than in the past (Cohen and Bianchi 1999).
Women have increased their educational attainment over the past four 
decades, and many women spend several years in the labor force prior to childbearing 
and then remain attached to the labor force after they begin child bearing.  This new 
pattern of women’s work and family building differs markedly from the path that 
women of previous generations took.  In mid-20th century America, women would 
marry early, have children quickly after marriage, and remain outside the labor force 
to raise their children (Goldin 1990).  In part, this was possible because of the “family 
wage” that white, married men typically received. The rise in women’s labor force 
participation in the 1950s and 1960s was largely due to an increase in older women 
returning to the labor force after their children were grown (Goldin 1990).  More 
recently, the stagnant wage rates of men, especially men with lower levels of 
education, coupled with rising housing costs have made it a necessity for families to 
have two paychecks to make ends meet, and to afford the level of consumption that 
they desire (Levy 1987; Levy 1998).
The historical trend of increasing labor force participation among mothers 
with infants seems to have declined and leveled off.  Figure 2.1 shows the labor force 
participation rate of mothers with infants less than one year of age from 1976 to 2002.  
For the first time since 1976, the decade’s long trend of increasing labor force 
participation among mothers with infants has fallen from an all-time high of 59 
percent in 1998 to 55 percent in 2000 and remained at that same level in 2002 (Bachu 
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and O'Connell 2000; Downs 2003).  The decline is apparent among older, White, and 
married mothers, as well as mothers with some college education. 
 New data from the CPS show a rise in the percent of stay-at-home mothers –
defined as married mothers with children under 15 who are out of the labor force for 
at least one year to care for home and family—from 20 percent in 1994 to 22 percent 
in 2000, representing an increase of 14 percent (Fields 2003).2  It is against this 
backdrop of an increase in married mothers who are shedding their worker roles for 
2 This percentage may seem low compared with the percentage of married mothers with children who 
are not in the labor force, but that is expected since it is a more strict definition of stay-at-home 
motherhood (the mother must be married with a child under 15 and have been out of the labor force for 
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Figure 2.1:  Labor Force Participation Among Women 
With Infants, 1976 to 2002
Source: Downs, B. 2003.  Fertility of American Women, 2002.  Current Population Reports. 
U.S. Census Bureau.
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full-time motherhood that I aim to better understand the labor force transition 
dynamics of this group.  Little is known about full-time mothers and what processes 
motivate them to leave the labor force.  Do women who exit the labor force to be full-
time mothers share the same characteristics as women who exit for other reasons?
Mother’s labor force patterns surrounding childbirth
Women’s labor force activity surrounding the birth of a child is well 
researched.  While the 1960s represented a time when the vast majority of women 
exited the labor force upon the birth of the first child, today the majority of women 
remain employed, taking only short maternity leaves (Smith et al. 2001).  There is 
consensus among studies that as the birth approaches, women increasingly reduce the 
number of hours worked per week (Cramer 1979; Desai and Waite 1991; Klerman 
and Leibowitz 1999; Smith, Downs, and O'Connell 2001; Waite, Haggstrom, and 
Kanouse 1985).  A woman’s likelihood of leaving increases as the due date 
approaches, with fewer women leaving in the first trimester and the majority leaving 
in the last trimester (Klerman and Leibowitz 1999; Smith, Downs, and O'Connell 
2001). In fact, 82 percent of employed women now work into the third trimester 
(Smith, Downs, and O'Connell 2001), with many (more than half) working the month 
they deliver.  The research also shows that women who work into their third trimester 
return to their job quicker (most mothers are back to work by 6 months postpartum) 
(Klerman and Leibowitz 1999; Smith, Downs, and O'Connell 2001) and that those 
who leave early on in the pregnancy, do not return to work within the first year 
(Klerman and Leibowitz 1999; Smith, Downs, and O'Connell 2001).  
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Klerman and Leibowitz (1999) find that women self select into workers and 
nonworkers at the birth of their first child.  Those mothers who work after a first birth 
are more likely to work after a second or third birth as well, while mothers who leave 
the labor force after a first birth are more likely to remain out of the labor force for a 
longer period of time and not work after subsequent births.  Similarly, women who 
work into their pregnancy show stronger long-term ties to the labor force (Hofferth 
1996).  (Mott and Shapiro 1983) find that work during pregnancy is a good predictor 
of labor force participation 5 to 10 years after the first birth, and (Even 1987) shows 
that the probability of women reentering to the labor force after the birth of a child 
falls as the length of the interruption rises.
However, recent research shows that women’s work patterns are more varied 
and dynamic than previously thought.  Research on women’s work and family 
patterns often portray women as falling into two distinct and exclusive groups 
depending on their attachment to the labor force or family (Blau 1976; Mott and 
Shapiro 1982; Scanzoni 1979; Schwartz 1989; Waite 1981).  Vandenheuvel (1997) 
debunks the notion that women can be sorted into two types—those for whom career 
is primary and those for whom family is primary—by showing that women follow 
diverse life paths after the birth of their first child.  Over a ten-year period, the 
dichotomous distinction loses traction falling from 81 percent of white women in a 
stable role sequence (either continuously in the labor force or continuously out of the 
labor force) at two years after the first birth to only 24 percent in a stable role 
sequence at 10 years after the first birth (Vandenheuval 1997).  By five years after the 
first birth, only half of the white mothers have remained either continuously 
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employed or continuously not employed, while the other half have experienced 
diverse labor force patterns.  Similar results are found for Black women, although 
Black women have a slightly higher rate of stable role sequence due to their higher 
rates of continuous labor force participation.  Moen (1985) also finds numerous labor 
force transitions among women over a five-year period using data from the late 
1970s.
Work interruptions are an important part of women’s overall labor force 
patterns, but can have potentially negative repercussions for occupational attainment 
and overall earnings (Mincer and Polachek 1974; Polachek 1981; Polachek 1987).  
Polacheck (1981), relying on human capital theory, argues that discontinuities in 
employment diminish skills and reduce overall work experience, which leads the 
intermittent worker to be viewed as less well-trained, experienced, and committed.  
Thus, finding a job after a labor force break that has equivalent pay, skills, and 
rewards with the job prior to the labor force break may be difficult, especially if a 
mother is searching for work with reduced hours.  Mothers may therefore have to 
settle for a less rewarding job after a labor force break.  Felmlee (1995) finds that 
even a single labor force break has immediate and adverse effects on women’s 
employment prospects, including lower wages and job status, and higher rates of 
downward mobility.  She also finds that married women are more likely to have a job 
change with an interruption, because the family can rely on the father’s paycheck in 
the interim; and that having a preschool age child increases the likelihood of a job 
change to a lower paying job, suggesting that mothers of young children shift to jobs 
that are less demanding and have reduced hours.  Downs and Smith (2003) also find 
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that mothers switch jobs in the year after the birth of their first child to accommodate 
their desire for part-time work, presumably because their pre-birth job did not offer a 
part-time alternative, and this job switching for reduced hours is often correlated with 
reduced pay and skill level.  Therefore, evidence exists that some mothers trade off 
pay and prestige for more flexibility and time with children.
Part-time work
The current organization of work is based on the male breadwinner/ wife 
homemaker template, which requires the worker to fully concentrate on work and 
career (Moen and Yu 2000; Williams 2000).  Centered on the premise that employees 
will work full- time hours and will work overtime when necessary, job promotions 
and raises are granted based on a model that uses the “ideal” worker as the norm 
against which all other employees are compared.  Ideal workers appear to have no 
other personal or family obligations, work overtime when necessary, and prioritize 
their job before their family.  Invisible from this picture of the ideal worker is the 
backstage support provided by the homemaker wife, which enables the ideal male 
worker to “have it all,” i.e., pursue a career unfettered by family care obligations yet 
have a wife to provide nurturance, cooked meals, laundered clothes, and well-
behaved and cared for children. Within this rigid framework, there is no place for 
rewarding part-time work with opportunities for advancement and prestige.
Part-time jobs, which are predominantly held by women, are often equated 
with low-status and low-pay (Blank 1990; Waldfogel 1997a; Williams 2000).  In 
addition, part-time jobs are usually limited in terms of benefits (health insurance, 
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pension benefits), are often of uncertain duration, and lack protections that full-time 
jobs enjoy (Kalleberg, Reskin, and Hudson 2000; Tilly 1996; Williams 2000).  Part-
time jobs are frequently regarded as “mommy track” positions, with little or no 
chance for advancement, prestige, or authority and tend to offer less rewarding and 
challenging work (Blair-Loy 2003; Blank 1990; Blossfeld and Hakim 1997; Drobnic 
and Wittig 1997).  
Yet, not all part-time jobs are “bad jobs.”  Blank (1990) finds that women who 
switched into part-time work voluntarily were paid more per hour than comparable 
women who worked full-time, controlling for differences among women and factors 
that affect their decisions to work part-time.  Research by Tilly (1996) delineates two 
different types of part-time jobs.  The bad part-time jobs are those in the secondary 
job market and are entry-level, typically dead-end jobs that demand little skill, 
training, and responsibility, offer little opportunity for advancement, are poorly paid 
and offer no benefits (Tilly 1996).  Understandably, these jobs have high rates of 
turnover.  On the other hand, the good part-time jobs, are positions in the primary 
labor market, tend to be well-paid, offer pro-rated benefits, and demand skill and 
training.  As such, Tilly (1996) calls these jobs “retention” part-time jobs because 
they are used to keep valued employees on the job, and although the part-timer may 
not have supervisory responsibility or get promoted while in this retention state, they 
retain their position on the career ladder.  These retention part-timers tend to be 
women who have care-giving responsibilities and prefer to work less than full-time 
hours, and thus turnover tends to be low in these positions.  Perhaps both the 
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employer and the employee believe that when the time-intensive demands of caring 
for young children pass, the employee will return to full-time hours.
However, even for retention part-timers, employers and coworkers can be 
hostile to part-timers and consider them to be less committed to their work.  Some 
professional women who do attempt to work part-time end up leaving their position 
because they do not like the loss of authority, the lack of rewarding, interesting work, 
or the hostility felt from coworkers (Crittenden 2001; Wharton and Blair-Loy 2002; 
Wolf 2001).  Blair-Loy (2003) explains that the stigma associated with part-time 
work leads many professionals, who otherwise would like to cut back their work-
week, not to attempt to negotiate reduced workloads.  Several studies have 
documented that parents would like to work fewer hours (Clarkberg and Moen 2001; 
Galinsky and Swanberg 2000; Gerson and Jacobs 2001; Jacobs and Gerson 1998), 
and that many feel that they cannot, partly due to fears about the negative effect on 
their careers (Wharton and Blair-Loy 2002).
One common reason portrayed anecdotally and in the qualitative research for 
professional women to quit their jobs is that there is no part-time option available—
essentially their choice consists of full-time or no time (Crittenden 2001).  Some 
evidence exists that mothers switch jobs in the year after the birth of their first child 
to accommodate their desire for part-time work (Downs and Smith 2003), presumably 
because their pre-birth job did not offer a part-time alternative, and this job switching 
for reduced hours is often correlated with reduced pay and skill level.  Others state 
that they were not prepared for the conflicting demands of work and family, and 
expected their husbands to play a larger role in the care of children and increased 
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housework associated with children (Wolf 2001).  Others did not realize how time-
consuming and all encompassing mothering would be, and how hard it would be to 
leave their child for long periods of time.  
Williams (2000) argues that women looking to balance work and family have 
two alternatives, neither of which constitutes a full range of choice or equality.  
Women can 1) perform as ideal male workers without the backstage support that 
facilitates full- and over-time employment, or 2) take dead-end “mommy track” jobs 
or low-paying, low-skilled “women’s work”.  Williams (2000) contends that these 
two “choices” are based on a male ideal worker model, and as such, neither option 
offers equality.  Qualitative research reveals that women often say it is their choice to 
leave their job, even though their first choice would have been to have the same job, 
but just with fewer hours, but that was not an option they could choose.  In many 
cases, “choice” hides social constraints and discrimination (Crittenden 2001; 
Williams 2000).  A third alternative that more and more professional women are 
exercising is to not marry, remain childless, or delay both as long as possible (Moen 
and Yu 2000).
Types of married couples
“Traditional” couples—Specialization within marriage
Traditional specialization within marriage occurs when the husband 
concentrates on market work and the wife concentrates on home production (Becker 
1981).  In the 1960s, this was the norm for families with children as only 19 percent 
of wives with children under 6 were employed outside the home, although low-
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income mothers and mothers of color often were employed (Casper and Bianchi 
2002).  The typical pattern of women’s employment for those born in the 1930s (thus 
they married in the 1950s) was employment prior to marriage, but once married a 
labor force exit would quickly ensue (Goldin 1990).  Over time the typical pattern of 
women’s employment has changed such that today, the typical pattern of women’s 
employment is employment, take a short leave of absence for maternity leave, and 
return to employment.  At the turn of the 21st century, traditional specialization within 
marriage was more the exception than the rule.  By 2001, 64 percent of married 
mothers with children under 6 were employed, thus only 36 percent of married couple 
families with children under 6 consisted of a male breadwinner and a female 
homemaker (Casper and Bianchi 2002).
Yet, modified forms of specialization within marriage are clearly visible in 
our society today, especially within married couples with young children.  Married 
mothers with young children work on average 20 hours per week, fewer hours than 
all married women (25 hours) and all women (27 hours) (Casper and Bianchi 2002, 
Table 10.1, page 290).   Scaling back hours of employment is a strategy many 
married mothers of young children rely upon to enable them to balance their work 
and family responsibilities and maintain a foot in both spheres (Spain and Bianchi 
1996).  A very small minority of married-couple families with children (roughly 2 
percent) flip the gender roles upside down and have an employed mother with a full-
time father (Fields 2003; Smith and Fields 2004), a reversed form of specialization 
within marriage.  Very few fathers work part-time hours while their wife works full-
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time hours, although the percentage of fathers providing child care for their children 
while the mother is employed has risen since the 1980s (Smith 2002).  
Raley, Mattingly, and Bianchi (2006) document the change in the distribution 
of couples by their breadwinner status from 1970 to 2001.  In 2001, 70 percent of 
couples were dual-earners, up from 41 percent in 1970 (this includes couples without 
children).  Following Nock's (2001) categorization of couples as mutually economic 
dependent spouses (MEDS), Raley et al. (2006) find that couples where the husband 
was the primary provider decreased from 87 percent to 64 percent (includes husband 
as sole earner and primary provider among dual-earners), primarily due to a decrease 
in husband as sole provider families.  The percent of couples with a wife as the 
primary provider increased from 4 percent to 12 percent over the same time period.  
Taken altogether, the majority of married couple families with children exhibit either 
traditional specialization or a modified form of specialization, enabling the husband 
to focus more on market work and career advancement and the wife to focus more on 
providing for the well-being of the family and home.
Egalitarian marriages
Gornick and Meyers (2003) view egalitarian marriages as those where men 
and women share domestic and provider roles.  Others find that what sets egalitarian 
marriages apart from nonegalitarian marriages is the determination to subvert 
traditionally gendered divisions of labor and power (Blaisur e and Allen 1995; Risman 
and Johnson-Sumerford 1998), efforts to create more companionate, collaborative 
marriages (Schwartz 1994), and the valuing of women’s paid work as a necessary 
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condition to achieving a more equitable relationship (Risman and Johnson-Sumerford 
1998).  Several studies show that when couples are more equal in their earnings, 
regardless of their economic level, they exhibit more equal power relationships 
(Bittman, England, Sayer, Folbre, and Matheson 2003; Brines 1994; Coltrane 1996; 
Sexton and Perlman 1989).  It is possible that couples that have equal education 
levels also regard one another as equals and demonstrate more balanced marital 
power.  The rise of women’s labor force participation has been used as a prime 
indicator of women’s status (Cotter, Hermsen, and Vanneman 2004) and dual-earner 
couples are often considered more egalitarian than husband sole earner couples.  
More recently, the wife’s relative earnings to her husband have become a marker of 
marital power and couples with high earning wives have come to embody 
egalitarianism.
Delayed childbearing
Gains in women’s market equality to men are in part attributable to an 
increase in the age at first birth.  Since the 1960s, we have seen a shift in the age at 
first birth toward older ages, notably among women with college degrees (Rindfuss, 
Morgan, and Offutt 1996).  The mean age at first birth has steadily increased from 
21.4 in 1970 to 24.9 in 2000, an increase of 3.5 years (Martin, Hamilton, Sutton, 
Ventura, Menacker, and Munson 2005).  Simultaneously, the proportion of women 
graduating from college has steadily increased from 12 percent in 1970 to more than 
half in 2004, such that women now are more likely to earn a college degree than men 
of comparable ages (Stoops 2004).  
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The birth of a first child is an important life-changing event, and the timing of 
the onset of family building certainly influences educational attainment, occupational 
opportunities, marriage prospects and overall earnings (Rindfuss and St. John 1983).  
Early age at first birth is associated with disruptions in the young mother’s schooling, 
poverty after the birth of her first child, and dependence on public assistance 
(Geronimus and Korenman 1992; Hofferth and Moore 1979), setting a pathway of 
decreased market value and job mobility.  On the other hand, late child bearers tend 
to have high market value because they have been on a life course pathway that 
encourages higher education and continuous employment (Martin 2000).  They are 
likely to be well established professionally and more secure economically (Hofferth 
1984).   
Bloom (1986) finds that women aged 30-39 who wait until at least age 27 to 
have their first birth, earn 36 percent more than those who have their first child before 
age 22, and 18 percent more than those who first give birth at ages 22-26.  When 
controlling for education and years of work experience and other control variables, 
those who have their first birth after age 27 still earn roughly 10 percent more than 
those who give birth prior to age 22.  Late child bearers and childless women have 
higher education levels and more work experience, both of which account for most of 
the hourly wage differential.  
The timing of a woman’s first birth influences the level of education she 
attains (Hofferth, Reid, and Mott 2001), and in turn the career paths that are available 
to her (Coombs and Freedman 1970; Rindfuss and St. John 1983).  According to 
Bloom’s (1986) research using the 1985 CPS, childless women are more likely than 
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women with children to hold managerial positions; childless women and late 
childbearers are more likely to hold professional positions; and early childbearers are 
heavily represented in service and blue collar professions.  Clearly a woman’s early 
life events are setting the stage for later life outcomes (such as earnings) (Rindfuss 
and St. John 1983) and are likely contributing to her worldview and shaping her 
meaning of work and family.
Research suggests that women who delay childbearing until a later age appear 
to experience the transition to motherhood differently than those who begin 
childbearing at early ages (Coltrane 1990; Coltrane and Ishii-Kuntz 1992).  Although 
career interruptions tend to have a negative effect on wage attainment, and thus would 
deter labor force exits, (Taniguchi 1999) argues that the disruptive effect could vary 
by the timing of the interruption.  
Specialization in marriage—Negative consequences for women and children
Important tradeoffs are inherent in specialization in marriage.  Although 
specialization may bring higher total income to some families, it also creates 
inequities within families (Blau, Ferber, and Winkler 1998; Gornick and Meyers 
2003).  Full-time homemakers lack bargaining power within the family, are less able 
to leave the family if domestic abuse or serious problems arise, and often fall into 
poverty in the case of divorce (Budig and England 2001; Crittenden 2001; Ferree 
1990; Gornick and Meyers 2003).  For women, long-term negative economic 
repercussions of specialization in marriage (even modified specialization) are 
widespread.  A significant wage penalty is associated with motherhood (Budig and 
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England 2001; Lundberg and Rose 2002; Waldfogel 1997b; Waldfogel 1998a; 
Waldfogel 1998b).  Men do not suffer the same penalty—their wages have been 
found to increase after the birth of a child (Lundberg and Rose 2002).  Women who 
step out of the labor market to raise children have lower lifetime earnings (Joshi 
1990), which in turn lowers their pension income.  Women experience difficulty 
reentering the labor force at a level similar to their pre-full-time motherhood spell due 
to the loss of skills from not working.
Although there has been a narrowing of the gender gap in pay between the 
hourly earning of women and men in recent decades, women still have lower earnings 
than men.  Despite gains in educational attainment and the increase in continuous 
employment among women over the life cycle, one important factor explaining the 
persistence of the gender wage gap is that women tend to have less continuous labor 
market experience than men with comparable characteristics, such as education 
(Goldin 1990; O'Neil and Polachek 1993; Sorensen 1991).  
These findings have potentially important implications for gender equality in 
the labor market and in the home.  Since most women are mothers and do the bulk of 
child rearing, any “price” of motherhood not shared equally by fathers has 
implications in terms of gender equality (Budig and England 2001).  In our society, 
earnings are an important source of power and influence.  On the family level, for 




Breadwinning has traditionally granted privileges to men within the family.  
Historically, the marriage contract defined husbands as breadwinners and wives as 
homemakers.  An “exchange of resources” then ensues, with men trading their 
income for domestic and caring labor provided by wives.  Because earning money is 
more highly valued than performing household labor, the act of earning money has 
translated into the right to control it, and how it is spent, and this control has extended 
to authority over other household decisions (Tichenor 2005).  Other advantages have 
been conferred to the traditional breadwinner, such as more leisure time and freedom 
from domestic responsibilities.  In essence, a man’s income has guaranteed him 
greater power and privilege within marriage (Bernard 1981; Ferree 1990).   
The equation of money with power has led to the argument that if women are 
to increase their power vis-à-vis their husbands and in society, they need to pursue 
higher education and gain independent wages on equal footing with men, so that they 
can improve their sense of personal competence and increase their autonomy and 
power in their marital relationship.  However, evidence suggests that the movement 
of large numbers of women into the labor force has not translated into a substantial 
shift in the balance of marital power in women’s favor—men have for the most part 
preserved their power and privilege in the home.  Some research on marital power 
suggests that women’s earnings have increased their control over money in the 
marital relationship (Blumstein and Schwartz 1991; Pahl 1989; Whyte 1990) and that 
some men have increased their domestic labor in response to their wives’ 
employment (Berk 1985; Coltrane 2000; Presser 1994).  But the bulk of the literature 
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on marital power suggests that women’s employment has not considerably altered the 
balance of power in marriage, as men still exercise greater decision-making control, 
and despite employment, women continue to perform the lion’s share of the 
household work and child care (Berk 1985; Bianchi, Milkie, Sayer, and Robinson 
2000; Bittman et al. 2003; Blumberg 1984; Blumstein and Schwartz 1991; Brines 
1994; Greenstein 2000; Hartmann 1981; Hochchild and Machung 1989; Pleck 1985; 
Zelizer 1989).  The balance of power appears to favor the husband even in marital 
relationships where the wife outearns her husband (Atkinson and Boles 1984; 
Bittman et al. 2003; Blair-Loy 2003; Brines 1994; Greenstein 2000; Hochchild and 
Machung 1989; McRae 1986; Tichenor 1999; Tichenor 2005; Zipp, Prohaska, and 
Bemiller 2004).
Why have higher earnings on the part of women not translated into greater 
marital power?  (Blumberg and Coleman 1989) argue that men’s and women’s money 
have different meanings attached to them, and gendered practices and ideology 
discount and diminish the value of a wife’s earnings in relation to her husband.  
Tichenor (1999, 2005) argues that gender ideology and expectations—specifically 
that men should be breadwinners and women should be homemakers—shape the 
marital interactions in ways that weaken the cultural link between money and power 
for women.  For example, in a sample of 30 couples (in 22 the wife outearns the 
husband), couples with breadwinning wives maintain and reproduce men’s 
dominance by redefining the provider role, minimizing their income or status 
differences, and having the wife defer to the husband in decision-making.  
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Doing gender
That men retain privileges, even when women are the major earners in their 
families, implies that gender plays a major role in shaping marital power.  Previous 
literature suggests that gender display, the enactment of gender appropriate behavior 
in every day interactions, is an important component of marital power.  According to 
the gender perspective, gender is socially constructed through a system of boundaries 
that define what is appropriate for each gender—self-concepts, beliefs, and 
expectations for behavior regulate symbolic displays of masculinity and feminity and 
behavior (Potuchek 1992; Risman and Schwartz 1989; Thompson 1993; Zvonkovic, 
Greaves, Schmiege, and Hall 1996).  Men are typically responsible for breadwinning 
and derive a self-concept of successful male achievement when they are able to 
provide adequately for their families.  Women are typically responsible for 
housework and family care and also derive a self-concept as a successful female 
when the house is clean, the children are well-cared for, and the dishes are done.  
Issues of work, paid and unpaid, are fundamental to the gender perspective 
model.  The creation of gender is the same as the creation of a division of labor 
between the sexes, and the production of gender relations is a major part of what 
families create in doing housework (Berk 1985; Fenstermaker, West, and Zimmerman 
1991; Hartmann 1981).  Housework produces home-based commodities but also 
serves to reproduce gender in that the division of labor is a key marker of what it 
means to be a woman as distinct from a man (Berk 1985; Fenstermaker, West, and 
Zimmerman 1991; Hartmann 1981).  Women’s doing of housework can be viewed as 
a symbol of love and a symbol of gender (Thorne 1982).  Yet, the gender perspective 
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suggests that the creation of gender is a process of negotiation and renegotiation 
throughout marriage, and this process can be active and contentious (Potuchek 1992).  
The renegotiation of gender in marriage as a contentious process is evident in the 
married-couples studied by Hochchild (1989) and Zvonkovic and her colleagues 
(1996).
Marriage provides a setting for the enactment of gender because the division 
of labor and doing housework or not doing it facilitates gender display.  Women do 
gender when they engage in housework, and men do gender when they do not.  
Culturally, men’s primary work is to provide economically for the family; thus if the 
wife earns more than her husband, the logic of gender display is that the couple will 
compensate by adopting gender-traditional behaviors elsewhere in the marriage 
(Brines 1994).  
While one would expect that women who outearn their husbands to be able to 
negotiate less housework, Brines (1994) and Greenstein (2000) both find that women 
who outearn their husbands also engage in more housework than their husbands, 
leading to what seems to be diminished marital power.  Brines (1994) found that 
husbands who are financially dependent on their wives due to prolonged joblessness 
do less housework as their dependency increases, and this finding is particularly 
notable among married men in low-income households.  The masculinity of these low 
earning men may already be threatened due to their failed economic provisioning.  
Brines (1994) argues that gender norms are violated when wives outearn their 
husbands and couples compensate by adopting gender-traditional behaviors elsewhere 
in the marriage.  Bittman et al. (2003) offer the term “gender deviance neutralization” 
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to explain the compensatory behavior of a high earning wife relative to her husband, 
when she takes on more than her share of housework to neutralize the failure of her 
husband to provide a majority of the couple’s income.  This notion is supported by 
Hoshschild’s (1989) study—she also found husbands who earned less than their 
wives not sharing in housework.  
Blair-Loy (2003) and Hochchild (1989) find a similar reluctance among 
husbands in middle- and high-income households to break out of the culturally 
prescribed male role of economic provider, and take on culturally prescribed female 
family oriented responsibilities, even when the wife had the higher paying job and the 
couple was contemplating a job exit for the wife.  Blair-Loy (2003) reveals in her 
qualitative study of 81 women executives in finance-related occupations that even 
when the wife outearns her husband, she quits her job if family emergencies arise, 
presumably because her husband would not.  It is possible that high earning wives 
may neutralize their gender deviance of outearning their husbands by exiting the labor 
force altogether.  
However, these husbands of the executive women in Blair-Loy’s (2003) study 
were high earners relative to other men, giving these high earning wives the choice of 
breadwinning or homemaking, without compromising their high standard of living.  
Research shows that high earning men are more likely to marry high earning women 
(Burtless 1996) and that since the late 1960s the correlation between husbands’ and 
wives’ earnings has grown, although it is still low compared to spouses’ correlation 
on education (Cancian and Reed 1999; Mare 1991).  “Positive assortative mating” is a 
common practice, that is, men and women tend to sort into marriage on the basis of 
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similar age, religion, race, class, physical characteristics, and education (Becker 1981; 
Lichter 1990; Oppenheimer 1988; Sweet and Bumpass 1987) and increasingly on 
earnings (Cancian and Reed 1999; South 1991).  
In 1993, 20 percent of wives in dual-earner couples had annual earnings that 
exceeded that of their husbands, but as husbands’ annual earnings increased, wives’ 
annual earnings were less likely to outpace their husbands’ (Winkler 1998).  When 
the husbands’ income was in the first quintile, 55 percent of wives outearned their 
husbands.  However, only 14 percent and 2 percent of wives outearned their husbands 
when the husbands’ income was in the third and fifth quintiles, respectively.  This is 
important because couples where both spouses have high earnings have a different set 
of options available to them (hire domestic help, rely on one income) than couples 
where both spouses are low earners, and the wives’ monetary contribution is vital to 
family well-being.
A wife’s higher earnings relative to her husband may augment her marital 
power and encourage more gender equality in the home, but it also violates gender 
norms and wives may compensate by exiting the labor force or reducing their work 
hours to realign themselves on equal or lower footing in relation to their husband, 
actively creating gender.  If money equals power in our society, and it is high earning 
wives—the very women who are poised to break glass ceilings—who exit the labor 
force, then what does this say about gender equality in the market place and in the 
home?  If women actively create gender within their marriage by exiting the labor 
force even when they outearn their husband, what does this imply about the strength 
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of appropriate gender display.  Could this be part of the stalling out of women’s 
market equality with men?
Stalled market equality
Several researchers of women’s employment and gender relations have noted 
that a cultural revolution has not occurred simultaneously with the women’s 
economic revolution (Blair-Loy 2003; Crittenden 2001; Gornick and Meyers 2003; 
Hays 1996; Hochchild and Machung 1989; Presser 1994; Sayer, Cohen, and Casper 
2004; Williams 2000)  Hochchild (1989) calls it a “stalled revolution” and argues that 
we need a new ideological revolution encouraging men to share in the housework, 
and encouraging employers to want to provide child care, job sharing, and parental 
leave so that women too can succeed in the market place and true gender equality can 
be achieved.  Hays (1996) contends that this solution would only shift the focus from 
intensive mothering to intensive parenting, and would be only a partial answer to the 
conflict between work and family, leaving both parents burdened, especially men 
who currently focus primarily on market work.  Several researchers (Crittenden 2001; 
Williams 2000) call for better and real options for those with care-giving 
responsibilities, including part-time hours that offer real avenues for advancement 
and promotions, since the current system marginalizes part-time workers and those 
who cannot perform as the ideal worker.  Blair-Loy (2003), on the other hand, 
believes that the change must come from within the system, initiated by women 
holding top managerial positions who can advocate effectively for change.  Sayer et 
al. (2004) explain that in order for women to gain market equality with men 
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conditions must change, such as less value being placed on maternal time with 
children, fewer women being solely charged with raising children, men helping more 
with the second shift, or policies facilitating care-giving and market work.  Despite 
the lively debate on the best solution to reduce the second shift for women and 
achieve gender equality, feminists agree that socially constructed, unbending gender 
roles are at the root of why market inequality persists.
Intensive mothering
What is at the root of unbending gender roles?  Some point to the high value 
of and emphasis placed on maternal time with children, or the current context of 
appropriate parenting called “intensive mothering.”  
Several researchers argue that the cultural perspective of what it means to be a 
“good” mother has changed over time, such that the contemporary mother is expected 
to pour endless time, energy, and money into the care and well-being of her children 
(Arendell 1991; Blair-Loy 2003; Crittenden 2001; Hays 1996; Williams 2000).  In the 
past, mothers surely were charged with child care, but also were saddled with time-
intensive housework, and often the care of children merely consisted of making sure 
daily needs were met (Hays 1996).  Child rearing values reflected a socially 
constructed cultural model for appropriate child care in tune with the social beliefs 
and customs of that time.  Over time a shift from producing quantity to producing 
quality children has occurred, and the socially constructed appropriate child rearing 
values now require a child-centered focus and necessitate time-intensive, emotionally 
absorbing, labor intensive care from the mother, as the mother’s love and nurturance 
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is considered crucial to child well-being (Hays 1996).  Child rearing today now 
includes “floor time,” face to face interactions, chauffeur time shuttling children from 
enrichment activity (i.e., soccer) to enrichment activity (i.e., music lessons), all 
centered on the needs and desires of one’s child (Lareau 2002; Lareau 2003; Williams 
2000).
Presently, the shift to producing quality children is evident and more 
pronounced among those with higher education levels.  As education rises, women 
spend more time with their children (Bianchi 2000).  Hays (1996) finds that 
professional women use more intensive time-consuming child- rearing techniques than 
less educated women.  Lareau (2003) finds a similar parenting style among middle 
class families.  They tend to talk and read more to their children, and give their 
children choices, using negotiation rather than demanding obedience to firm rules, 
which is a more time-consuming child rearing practice.  They also set a high premium 
on developing independence and critical thinking (Crittenden 2001).  However, Hays 
(1996) also finds at all socio- economic levels, that intensive mothering is the 
perceived norm guiding appropriate child rearing, and that it is understood to require 
a huge expenditure of time and effort.  
Blair-Loy (2003) describes intensive mothering in terms of a cultural 
schema—the family devotion schema—that assigns primary responsibility for home 
and family to women.  It promises women fulfillment, meaning, creativity, intimacy, 
and a secure livelihood in caring for husband and children and prescribes a model of 
motherhood that is intensive, emotionally absorbing, and centered on one’s precious 
child or children (Blair-Loy 2003; Hays 1996).  The family devotion schema 
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mandates stable marriage with different and complementary life callings for men and 
women.  
The corresponding life calling for men, according to Blair-Loy (2003), can be 
described by another cultural schema—the work devotion schema—one that is 
traditionally masculine, and demands that one give an immense time commitment and 
strong emotional allegiance to one’s firm or career.  Work in turn gives an important 
source of meaning, justification, purpose, and status.  Fathers, therefore, are culturally 
given permission to focus exclusively on their breadwinner capacity and specialize in 
market production without worrying about the care of the home and children, because 
their wives will be providing the backstage support for their career and tending to the 
demands of the family and household.
These two cultural schema’s (schema of work devotion and schema of family
devotion) require intense time commitments, are typically defined as a calling or 
vocation, and give purpose to life (Blair-Loy 2003).  Because schemas are 
constructed by societies over time, they are largely unquestioned and are based on 
shared cultural models.  The demands of the work devotion schema make it virtually 
impossible for those with significant care-giving responsibilities to reach the peak 
positions in an organization (Acker 1990; Acker 1992; Moen 1992; Moen and 
Wethington 1992).  Even among lower level workers, finding time to care for family 
and home and engage in market work for regular full-time hours can prove 
challenging.  For employed mothers, these two schemas collide making work and 
family conflict a poignant challenge that many women must resolve.  Mothers are 
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expected to “act like a man” in the job market, despite the simultaneous cultural 
expectation that they be fully involved in the lives of their children.
The same conflicting cultural expectations are not as apparent for employed 
fathers, but competition between the role of worker and father may become more 
salient as the small but growing proportion of men who desire to share the nurturing 
role with their wives attempt to do so (Kaufman and Uhlenberg 2000).  Research 
reveals that younger fathers are beginning to question whether they want to work long 
hours such that their parental role is effectively diminished to that of a “distant 
provider” (Casper and Bianchi 2002; Cohen 1993; Grimsley 2000; Jump and Haas 
1987; Kaufman and Uhlenberg 2000; Milkie, Bianchi, Mattingly, and Robinson 
2002) and that some fathers are acting on that desire.  Kaufman and Uhlenberg (2000) 
find a decrease of 9 hours worked per week outside the home among young fathers 
who have a more egalitarian perspective.  Since 1965, we have seen a notable 
increase in the time married fathers spend with their children, from an average of 2.8 
hours per day to 3.8 hours in 1998 (Bianchi 2000).
The literature on fatherhood provides two competing models of what it means 
to be a father (Goldscheider and Waite 1991; Hyde, Essex, and Horton 1993).   The 
“good provider” model, based in more traditional viewpoints of gender roles, calls for 
men to demonstrate their commitment to the family by being responsible workers and 
bringing home an acceptably high income.  Under this scenario, we expect that the 
division of labor would be more traditional, and mothers would be less inclined to be 
employed, or if they were employed they would view their job as secondary to their 
husbands’.  On the other hand, the “involved” father model (or “new fatherhood” 
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model) suggests that a more select group of men are becoming fathers, and they are 
more dedicated to being involved in the nurturing and rearing of their children.  These 
families tend to hold an egalitarian perspective on parenting and providing, with the 
husband and wife equally sharing responsibility for providing family income and the 
care of home and family.  Families that believe that both parents are equally 
responsible for market work and housework will exhibit a more equal division of 
labor and wives living in these families will be employed.
Despite a move toward more gender equality in the home, these fathers by no 
means represent the norm.  Motherhood is highly predictive of nonemployment and a 
reduction in time spent in market work, while the association between fatherhood and 
market work effort is reversed—fathers are more often employed and work longer 
hours than nonfathers (Kaufman and Uhlenberg 2000; Waite, Haggstrom, and 
Kanouse 1985).  
Even among egalitarian couples, the birth of a child tends to increase the 
division of labor around gender lines.  This may be due to the fact that the labor 
market tends to economically reward fathers better than mothers, with men receiving 
higher pay and more promotions to a greater extent than women of similar education 
levels and types of jobs.  Many studies find that labor markets are structured to 
exclude women from the high paying and high status jobs, and therefore their market 
labor is deemed less valuable than men’s (Berk 1985; Coltrane 1996; England and 
Farkas 1986; Ferree 1990).  Due to this external market force, families may have an 
incentive to choose fathers to specialize in the market and mothers to specialize in the 
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home.  This has contributed to the view that “good” fathers are successful economic 
providers.  
Up against the conflicting cultural expectations and real time pressures 
inherent in combining paid employment and motherhood, women seek strategies to 
balance their work and family responsibilities (Moen and Yu 2000; Spain and Bianchi 
1996).  One strategy many women have used is to delay marriage and child bearing, 
and limit the number of children they have (Moen and Yu 2000).  Other common 
strategies mothers use to balance their work and family responsibilities are to 
decrease their hours spent working to part-time and/or decrease their time spent doing 
housework.  Still other strategies include working in a job rather than pursuing a 
career (Becker and Moen 1999), curtailing career ambitions or putting them on hold, 
switching jobs or careers (Downs and Smith 2003), and leaving the labor force 
altogether.  
Previous research on mother’s labor force participation
Work related measures
Market value
Market-based human capital, or market value measures that represent job 
commitment, continuity and investment have been shown to be positively associated 
with continued maternal employment after a child’s birth (Blau, Ferber, and Winkler 
1998; Goldin 1990).  For example, women with higher levels of education, higher 
number of hours worked pre-birth, higher hourly wages, and longer job tenure are 
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more likely to return to work after a child’s birth (Glass and Riley 1998; Leibowitz, 
Klerman, and Waite 1992b; Smith, Downs, and O'Connell 2001).  Several researchers 
draw upon neoclassical economic theory to explain the relationship between market 
value and labor force transitions (Desai and Waite 1991; Hofferth 1996; Klerman and 
Leibowitz 1999; Leibowitz, Klerman, and Waite 1992a; Leibowitz, Klerman, and 
Waite 1992b).   Increased market value essentially increases wages, which deter job 
exits because the value of a mother’s market time (her wage) is higher than her 
nonmarket time (her reservation wage); similarly, women with high market value will 
be more likely to enter the labor force (Becker 1991; Blau, Ferber, and Winkler 
1998).   Researchers have argued that as women make greater investments in their 
careers and demonstrate job commitment in a similar fashion as men, they will be 
compensated monetarily in a similar way as men, and the wage gap will disappear 
(Goldin 1990).  The thinking follows that women who have higher levels of market 
value will respond in the same way that men do, that is they will maintain their 
employment at the same level regardless of their concomitant family responsibilities.
Gaining a higher education represents a career investment and enables the 
acquisition of a better paying job, with benefits and rewarding work.  Research shows 
that mothers with higher education levels remain employed longer into their 
pregnancy and return to work more quickly after their first birth (Desai and Waite 
1991; Leibowitz, Klerman, and Waite 1992b; Smith, Downs, and O'Connell 2001).  
However, Leibowitcz, Klerman, and Waite (1992a) find that women with less than a 
high school degree are less likely to return to work than high school graduates, but 
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women with some college do not differ significantly from women with high school 
degrees.
Education also serves to provide alternative job opportunities, enabling one to 
switch jobs and advance when no advancement opportunities occur within the current 
employment structure.  Mothers with higher education levels can use their education 
to get another job after they experience a labor force interruption, and higher levels of 
education can buffer the negative effect of less continuous employment (Felmlee 
1984).  Femlee (1984) finds that education has a significant and positive relationship 
to rates of leaving employment. 
Wages represent compensation for paid work and reward for earlier career 
investments.  The effect of a woman’s wages are consistent across the research—
mothers with higher wages are more committed to the labor force; they return to work 
from maternity leave more quickly after a birth, are less likely to exit the labor force, 
and enter the labor force more quickly after job interruptions (Desai and Waite 1991; 
Felmlee 1984; Felmlee 1993; Leibowitz, Klerman, and Waite 1992a; Leibowitz, 
Klerman, and Waite 1992b).  
Hours spent in market work tends to indicate job commitment, and part-time 
work generally is part of the secondary labor market, associated with low-status, low-
pay, limited benefits, and high turnover, although not all part-time jobs are considered 
dead-end, bad jobs (Tilly 1996; Waldfogel 1997a).   Research on job exits shows that 
the higher the number of hours worked, the lower the likelihood of a job exit (Glass 
1988).  
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Job continuity has been shown to deter job exits.  Mothers who remain 
employed longer into their pregnancy take less time off for maternity leave (Klerman 
and Leibowitz 1999; Smith, Downs, and O'Connell 2001) and mothers who have 
more continuous work experience are less likely to exit the labor force (Blau 1976; 
Blau, Ferber, and Winkler 1998; Moen and Smith 1986; Mott and Shapiro 1982). 
Job characteristics
Job characteristics, or measures of the work environment, can influence a 
mother’s labor force participation in several ways.  First, jobs that are rewarding—
both financially and in nonpecuniary ways, such that they offer prestige, high status, 
and challenging work—may have higher labor force penalties for labor force 
withdrawal and thus deter women’s labor force exits (Desai and Waite 1991).  
Managers and professionals often are required to devote a high time investment in 
work but receive high wages, high status, and challenging work as a reward (Blair-
Loy 2003).   Women with higher occupational prestige are less likely to experience a 
labor force exit, while women with high job dissatisfaction were more likely to exit 
the labor force and to change employers (Glass 1988).  Surprisingly, Desai and Waite 
(1991) do not find any effect of the sex composition of an occupation on women’s 
labor force participation during pregnancy or after the first birth (predominantly 
female occupation, part-year workers, part-time workers, or many mothers in the 
occupation), all theoretically predicted to draw women into the occupation because of 
their believed compatibility with family responsibilities.
Second, jobs that are flexible and convenient to combine with child rearing 
may be attractive to mothers because they reduce the cost of employment and 
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facilitate work-family balance, something that so many mothers struggle to achieve.  
Self-employment or public sector jobs seem to provide greater flexibility than private 
sector jobs in that they generally do not require over-time hours (Moen and Yu 2000) .  
Holding these jobs may proxy for other job flexibility such as being able to negotiate 
part-time options.  To date, I have not seen any studies that include the worker’s 
sector as a covariate in determining job exits.
Finally, jobs that provide benefits often are considered “good jobs” and have 
high retention rates (Tilly 1996).  These benefits may include health insurance, 
pensions, flexible spending accounts, flex-time, part-time options, the ability to work 
at home, child care at work, and liberal unpaid leave policies.  Hofferth (1996) found 
that among mothers who worked during pregnancy, having the option for part-time 
work and liberal unpaid leave policies increase the chance of a mother returning to 
work after the birth of a child.  Mothers who had access to a flexible spending 
account and liberal unpaid leave returned to work full-time, while mothers who had 
part-time work options available and child care at the work site returned to work part-
time.  Likewise, Glass and Riley (1998) find that job flexibility, the ability to work 
part-time, longer maternity leaves, the ability to avoid mandatory overtime, and 
supportive supervisor and co-workers all increased job retention after childbirth.  
Receiving health benefits through the current job is a likely proxy for other family 




The number of children one has and the presence of young children mark a 
time in a mother’s life that is family intensive and often conflicts with paid work 
outside the home.  According to both the life course perspective and neoclassical 
economic theory, a mother’s labor force participation will decrease at times when her 
family responsibilities are high.  Total family child care costs are greater when 
preschoolers are present in the family, and increase with additional children.  While a 
mother’s earnings may exceed the cost of nonfamily child care for one child, the costs 
of child care for two or three children may well push the family to consider having 
one parent stay home with the children.  Research shows that the effect of the number 
of children and age of youngest child on women’s labor force exits is mixed, with 
some studies finding that greater family responsibility increases labor force exits 
(Baum 2002; Felmlee 1995; Han and Waldfogel 2001; Hayghe and Bianchi 1994), 
and others finding no significant relationship or mixed results (Drobnic, Blossfeld, 
and Rohwer 1999; Hofferth 1996).  
Family economics
The family economic situation is theoretically and empirically an important 
factor in mother’s labor force participation.  Historically, economic need has been a 
driving force (McLaughlin 1982; Mott and Shaw 1986; O'Connell 1990; Rosenfeld 
1996), with Black mothers and unmarried mothers returning to work the fastest after 
the birth of the first child (O'Connell 1990), likely because these mothers depend on 
their own earnings to support their families.  Moen and Smith (1986) find that some 
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mothers prefer not to work but do so because of economic need.  More recent 
maternity leave data no longer find that economic need is driving quick returns to the 
labor market; instead work-related variables, such as working late into a pregnancy 
and the use of maternity leave, are highly predictive of returning to the labor force 
after the birth of a first child (Smith, Downs, and O'Connell 2001).  Similarly, 
Hofferth (1996) finds that mothers in families that were near poor returned to work 
less quickly than mothers in higher-income families.  
Neoclassical economic theory assumes that the shadow-value of time (or the 
value of a mother’s nonmarket time) would be higher for women with greater 
alternative sources of income, either from a husband, others, or from nonlabor 
income.  Therefore, one would expect that a mother’s labor supply would decrease as 
other family income increases (family income not including the mother’s earnings).  
Research on mother’s labor supply support this premise, and find a positive 
relationship between other family income and mother’s labor force exits and a
negative relationship between other family income and mother’s labor force entrances 
(Desai and Waite 1991; Felmlee 1984; Felmlee 1993; Hofferth 1996; Leibowitz, 
Klerman, and Waite 1992a; Leibowitz, Klerman, and Waite 1992b).
The effect of child care costs on mothers employment has been studied 
extensively.  According to economic theory, child care costs act as a tax on a mothers 
earnings, thus lowering the mother’s effective wage in the labor market and having a 
negative impact on her propensity to participate in the labor force (Anderson and 
Levine 2000; Baum 2002; Blau and Robbins 1989; Connelly 1992; Han and 
Waldfogel 2001; Hofferth and Wissoker 1992).  Additionally, research on child care 
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suggests that mothers may feel an increased attachment to their new infants and value 
mother care over other forms of child care, but as a child ages prefer organized child 
care arrangements for socialization, cognitive development, and school readiness 
(Smith 2002; Sonenstein 1991).    The result from several studies is clear and 
consistent—higher child care costs decrease the probability that a mother will 
participate in the labor force.  Han and Waldfogel (2001) find that these effects are 
larger for single mothers than for married mothers.
Demographic controls
Several control variables have been included in models predicting labor force 
transitions.  Age has been shown to decrease the likelihood of a job exit (Smith, 
Downs, and O'Connell 2001).  Minority mothers tend to have a higher propensity to 
participate in the labor force (Vandenheuval 1997; Waite and Nielsen 2001) and 
living in a metro area increases the likelihood of a labor force transition.  Moving has 
a negative effect on married women’s labor force participation (Bielby and Bielby 
1992; Boyle, Cooke, Halfacree, and Smith 2001).
Summary
This chapter examined the trends in the labor force participation of mothers 
and discussed labor force patterns around the time of childbirth.  Different types of 
married couple families with children were discussed, and issues of marital power 
were reviewed.  Other cultural currents, such as intensive mothering, delayed 
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childbearing, the social construction of gender, were considered along with their 
potential influence on mothers’ labor force participation. Finally, the chapter 
reviewed the previous literature on the determinants of labor force participation.  The 
following chapter reviews the theoretical framework that guides the interpretation of 
the results.
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
In this dissertation, I aim to better understand what factors contribute to a 
married mother’s decision to change her labor force status—either to exit the labor 
force or to enter it.  This chapter first develops the theoretical framework guiding the 
analysis based on three theoretical streams, and then discusses how a variety of 
determinants of labor force participation would be interpreted under the different 
theoretical streams.
Theoretical Framework
In this dissertation, I investigate the extent to which work and family related 
variables and demographic controls are predictors of labor force transitions for 
married mothers.  I draw on three theoretical streams: neoclassical economics, the life 
course perspective, and the social construction of gender and consider how each of 
these three perspectives may assist in the interpretation of labor force decision-
making.  I do not see these three perspectives as competing theories and I do not test 
them against one other.  Rather, I draw upon all three to broaden the discussion and 
understanding of the processes at hand, as all three have worthy contributions to 
understanding labor force transitions of married mothers.  
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Neoclassical economics3
Neoclassical economic theory, or New Home Economics, focuses on the 
division of labor within the family and argues that the 1950’s style “traditional 
family” is the ideal family form (Becker 1965; Becker 1981; Becker 1991; Mincer 
1962).  The basic assumption underlying neoclassical models is that the family is a 
unit where adults make informed and rational decisions to maximize the utility and 
well-being of the family (Becker 1965; Becker 1991; Blau, Ferber, and Winkler 
1998).  In order to be a utility maximizing unit, a traditional division of labor where 
women specialize in housework and child care and men specialize in market work is 
necessary because there are considerable efficiency gains.  Labor specialization is a 
central component in the family’s cost-benefit calculation, as individuals invest more 
time and energy in those activities at which they are most efficient.  
The notion of specialization and exchange is key to maximizing utility and 
efficiency of the family.  One member specializes in market production enabling the 
family to purchase market goods and the other specializes in home production 
enabling the family to enjoy home-produced goods.  They then exchange or pool the 
fruits of their labor to achieve the utility-maximizing household.  For specialization to 
work, it is necessary that one individual has a comparative advantage in market or 
home production, one whose value of time spent engaged in home work is greater 
than the value of their time engaged in market work.  
The concept behind specialization is that all actors are presumably rational 
utility maximizers, with each spouse specializing in the work that they do best in 
3 The following discussion of neoclassical economic theory as applied to analysis of the family draws 
heavily from Blau, Ferber, and Winkler (1998).
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order to gain the largest income and the greatest amount of satisfaction (Ferber 2003).  
Ferber (2003) offers a simple example to illustrate this point.  “Assume that the man 
can earn $20 an hour or produce a dinner during the same period of time, while the 
woman can produce a better dinner, or earn $15; it is obvious that he should work in 
the market, and the women should stay home and cook dinner.  Or, assume that both 
could earn $15 an hour, but the woman would cook a better dinner; the rational 
decision is that she should stay at home” (page 10-11).4  When applied to the actual 
work and family decision-making process, the actual time allocation chosen by each 
individual will depend on their preferences for market and home-produced goods.  
It is generally the case that men have a comparative advantage in market work 
and women have a comparative advantage in home production.  Neoclassical theorists 
argue that women are more efficient at and better suited for housework and develop 
“tastes” or “preferences” for it, since they are biologically more involved in the 
bearing and rearing of children.  Men on the other hand, are more efficient at market 
work because they spend more time doing it, and thus continue to earn more than 
women.  Neoclassical economists argue that women accumulate less human capital 
because they have less continuous lifetime work experience than men; they seek 
“family-friendly” jobs that are easier to combine with parenting, at lower pay rates; 
and they are less productive at work since they have less energy for it due to their 
exhausting housework and child care demands (Budig and England 2001; Ferber 
2003).
4 Neoclassical economic theorists have not explicitly discussed rational decision-making when the 
gender roles are reversed.  I discuss this further in the next section.
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Blau, Ferber, and Winkler (1998) posit that men’s comparative advantage in 
market work can be true for several reasons—because in general girls and boys are 
raised with different expectations and receive different education and training; market 
discrimination against women has lowered their market earnings; and the traditional 
division of labor generates skills in the sphere in which one specializes, and thus 
women have become better at home production because they specialize in it and men 
have become better at market work because they specialize in that.
The neoclassical model can also be used to explain how individuals decide 
whether or not to participate in the labor force.  A mother’s decision to work or not is 
made by comparing the value of her time in the market (her wage, w) to the value she 
places on her time spent at home caring for children and doing housework, or her 
reservation wage (w*), given a fixed budget constraint.  If w is greater than w*, she 
participates in the labor market; if w is less than w*, she does not (she remains out or 
exits).  The value of her market time consists of her wage rate net of child care 
expenses, and depends on her market value, including her education level, job skills, 
seniority, and cumulative work experience (Desai and Waite 1991; Hofferth and 
Collins 2000; Hofferth 1996; Leibowitz, Klerman, and Waite 1992b).  The value of 
her nonmarket time, or reservation wage, is influenced by tastes and preferences (as is 
the value of market time) and also by the level of demands on the nonmarket time.  
For example, the presence of very young children or other circumstances requiring 
intense attention will increase her reservation wage (Blau, Ferber, and Winkler 1998; 
Hofferth 1996; Leibowitz, Klerman, and Waite 1992b).  The availability of income 
from other sources (husband or savings) also influences the value placed on her 
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nonmarket time, reducing the opportunity cost of her foregone wages and leading to 
lower labor force participation (Blau, Ferber, and Winkler 1998; Hofferth and Collins 
2000; Leibowitz, Klerman, and Waite 1992b).
The theory implies that factors that increase the value of a mother’s market 
time, or her wages, tend to increase the probability that she will participate in the 
labor force (Blau, Ferber, and Winkler 1998).  Therefore, factors that increase her 
market value such as higher education levels, full-time work, continuous work 
experience, and longer job tenure all are theoretically (and empirically) positively 
associated with continuous labor force participation.  Mothers with high market value 
will remain in or enter the labor force while mothers with low market value will exit 
or remain out.  The value placed on market work should also ideally take into account 
job characteristics, with those jobs that are more challenging, offer rewarding work, 
provide a pleasant environment, and offer benefits such as health insurance increasing 
the probability of labor force participation (Blau, Ferber, and Winkler 1998).
On the other hand, factors that increase the value of nonmarket time will 
lower the probability that she will participate in the labor force (Blau, Ferber, and 
Winkler 1998).  The presence of young children, a high number of children, twins, 
and a preference for maternal care for children all are in theory negatively associated 
with labor force participation.  Other family income, which in effect decreases the 
opportunity costs of not working, and thus increases the value of nonmarket time, will 
be negatively associated with labor force participation.  High child care costs will 
effectively lower a mother’s wage and increase the value of nonmarket time, and thus 
will be negatively associated with labor force participation (Anderson and Levine 
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2000; Baum 2002; Connelly 1992; Han and Waldfogel 2001; Hofferth and Wissoker 
1992).
Life course perspective
For many, the neoclassical model does not give sufficient attention to 
developmental pathways, and the social context within which work and family 
decisions are made.  A life course, role context theoretical approach focuses not on 
what each individual gets out of market and nonmarket work and the best ways to 
maximize household efficiency, but rather on the context of lives.  Life stage, the 
timing of events, and each spouse’s circumstances influence the family decision-
making process; thus, considering their respective roles illuminates the intricacies of 
the work/family interface (Moen and Yu 2000).  A life course perspective provides a 
framework that guides research exploring the dynamics of multiple, interdependent 
pathways (Elder 1994).  This is very helpful when considering a couple’s decision for 
the wife to exit or enter the labor force because the labor force participation of one 
spouse potentially has ramifications on the other spouse’s consumption, leisure, 
housework demands, and pressure to be the sole or primary breadwinner.  
Two aspects of the life course perspective can potentially enhance our 
understanding of the dynamics involved in labor force decision-making.  The first is 
the concept of adaptive strategies, which is based on the notion that actors have 
interdependent lives, and they make choices based on their interactions with their 
family, friends, and coworkers over the life span (Elder 1994; Moen and Yu 2000).  
Adaptive strategies are the ways couples cope with the pressure of simultaneously 
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building families and careers, and most often reflect the normative, culturally 
prescribed ways of behaving (Moen and Yu 2000).    Moen and Yu (2000) emphasize 
how married women’s “choices” are constrained by their husbands’ circumstances.  
Married women tend to adapt their labor force behavior as a couple work-family 
balance strategy in response to their husband’s work situation.  For example, a mother 
may cut back her work hours or even quit her job in response to her husband’s long
work hours because she does not want to have her children in child care for long 
hours each day.
The timing of life events is the second concept of the life course perspective 
that is potentially useful in explaining married mother’s labor force behavior.  The 
timing of lives is grounded on the idea that certain life events are age-based, and 
reflect social expectations and beliefs based on age appropriate behavior (Elder 
1994).  Thus, life transitions like marriage or the birth of the first child can be 
relatively early or late according to demographic patterns and age norms.  The timing 
of these family building life events can in turn, influence the timing of subsequent 
labor force transitions, particularly for women, who are typically responsible for 
housework and child care (Becker and Moen 1999; Coltrane and Ishii-Kuntz 1992).  
By analyzing the timing of events, analysts can be sensitive to the consequences of 
early or late transitions for later experiences and events.  Central to the life course 
perspective is that developmental processes and outcomes are shaped by the social 
trajectories that people follow, and early choices and pursuits set the stage for those 
trajectories.  Social timing also involves the scheduling of multiple trajectories, such 
as family and career building, and their synchrony or asynchrony.
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The timing of a woman’s first birth influences the level of education she 
attains (Hofferth, Reid, and Mott 2001), and in turn the career paths that are available 
to her (Coombs and Freedman 1970; Rindfuss and St. John 1983).  The life course 
perspective provides a rationale for differential impacts on labor force participation 
depending on the age at first birth due to its attention to the timing of events and their 
consequences (Elder 1998).  In short, the life course perspective argues that the 
timing of childbearing has an effect on the extent to which the birth of a child shapes 
a woman’s life chances.  Researchers argue that mothers who have accumulated 
sufficient work experience prior to childbearing may suffer a smaller price for their 
time away from paid work because they have built the foundation of their careers, and 
consequently this work experience enables them “time off” without suffering 
downward mobility in the future (Blackburn, Bloom, and Neumark 1993; Taniguchi 
1999).   Thus, under the life course perspective, late childbearing would be associated 
with a labor force exit, which differs from the expected relationship if using a 
neoclassical economic theory lens.
The life course perspective offers alternative interpretations from neoclassical 
economic theory regarding the meaning of husband’s work hours and women’s age at 
first birth.  These interpretations are considered specifically in relation to married 
mothers’ labor force exits or entrances in the section below entitled “Discussion of 
determinants.”
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Social construction of gender
The gender perspective offers yet another alternative interpretation of what 
influences married mothers’ labor force exits.  While neoclassical economic theory 
argues that the husband is the altruistic head of the household and the perspective 
does not discuss in depth issues of marital power, central to the gender perspective is 
power and the maintenance of the gendered and unequal status quo within the home 
and in society.  
The gender perspective views gender as something that is produced in 
everyday activities and interactions, with gender being a fundamental dimension of 
stratification within the family and society at large (Berk 1985; Ferree 1990; West 
and Zimmerman 1987).  Rather than describing gender and the supposed differences 
between the sexes as biologically based, the gender perspective contends that through 
interactions with others, gender is negotiated and created in a situated and culturally 
appropriate context that reinforces the socially perceived differences between the 
sexes, creating what is generally viewed and accepted as appropriate “maleness” and 
“femaleness” (Osmond and Thorne 1993).  Thus, gender is conceptualized as “the 
social construction and exaggeration of difference between women and men; and the 
use of these distinctions to legitimize and perpetuate power relations between women 
and men” (Osmond and Thorne 1993:593).  The issue of dominance is central to the 
gender perspective, as the construction of difference, when difference doesn’t really 
exit, requires power (Ferree 1990).
Based in symbolic interaction theory, the gender perspective focuses on how 
actors strive to create meaning out of their behaviors and the behaviors of others, 
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using symbols that denote shared meanings to define and interpret their lives 
(Zvonkovic, Greaves, Schmiege, and Hall 1996).   Through this active process of 
deriving meaning from interaction, the behaviors of men and women are seen as 
opposites with unequal social value (Ferree 1990).
The gender perspective argues that gender is not simply something one “is” 
but rather, is something one does in interaction with others (Fenstermaker, West, and 
Zimmerman 1991).  Actively producing gender is an accomplishment; “the activity of 
managing situated conduct in light of normative conceptions, attitudes and activities 
appropriate for one’s sex category” in the family, workplace, and society at large 
(West and Zimmerman 1987).  The intersection of gender inequality at work and at 
home is a central tenant of the gender perspective, since interactions in the home 
reinforce and perpetuate the culturally accepted gender categories at work and vice 
versa (Fenstermaker, West, and Zimmerman 1991).  Generally speaking, female 
occupations are often extensions of gender appropriate housework.
The gender perspective has been used to explain the division of household 
work among couples (Bittman et al. 2003; Brines 1994; Coltrane 2000).  According 
to the gender perspective, women do gender when they engage in housework, and 
men do gender when they do not.  Culturally, men’s primary work is to provide 
economically for the family, while women’s primary work is to maintain the home, 
even if she also engages in market work.  Brines (1994) finds that men who are 
economically dependent on their wives do less housework as their dependency 
increases, particularly among low-income households, where the husband’s 
masculinity may be threatened due to their low earning capacity.  She argues that 
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gender norms are violated when wives outearn their husbands, and therefore one or 
both members of the couple decide to free men from domestic work in order to avoid 
further gender deviance.  If the wife earns more than her husband, the logic of gender 
display is that the couple will compensate by adopting gender-traditional behaviors 
elsewhere in the marriage (Brines 1994).  Thus, low-earning husbands relative to their 
wives would not be expected to help with housework.  Bittman et al. (2003) offer the 
term “gender deviance neutralization” to explain the compensatory behavior of a high 
earning wife relative to her husband, when she takes on more housework to neutralize 
the failure of her husband to provide a majority of the couple’s income.   
In general, the gender perspective and “doing of gender” has been used to 
explain why wives engage in more housework than husbands.  If a wife displays her 
gender by doing more of the domestic work to show she is female, this gender display 
intensifies her work and family conflict to a greater extent than her husband, and thus 
she would be more compelled to exit the labor force to accommodate her child 
rearing and family responsibilities.  However, if one assumes that the act of a labor 
force exit in itself is also a compensatory behavior that can be used to neutralize the 
gender deviance of a wife outearning her husband, the gender perspective can be 
applied to the study of mothers’ labor force transitions.  The theory as extended to 
labor force participation predicts that if the wife earns more than her husband, she 
would exit the labor force (or enter at part-time hours) to neutralize the gender 
deviance of her high earnings relative to her husband.  Although I am not able to 
ascertain whether a labor force exit is due to pressures to “do gender,” the gender 
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perspective offers an alternative interpretation of the role of a wife’s relative earnings 
in labor force transitions.
Although neoclassical economic theorists have not explicitly discussed 
rational decision-making and efficient family functioning when gender roles are 
reversed in married couple families (i.e., the wife has the comparative advantage in 
market work), one can assume that it would say that the wife would do more 
breadwinning.  Recall the discussion on page 49 where different scenarios of wife and 
husband earning power and cooking skills were explored.  An extension of those 
examples would lead us to assume that if the wife could earn $20 an hour, and the 
husband $15 an hour, and they are equally competent at cooking dinner, or the 
husband would cook a better dinner, the husband should stay home.  But missing 
from this discussion is the case where the wife could earn $20 an hour and the 
husband $15, but the wife could cook a better dinner.  In this case, the family would 
have to decide whether the better dinner was worth more or less than $5.  
Using a gender perspective in my examination of married mother’s labor force 
participation allows for an alternate interpretation of the relationship between the 
wife’s relative earnings and labor force exits.
Discussion of determinants 
The three theories discussed above provide multiple interpretations of how 
several measures might be correlated with a married mother’s labor force 
participation, some leading to the same hypothesized relationship with labor force 
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participation, others leading to differing relationships.  These theoretical 
interpretations and relationships are discussed below.
Work related measures
Market value (realized or potential) 
Neoclassical economic theory implies that factors that increase the value of a 
mother’s market time, or her wages, tend to increase the probability that she will 
participate in the labor force.  Therefore, factors that increase her market value such 
as higher education levels, full-time work, and continuous work experience are 
theoretically positively associated with continuous labor force participation.  
Consistent with economic theory, I expect that mothers with high market value will 
remain in or enter the labor force while mothers with low market value will exit or 
remain out.
Job characteristics
According to neoclassical economic theory, jobs that are family friendly and 
flexible would increase the value placed on market work and decrease the reservation 
wage.  Having a managerial or professional job—a proxy for a challenging job that 
offers rewarding work and prestige—would decrease the chances for a labor force 
exit.  Likewise, working for the government or being self employed—a proxy for 
more flexibility—would also decrease the chance of a labor force exit.  Finally, 
receiving health insurance through your current employer—a proxy for a good job 




Within a neoclassical economic model, other family income, not including the 
wife’s earnings, decreases the opportunity costs of not working.  High levels of other 
family income in essence give more “choice” to women, because with higher levels 
of other family income, most of which is likely generated through their husband’s 
earnings, they can maintain a sufficiently high standard of living irrespective of their 
own labor force activity.  Lower levels of other family income constrain women’s 
choice and are expected to increase the value of her market time, because her 
earnings are necessary to keep the family solvent.  Thus I expect a negative 
relationship between other family income and labor force participation.
Neoclassical economic theory perceives child care costs as a tax on a mother’s 
wage, effectively lowering her wage and increasing the value of her nonmarket time.  
I expect that higher child care costs will be negatively associated with labor force 
participation. 
Presence of children
Neoclassical economic theory predicts that young children and large numbers 
of children increase a mother’s reservation wage and increase the value of her 
nonmarket time, and thus lower the probability of her labor force participation.  The 
life course perspective argues that mother’s adapt their behavior in line with socially 
prescribed gender roles dependent on the life stage—both in terms of family and 
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career building.  Hence, mothers intensely involved with family building, i.e., those 
with very young children and more children, will feel the need to adapt work-family 
strategies and exit the labor force or remain out more so than mothers with older and 
fewer children.  The relationship between the presence of children and labor force 
participation is the same regardless of which theory one uses to interpret the results.
Timing of life events—Age at first birth
According to neoclassical economic theory, early child bearing translates into 
less time to devote to further education and career building and to develop the ties to 
the labor market that provide monetary and nonpecuniary rewards from market work.   
As such, early family building pulls mothers away from a market orientation, 
increases her reservation wage and the value of nonmarket time, and is theorized to 
be negatively associated with labor force participation.  The costs of working—child 
care, transportation, and other work-related costs—would be sufficiently higher than 
her wages and serve to encourage a labor force exit.
On the other hand, late child bearing translates into more time to invest in 
education and career building, a reduction in family size and thus family 
commitment, stronger ties to the labor force, greater market value, and higher 
economic rewards from the labor market.  Economic theory argues that stronger ties 
to the labor force and higher wages effectively reduce the value of her nonmarket 
time.  Women with high earnings are better equipped to buffer the opportunity cost of 
raising children, and can purchase child care which enables them to remain in the 
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labor force throughout childbearing years.  A neoclassical economic theorist would 
expect late childbearing to be positively associated with labor force participation.   
To round out the discussion on age at first birth, I draw on the life course 
perspective.  The life course perspective concurs with neoclassical economic theory 
that delayed childbearing enables women to attain higher levels of education and 
invest in one’s market value.  However, the life course perspective adds the important 
dimension that it is the timing of family building that encourages or discourages 
continued education and the accumulation of market value, which allows for 
alternative explanations of how early or late family building may effect subsequent 
labor force participation.
For example, it is possible that early childbearers will remain in the labor 
force because their early family building has put them on a path of lower earnings and 
thus the need for the mother’s wage is essential to keep the family out of poverty.  
Under this interpretation, early family building is hypothesized to be positively 
associated with labor force participation.
Furthermore, it is also theoretically possible that women who postpone 
childbearing would exit the labor force if one looks to the life course perspective for 
interpretation.  Late child bearers tend to have high market value because they have 
been on a life course pathway that encourages higher education and continuous 
employment (Coltrane and Ishii-Kuntz 1992).  They are likely to be well established 
professionally and more secure economically (Hofferth 1984).  Researchers argue 
that women who delay childbearing until a later age appear to experience labor force 
transitions differently than those who begin childbearing at early ages (Coltrane 1990; 
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Coltrane and Ishii-Kuntz 1992).  Although career interruptions tend to have a 
negative effect on wage attainment, and thus would deter labor force exits, Tanigushi 
(1999) contends that the disruptive effect varies by the timing of the interruption.  
The life course perspective provides a rationale for differential impacts on labor force 
participation depending on the age at first birth due to its attention to the timing of 
events and their consequences (Elder 1998).  Researchers argue that mothers who 
have accumulated sufficient work experience prior to childbearing may suffer a 
smaller price for their time away from paid work because they have built the 
foundation of their careers, and consequently this work experience enables them 
“time off” without suffering downward mobility in the future (Blackburn, Bloom, and 
Neumark 1993; Taniguchi 1999).  In short, late child bearers may believe that they 
will be able to reenter the labor force relatively easily because they have amassed 
human capital and market value.  Under this interpretation, late child bearing is 
expected to be negatively associated with labor force participation.
The life course perspective also allows for the interpretation that the process 
of delayed child bearing somehow makes these mothers want to care for their 
child(ren) full time.  If delayed child bearing is due to the difficulty in finding an 
appropriate mate or to difficulties in getting pregnant and the accumulation of higher 
education and work experience is filling the void, then delayed childbearing would be 
negatively associated with labor force participation.  I am not able to test this theory, 
as my data set does not include any measures of the reason for delaying child bearing 
or the difficulties in getting pregnant.  
65
Husband’s work hours
Under a life course perspective, couples have interdependent lives and take on 
adaptive strategies to balance the couple’s work and family time.  If the husband’s job 
requires long work hours, the wife’s “choices” are constrained by his work situation.  
The life course perspective theorizes that mothers married to men who work long 
hours would adapt their work schedules either by exiting the labor force (or reducing 
work hours) if the family is not willing to put their child(ren) in day care for long 
hours.  Similarly, mothers would be reluctant to enter the labor force if married to 
men who work overtime hours.  Likewise, for nonemployed mothers, being married 
to a husband who is not employed would constrain her choice.  Under the life 
perspective, she would adapt her labor force behavior and enter the labor force.
The gender perspective offers the interpretation of a husband’s long work 
hours as a display of his gender—central to being masculine in our society is being a 
breadwinner, and working long hours is one way to accomplish maleness in the home 
and the workplace.  This display of gender among husbands by working long hours 
constrains wives to also display gender through a labor force exit or continued 
nonemployment.
Finally, neoclassical economic theory would interpret a husband’s long work 
hours as part and parcel of men’s comparative advantage in market work.  Good-
paying jobs require long work hours and overtime, and as men are more likely to hold 
the primary job, long work hours come along with that turf.  Applied to married 
mothers’ labor force transitions, having a husband who works long hours would 
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increase the value of her nonmarket time, decrease the value of her market time, and 
she would exit the labor force or remain out.   
The three theories offer alternative interpretations of why mothers married to 
men who work long hours would be more inclined to exit the labor force, and less 
inclined to enter it, than mothers married to men who work fewer hours per week.  
But all three theories agree in their theorized relationship to mothers’ labor force 
participation—a husband’s long work hours are hypothesized to be negatively 
associated with labor force participation.
Gender egalitarianism between spouses
How are wife’s relative earnings theoretically associated with labor force 
exits?  Economic theory argues that the highest earner has the comparative market 
advantage, thus to maximize household efficiency the higher earner would remain 
employed, specializing in market work, and the lower earner would specialize in 
household work.  In general, neoclassical economic theory has been called upon to 
explain women’s lower labor force participation, married women’s labor force exits, 
and women’s lower earnings—all in the context of a wife’s lower earnings power 
relative to her husband.  When theorizing about the relationship of a wife’s relative 
earnings when she outearns her husband, neoclassical economic theory has been 
relatively silent.  Taken at face value, neoclassical economic theory suggests that 
families wishing to maximize their household efficiency would follow the same rules 
regardless of who has the comparative advantage in market work.  Thus, in a gender-
neutral world, mothers who outearn their husbands would not exit the labor force.
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The gender perspective offers an alternative interpretation, as gender theory 
contends that gender and the active creation of gender is very much part of everyday 
life.  Men display gender by engaging in market work and being the breadwinner.  If 
his gender display is compromised or violated by a higher earning wife, the gender 
perspective makes the case that the couple will compensate by engaging in ways to 
neutralize the gender deviance of his failure to provide a majority of the couple’s 
income.  A labor force exit on the part of the wife is one such compensation, albeit a 
rather dramatic one.  This compensatory behavior would reinforce and reproduce 
appropriate gender display, especially when one or both of the spouses believe in a 
traditional division of labor along gender lines.  Although I cannot control for each 
spouse’s gender ideology, it is likely that this comes into play when couples negotiate 
gender and their work and family responsibilities.
Summary
Relying on three theoretical streams broadens the interpretation of the 
relationship between the independent variables and married mothers’ labor force 
participation and allows for a more full examination of these determinants of 
mothers’ labor force exits and entrances.  Sometimes these theories hypothesize the 
same relationship with labor force participation, and sometimes they are different.  
However, I am not testing each theory against the others; rather, the analyses that 
follows draws on the strengths of each theory to gain a deeper understanding of the 
processes at hand.
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Chapter 4: Data and Methodology
This dissertation uses the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) 
1996 panel and event history analysis to analyze labor force transitions into and out of 
the labor force.  The SIPP is well suited to answer the questions posed in this 
dissertation because it collects a variety of family events, changes in household 
composition, and employment histories in interviews held every four months, with 
retrospective questions for the intervening months between interviews for a large 
number of wives and husbands.  Event history analysis is appropriate because it 
allows the independent variables to change over time, leading to less bias in the 
estimates (Allison 1982), and because it allows for the inclusion of censored 
observations (Gupta and Leite 1999).
Event history analysis requires information on the timing of respondents’ life 
course events.  Event histories typically record the critical dates and activities of
respondents’ major life course transitions for the domains of family, education, 
military, and employment (Heaton and Call 1995).  An ideal way to collect data on 
individual’s life events is to gather the data as the events occur, thereby reducing 
memory and reporting errors.  Short time intervals between interviews, in conjunction 
with retrospective questions to fill in transitions that occurred between survey 
interviews, allows for continuous event history data, minimizes bias from respondent 
recall, and reduces panel attrition (Heaton and Call 1995).     
This chapter first describes the data used in this dissertation, the samples 
analyzed, and the dependent and independent variables used in this dissertation.  
Then, the chapter explains the methodologies that are used.
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Data Source
The data used in this dissertation come from the 1996 SIPP Longitudinal 
Panel.  The large initial sample size (36,700 households) and the longer duration of 
this panel (4 years, instead of the more usual panel length of fewer years) allow 
investigation of employment patterns for a large number of married mothers.  
Improvements and expansions in the questions asked in the 1996 panel allow more 
focused and detailed analyses.  The SIPP is well suited for my analysis because it 
collects detailed monthly demographic data and employment activity data for all 
persons in the household for each interview reference period (called a wave).  The 
1996 SIPP Panel was conducted for 12 waves, collecting data for a continuous 48-
month period.  In some instances, questions were asked about each month in the four-
month reference period, in other cases questions were asked about the entire wave. 
Appendix Table 4.A shows the interview schedule for the 1996 SIPP panel.  
Interviews were conducted from April, 1996 until March, 2000.  Each wave of 
respondents is split into four roughly equal rotation groups and each month field 
representatives (or interviewers) interview one rotation group, or a quarter of the 
sample.  At each interview, core data are collected for the previous 4 months (called 
reference months).  This combined means that members of the same wave will have 
different interview months and reference months.  Appendix Table 4.A shows the 
rotation groups, waves, and reference months for the 1996 SIPP longitudinal file.
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Overall Universe
This dissertation explores the labor force transitions of married mothers with 
children under 15 who entered the panel in the first interview wave (wave 1), were in 
two or more consecutive waves, and were aged 15 to 60 at wave 1 when they entered 
the panel.  I also deleted cases where the interviews were invalid, three cases where 
the married mother was retired for all waves while in the panel, and the cases where a 
child under 15 was only present in the household for one wave.  To conduct my 
analyses, I analyze a person-level file where the unit of observation is a married 
mother to provide descriptive characteristics of the sample, and then analyze a 
person-wave file where the unit of observation is a person-wave to explore labor 
force transitions using event history analyses.  I examine a married mother’s labor 
force participation pattern and simultaneous changes in her life for the period that she 
is followed in the survey (up to four years).
Person universe
Table 4.1 shows that 9,845 women were in this overall universe, and on 
average they remained in the sample 10.4 waves, with 66 percent remaining in the 
sample all 12 waves.  The longitudinal nature of the SIPP allows me to observe other 
life transitions, like marriage and childbearing, which enable women to enter my 
sample.  For example, 92 percent of my overall sample is married at wave 1 and 91 
percent do not have children under 15 living with them in their household.  As 
women marry or have children during the panel they enter my sample.  Likewise, as 
they become single or their children age out (turn 15) they exit my sample, although 
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they may remain in the panel.  In addition, 24 percent of my overall sample had a 
birth during the panel, and 9 percent experience their first birth.
Table 4.2 shows employment patterns of my overall sample over the life of 
the 4-year SIPP panel.  This table is based on the 9,845 women shown in the previous 
table and presents unweighted data.  When considering their labor force status 
throughout the panel, 66 percent of the sample did not experience any labor force 
transition during the panel, 16 percent experienced one transition, 12 percent 
experienced two transitions, and 6 percent experienced three or more.
Table 4.1 General person file sample, total universe and select characteristics
(Universe includes married mothers with children under 15 at some point in panel,
 who entered panel in wave 1 and were in sample for two or more consecutive 
 waves, and were aged 15 to 60 at wave 1)
Number Percent
TOTAL 9,845 100.0
Mean number of waves in panel 10.4
In all 12 waves 6,461 65.6
Married at wave 1 8,968 91.1
Number of children at wave 1
 None 889 9.0
 One 3,556 36.1
 Two 3,520 35.8
 Three or more 1,880 19.1
Birth during panel 2,326 23.7
Married with child(ren) under 15 at wave 1 8,317 84.5
Source: 1996 SIPP Panel. Unit of analysis is person.
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The majority (72 percent) of the sample was employed at wave 1 when they 
entered the panel and 52 percent were employed the entire time they were in the 
panel.  One quarter of the sample had a labor force exit at some point in the panel, 
Table 4.2 Employment Patterns of Overall Sample of Married Mothers 
(Universe includes married mothers with children under 15 at some point in panel,
 who entered panel in wave 1 and were in sample for two or more consecutive 




  None 6,483 65.9
  One 1,611 16.4
  Two 1,128 11.5
  Three or more 623 6.3
Employed at wave 1 7,075 71.9
  Employed throughout panel 5,119 52.0
  Any labor force exit during panel 2,427 24.7
Number of exits
  One 1,999 20.3
  Two or more 428 4.3
Not employed at wave 11 2,770 28.0
  Not employed throughout panel 1,364 13.9
  Any labor force entrance during panel 2,533 25.7
Number of entrances
  One 2,107 21.4
  Two or more 426 4.3
Source: 1996 SIPP Panel. Unit of analysis is person.
Note: The percent of labor force exits during the panel includes all exits captured
  in the panel, including exits following an entrance among mothers who were not  
  employed in wave 1.  Similarly for entrances, the percent of entrances captured  
  in the panel includes entrances to mothers who were employed in wave 1.
1 2,412 married mothers with children were not employed at wave 1.
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either being the first transition captured during the panel or an exit following an 
entrance also captured during the panel.  
Twenty eight percent of the sample was not employed at wave 1 when they 
entered the panel and 14 percent remained not employed the entire time they were in 
the panel.  Again, one quarter of the sample had a labor force entrance at some point 
in the panel, either being the first transition captured in the panel or an entrance 
following an exit.  
Person-wave universe
I construct the overall person-wave universe by selecting the data for the first 
month of each wave from the 48-month SIPP file for married mothers with children 
under 15 who entered the panel in the first interview wave (wave 1), were in two or 
more consecutive waves, and were aged 15 to 60 at wave 1 when they entered the 
panel.  Because this universe is used to conduct the event history analysis and I am 
looking at transitions that occur from wave 1 onward in the panel, I omit the first 
wave of data because no labor force transitions have transpired yet.  However, 
variables containing all the characteristics of the previous wave are created and added 
to the first month of each wave to allow for comparison between those who 
experience a labor force transition and those who do not.  For example, month 4 data 
in wave 1 (longitudinal month 4) are found on month 1 wave 2 (longitudinal month 5) 
coded as last month’s characteristics.  Likewise, month 4 data in wave 2 (longitudinal 
month 8) are found on month 1 wave 3 (longitudinal month 9) coded again as last 
month’s characteristics.  Thus, all waves of data contain all the characteristics for the 
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current month and the previous month.  The overall universe consists of 72,494 
person-waves of observations, with 51,150 person-waves representing a wave where 
the married mother was employed and 21,235 person-waves where the married 
mother was not employed.
Analytic Samples
I construct three different analytic samples using the SIPP 1996 panel 
longitudinal files.  All samples are created to provide a complete event history with 
detailed chronological record of all significant events.  
Wave 1 sample—Person as unit of analysis
The first sample analyzed includes women who were married with children 
under 15 at wave 1, who entered the panel at wave 1 and were aged 15 to 60 at wave 
1.  The unit of analysis for this sample is a married mother.  I analyze the wave 1 
sample to provide a general description of the married mothers in my sample.  I 
restrict this sample to married mothers with children at wave 1 because it closely 
reflects the sample used in the event history analyses and I am able to provide 
weighted estimates using the wave 1 weight.  Table 4.3 shows that my wave 1 sample 
consists of 8,317 married mothers with children under 15 in wave 1.  
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Person-wave labor force exits sample
My second analytic sample includes person-waves where married mothers 
with children under 15 were employed the previous wave (i.e., they were at risk for a 
labor force exit in the current wave), had positive earnings in the previous wave, 
entered the panel in wave 1 and were in the sample for two or more consecutive 
waves, and were aged 15 to 60 at wave 1.  The unit of analysis for this sample is a 
person-wave.  Analyses of labor force exits use person-waves of exposure, or risk of a 
transition, which is an important point, as the “respondent” is not the unit of analysis 
in this sample.  This means that there is a record for each married mother for each 
Table 4.3 Analytic samples used in dissertation
Analytic sample Number
Wave 1 person file sample 8,317 married mothers
(Sample includes married mothers with children under 15 at wave 1,
 who entered the panel in wave 1 and were in sample for two or more 
 consecutive waves, and were aged 15 to 60 at wave 1)
Person-wave file samples
  Labor force exit sample 51,150 person waves
(Sample includes person-waves where married mothers with children under 15 
 were employed the previous wave (i.e., they were at risk for a labor force exit in
 the current wave), had positive earnings in the previous wave, entered the panel 
 in wave 1 and were in sample for two or more consecutive waves, and were 
 aged 15 to 60 at wave 1)
  Labor force entrance sample 21,235 person waves
(Sample includes person-waves where married mothers with children under 15 
 were NOT employed the previous wave (i.e., they were at risk for a labor force 
 entrance in the current wave), entered the panel in wave 1 and were in sample
 for two or more consecutive waves, and were aged 15 to 60 at wave 1)
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wave (or 4 month period) that she is in the panel.  Because of attrition, those 
individuals who were in the panel for a longer period of time contribute more person-
wave records to the sample.  This sample is used to analyze married mother’s labor 
force exits using event history analysis.  This sample enables an analysis of the 
process of labor force exits separately from labor force entrances.  Table 4.3 shows 
that my person-wave labor force exits sample consists of 51,150 person-waves of 
observations at risk of a labor force exit, meaning that these records represent a wave
where the respondent was married with at least one child under 15 years and had a 
paid job in the previous wave.  This sample is used to conduct the event history 
analysis of labor force exits, and show the multivariate regression results.  
Person-wave labor force entrances sample
My third analytic sample includes person-waves where married mothers with 
children under 15 were NOT employed the previous wave (i.e., they were at risk for a 
labor force entrance in the current wave), had positive earnings in the current wave if 
they entered the labor force, entered the panel in wave 1 and were in the sample for 
two or more consecutive waves, and were aged 15 to 60 at wave 1.  Similarly to the 
previously explained sample, the unit of analysis is a person-wave.  This sample is 
used to analyze married mother’s labor force entrances using event history analysis 
and enables an analysis of the process of labor force entrances separately from labor 
force exits.  Table 4.3 shows that my person-wave labor force entrances sample 
consists of 21,235 person-waves of observations at risk of a labor force entrance, 
meaning that these records represent a wave where the respondent was married with 
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at least one child under 15 years and did NOT have a paid job in the previous wave.  
This sample will be used to conduct the event history analysis of labor force 
entrances, and show the multivariate regression results.  
Attrition and Imputation
As in all longitudinal surveys, attrition is an issue.  Overall sample loss in the 
1996 panel is 35.5 percent over the 12-wave panel.  Individual item response rates 
will vary by item.  Most items on the SIPP are allocated through hot deck imputation 
techniques.  Appendix Table 4.B shows the imputation rates for the key variables 
used in the analysis.  
Weighting
The Census Bureau produces one longitudinal weight for the SIPP 1996 
longitudinal file, but it is only applicable for those who were present for the entire 
panel.  Because of attrition, sample size would be greatly reduced if I restricted my 
sample to only those who had a longitudinal panel weight.  Furthermore, it is very 
likely that those who attrite the sample differ in key characteristics from those who 
remain in the sample for all 12 waves.  
In this dissertation, I use a normalized wave weight in my multivariate 
models.  Each respondent with a valid interview has a valid monthly weight which I 
convert into a normalized wave weight to control for the sample design of 
oversampling certain populations (minority and low-income populations) and cluster 
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sampling.  The normalized weight is constructed by dividing the last month weight in 
each wave by the average weight for the sample in that month.  For example, the 
wave 1 weight is constructed by dividing the month 4 person weight by the average 
person weight for month 4.  
Standard Errors
Concerns have been raised regarding the potential for dependence between the 
observations in my dataset.  Longitudinal data, such as the data used in this 
dissertation, generate multiple observations of each individual and the number of 
observations included in the sample differs from individual to individual.  The 
concern is that the observations may not be mutually independent and thus would 
lead to estimates that are inefficient and biased, and overstated if the observations 
from the same individual are correlated.  I account for the possibility of correlation 
due to clustered observations by running my models in SAS using the PROC 
GENMOD program and I uniquely identify individuals (i.e., married mothers) within 
households as clusters.  This procedure adjusts the standard errors using Huber-White 
nonparametric correction techniques for multiple observations of sample people. The 
findings remained the same whether I correct the standard errors or not.  Although 
Allison (1984) argues that this is not necessary to correct for non-independence when 
using discrete-time event history analyses, to avoid any potential bias introduced due 
to dependence among observations I report estimates from models with corrected 
standard errors.  
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Data Limitations--Censoring
I rely on discrete-time event history modeling for several reasons, one of 
which is because I do not have a complete employment history of all respondents.  I 
do augment the analysis by using the work history topical module data, but these data 
are only collected for those who are present at wave 1 when that module is 
administered, thus I restrict my sample to those who enter in wave 1.  In addition, this 
module does not collect a complete employment history, rather it allows for the 
inclusion of some variables that measure work commitment and job continuity over 
the life course.  By nature, panel data are censored at both ends, since I have limited 
information on employment prior to time 1 or after time 12.  Hazard models account 
for right censoring.  
Left censoring is an issue.  Since I have very little information about women’s 
lives prior to the first interview, the data are inherently left censored.  Thus, women 
who exited the labor force prior to the survey period and then reentered—but not 
during the survey period—appear as employed women throughout the panel in the 
data.  Similarly, women who entered the labor force prior to the survey period and 
then exited—but not during the survey period—appear to be not employed.  In my 
analysis I am very clear that the results do not represent transitions over a lifetime but 
provide insight into the factors influencing labor force transitions over a four-year 
time period, a mere snapshot of a woman’s work and family career.  Clearly a full 
work history and family building history would be preferable to catch all labor force 
and other life transitions; however, my sample yields a sufficiently large number of 
labor force exits and entrances to provide insightful analyses.
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Dependent and Independent Variables
This dissertation focuses on labor force transitions of married mothers with 
children over a 4-year period.  These transitions are operationalized in the following 
way. 
Dependent variables
Labor force transition dynamics are examined in this dissertation by looking 
at two categories of dependent variables.  The first category of dependent variables 
examined is labor force transition measures.  The second category consists of two 
variables that attempt to beter capture a measure of full -time motherhood.  Appendix 
Table 4.C presents the variable name and coding for each of the dependent variables. 
Labor force transition dependent variables
This dissertation examines two labor force transition dependent variables: 
labor force exits and labor force entrances.  Both dependent variables are 
operationalized in a similar manner, using the same variables, however one indicates 
when a married mother exits the labor force and the other indicates when a married 
mother enters the labor force.
Labor force exit dependent variable
The labor force exit dependent variable is based on the response to a question 
about whether the respondent had a paid job in the past four months.  The following 
question is asked at each interview in reference to the preceding four-month time 
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period: “Did …(you) have at least one job (that is, a job for an employer, a business, 
or some other work arrangement) during the reference period or interview month?”  
This question ascertains whether the respondent had a paid job in any of the four 
months of the wave (the interview or current month and the preceding three months).   
Labor force exits are captured by looking at the responses to the labor force 
participation question longitudinally, wave-by- wave, and noting the first transition 
during the panel for each respondent from having a paid job with positive earnings in 
the previous wave to not having a paid job in the current wave (note that labor force 
transitions only occur between waves).  Although some respondents experience more 
than one labor force exit transition during the panel, my dependent variable is coded 0 
if there is no labor force exit during the panel, and coded 1 when the first labor force 
exit occurs. 
Labor force entrance dependent variable
The labor force entrance dependent variable is constructed using the same 
question ascertaining whether the respondent had a paid job or not as explained 
above.  To capture labor force entrances, the responses to the labor force participation 
question are examined longitudinally, wave-by- wave, and coded 1 when a respondent 
first transitions from not having a paid job in the previous wave to having a paid job 
with positive earnings in the current wave  (note again that labor force transitions
only occur between waves).  If no labor force entrance occurs during the panel, the 
dependent variable is coded 0.
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Full-time motherhood dependent variables
I also define a dependent variable aimed at capturing transitions into and out 
of full-time motherhood.  The SIPP survey asks respondents who answer “No” to the 
labor force participation question described above a follow-up question to determine 
the main reason they did not engage in market work over the past four months.  
Although not definitive in identifying all full-time mothers, the use of this question 
allows a more focused analysis of labor force transitions into and out of full-time 
motherhood than the standard approach of simply using a labor force participation 
measure.  The full-time mother dependent variables are based on the identification of 
married mothers who give reasons related to the care of children as their primary 
reason for not working, as opposed to giving other reasons for not working.  
Labor force exit into full-time motherhood dependent variable
The dependent variable measuring a labor force exit into full-time motherhood 
is a categorical variable coded 1 if there is a labor force exit for full-time motherhood 
reasons, coded 2 if there is a labor force exit for other reasons, and coded 0 if there is 
no exit.  Again, only the first transition is captured in this dependent variable.  This 
dependent variable measuring the transition into full-time motherhood is constructed 
by examining the longitudinal data, wave-by- wave, and noting any labor force exit 
with an accompanying full-time motherhood reason for not working and noting those 
labor force exits with other primary reasons for not working.  
The full-time mother category is operationalized by coding as 1 those married 
women with a child under 15 who were employed in the previous wave, (so they were 
at risk for a labor force exit), had positive earnings in the previous wave, and 
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transition into being not employed in the current wave with the explicit main reason 
to care for children or others.  The “exit for other reason” category is operationalized 
by coding as 2 those married women with a child under 15 who were employed in the 
previous wave, (so they were at risk for a labor force exit), had positive earnings in 
the previous wave, and transition into being not employed in the current wave with 
the another explicit main reason.  Married mothers who do not experience a labor 
force transition are coded as 0.  
Because the labor force variable requires the respondent to be out of the labor 
force for the entire wave, or all four consecutive months, the minimum length of each 
full-time motherhood spell is four months and is only tracked in terms of four-month 
intervals.  However, not all short (4 months or less) full-time motherhood spells of 4 
or more months are captured in this analysis.  The nature of the question allows for 
mothers who do not work in a time frame that spans two interview periods to not be 
counted because these mothers were employed for at least one of the months in the 
reference period for both of the interview periods.  A second shortcoming of this 
proposed definition is that mothers who stay at home and care for their children, but 
do not give this as their main reason for not working are not identified as not 
employed for child care reasons.  For example, the mother gives “going to school” as 
her main reason for not working, but she cares for her children all day and goes to 
school at night while her husband cares for the children.   The purpose of examining 
the full-time motherhood dependent variables is to determine whether the married 
mothers who explicitly exit the labor force to care for children and family differ from 
married mothers who have other primary reasons for exiting the labor force and how 
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this may influence the more standard approach of using a labor force participation 
measure as an indication of mothers who exit the labor force to care for children.  
Table 4.4 shows the weighted frequency distribution of the primary reason 
married mothers with children under 15 give for being out of the labor force in wave 
1.  This table is based on the nonemployed mothers who were married and had at 
least one child under the age of 15 in wave 1 (28 percent of the married mothers with 
children under 15 were not employed in wave 1).  The vast majority of nonemployed 
mothers, 82 percent, state a reason related to the care of children (pregnancy/ 
childbirth and taking care of children/others).  The remaining married mothers give 
reasons related to temporary or chronic health problems (6 percent), are not interested 
in working (4 percent), are in school (3 percent), are retired (2 percent), are unable to 
find work (2 percent), are on layoff (1 percent), or give other reasons (3 percent).  
85
Labor force entrance from full-time motherhood dependent variable
The dependent variable measuring a labor force entrance from full-time 
motherhood is also a categorical variable coded 1 if there is a labor force entrance 
among married mothers who were out of the labor force for full-time motherhood 
reasons, coded 2 if there is a labor force entrance for married mothers who were out 
of the labor force for other reasons, and coded 0 if there is no entrance.  This 
dependent variable measuring the transition from full-time motherhood is constructed 
by examining the longitudinal data, wave-by- wave, and noting the first labor force 
entrance during the panel with an accompanying full-time motherhood reason for not 
being employed in the previous wave, and noting those labor force entrances with 
other primary reasons for nonemployment.  
Table 4.4 Primary Reason Not Employed, Married Mothers with Children under 15
  in Wave 1
Number Percent Number Percent
Married nonemployed mothers 2,421 100.0 6,535,701 100.0
  at wave 1
Primary Reason not Employed
Temp unable injury 10 0.4 28,898 0.4
Temp unable illness 26 1.1 65,995 1.0
Chronic condition/disability 105 4.4 277,868 4.3
Retired 8 0.3 23,214 0.4
Pregnancy/childbirth 108 4.5 285,729 4.4
Taking care of children/others 1,855 76.9 5,045,502 77.2
Going to school 75 3.1 204,740 3.1
Unable to find work 51 2.1 129,827 2.0
On layoff 18 0.8 48,540 0.7
Not interested in working 85 3.5 224,223 3.4
Other 71 2.9 201,166 3.1
Source: 1996 SIPP Wave 1. Unit of analysis is a married mother.
WeightedUnweighted
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The full-time motherhood entrance dependent variable is operationalized in a 
similar manner as the full-time motherhood exit dependent variable explained above, 
with the exception that now those who enter the labor force are coded as having an 
event.  The full-time mother entrance category is operationalized by coding as 1 those 
married women with a child under 15 who were not employed in the previous wave 
(so they were at risk for a labor force entrance) with the explicit main reason to care 
for children or others, and transition into being employed in the current wave and 
have positive earnings in the current wave.  The “enter for other reason” category is 
operationalized by coding as 2 those married women with a child under 15 who were 
not employed in the previous wave (so they were at risk for a labor force entrance) 
with another main for nonemployment, and transition into being employed in the 
current wave and have positive earnings in the current wave.  Married mothers who 
do not experience a labor force transition are coded as 0.
Table 4.5 shows the unweighted number of person-waves where a labor force 
exit or entrance occurred.  Of the 51,150 person-waves where a mother was at risk for 
a labor force exit, in 1,848 person-waves a labor force exit occurred during the panel, 
1,432 for full-time motherhood reasons and 416 for other reasons.  Turning to labor 
force entrances, of the 21,235 person-waves where a mother was at risk for a labor 
force entrance, in 1,990 person-waves a labor force entrance occurred during the 
panel, with 1,571 entrances from full-time motherhood and 419 from other reasons.
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By nature, my dependent variables are rather fluid, with the universes and 
those at risk of a labor force transition event changing wave to wave—namely 
employment, marital, and parental status change over time, and individuals leave the 
sample.  Thus, the number of married mothers at risk of a particular transition event 
changes from wave to wave.  Longitudinal data captures when a married mother 
becomes divorced and when a marriage occurs, or when a birth occurs and when a 
14-year old child becomes 15.  All of these life changes indicate whether the woman 
is eligible to be in my overall universe of married mothers with a child under 15.   
Additionally, the primary reason given for not being employed can change wave to 
wave even for married mothers who remain not employed.  For example, a married 
nonemployed mother may be in school as the primary reason for not working, but 
then finish or stop school and give a full-time motherhood reason as her primary 
reason for nonemployment.  Changing reasons for nonemployment will not bias my 






Total sample size, person-waves 51,150 21,235
Dependent variables
Labor force exits
First labor force exit 1,848 NA
  For motherhood reasons 1,432 NA
  For other reasons 416 NA
Labor force entrances
First labor force entrance NA 1,990
  From motherhood reasons NA 1,571
  From other reasons NA 419
Source: 1996 SIPP Panel.  Unit of analysis is person-wave.
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analysis because I am looking at the initial break with the labor force rather than 
reasons for continued nonemployment.  Despite these limitations, the SIPP data are 
unique in that they identify the main reason for nonemployment and allow a first 
foray into whether labor force transitions differ depending on the reason for 
nonemployment.  
Table 4.6 below demonstrates how the overall universe of married mothers 
with a child under 15 changes from wave to wave.  The unit of analysis is the person 
and the table shows unweighted data.  In wave 1, for example, the overall universe is 
8,317 individuals and by wave 12 this number dropped to 5,738, mostly due to 
attrition, although some are not eligible due to becoming divorced or separating or 
because their youngest child turned 15 during the panel.  Simultaneously, some 
individuals became eligible to be in my sample because they got married or had a first 
birth, or had a child enter their household.  
Table 4.6 also illustrates how the labor force exits sample is constructed.  The 
5,903 employed married mothers in wave 1 constitute the group at risk of 
experiencing a labor force exit by wave 2.  This at risk group contributes a wave of 
data to the labor force exits sample made up of their wave 1 characteristics, wave 2 
characteristics, and the dependent variable noting whether they experienced a labor 
force exit from wave 1 to wave 2.   The 5,877 employed married mothers in wave 2 
constitute the group at risk of experiencing a labor force exit at wave 3, and they also 
contribute a wave of data in the labor force exits sample made up of wave 2 
characteristics, wave 3 characteristics, and the dependent variable noting whether 
they experienced a labor force exit from wave 2 to wave 3.  This continues 
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Table 4.6  Unweighted Numbers of Married Mothers with Children Under 15 and Employment Status by Wave 
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 6 Wave 7 Wave 8 Wave 9 Wave 10 Wave 11 Wave 12
Married mothers with 8,317 8,166 7,491 7,487 7,179 6,916 6,625 6,523 6,352 6,175 5,818 5,738
  children under 15
Employed 5,903 5,877 5,332 5,321 5,144 4,928 4,696 4,638 4,531 4,451 4,166 4,129
Not employed 2,412 2,289 2,159 2,166 2,035 1,988 1,929 1,885 1,821 1,724 1,652 1,609
  Full-time mother
    primary reason 1,963 1,890 1,774 1,810 1,687 1,626 1,600 1,561 1,512 1,428 1,339 1,295
Source: 1996 SIPP Wave 1. Unit of analysis is a married mother.
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throughout the panel, with each group at risk of a labor force exit contributing a wave 
of data to the total sample.
Likewise, the 2,412 nonemployed married mothers in wave 1 are at risk of a 
labor force entrance in wave 2.  They contribute one wave of data to the labor force 
entrance sample made up of their wave 1 characteristics, wave 2 characteristics, and 
the dependent variable noting whether they experienced a labor force entrance from 
wave 1 to wave 2.  By looking across the waves, and comparing the labor force status 
of the previous month to the current month, I identify those married mothers with 
children under 15 who experience a labor force exit or entrance and code them 
appropriately.
Independent variables
The independent variables used in this dissertation were selected because 
there is prior empirical or theoretical evidence of a relationship with labor force 
participation decisions.  The variables discussed below are grouped into six broad 
categories, which are explored in this dissertation, namely: 1) mother’s market value, 
2) job characteristics, 3) children, 4) family economics, and 5) gender egalitarianism 
between the wife and husband.  Control variables are discussed at the end of this 
section.  First I discuss the independent variables used in the labor force exit models 
and then those used in the labor force entrance models.  
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Labor force exit models
All of the independent variables used in the labor force exit models represent 
the characteristics at the wave prior to the transition, unless otherwise noted.  In this 
way, I am able to recreate the family situation just prior to the labor force transition at 
a time when the final decision to exit the labor force was being made. 
Work related measures
Market value (realized)
Market value is measured by education level, whether you hold a full-time 
job, monthly personal earnings, and cumulative work experience.  According to 
neoclassical economic theory, market value is positively associated with labor force 
participation, that is, those with greater market value tend to have greater labor 
market prospects and are more likely to be gainfully employed (Becker 1981).    
To determine how education level is associated with labor force exits, four 
dummy variables are created from the educational attainment variable: less than a 
high school degree, high school graduate (reference group), some college, and college 
graduate.  College graduate is further broken down into two categories: Bachelor’s 
degree and Master’s Degree and higher.  One case was missing educational level at 
wave 1 and was coded as less than high school because the respondent was 15.  
Usual hours worked is a continuous measure, calculated from respondent’s 
answers to the question of their usual hours worked per week in the last month.  The 
total hours worked is calculated by summing the hours worked at up to two jobs or 
businesses.  Employment status dummy variables were created with the following 
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categories: part-time hours (1 to 34 hours) and full-time hours (35 or more, reference 
group).  
Monthly personal earnings are an average of earnings over the previous four 
months, not including any months with no earnings.  This methodology is preferable 
than simply taking one month’s earnings because of variability in earnings. Several 
earnings constructs were created and tested to determine the best way to measure the 
effect of earnings.  Some of these specifications included a continuous variable of 
monthly earnings based on the direct question of personal earnings from a paid job, 
and a categorical variable grouped into four categories, and the log of personal 
earnings.  I include the log of monthly personal earnings in the models.
Several variables were created to measure previous work experience.  The 
work history topical module gathers information from respondents on a number of 
questions regarding previous work experience and breaks in the labor force for care-
giving.  The topical module is administered in wave 1 and refers to work experience 
prior to the panel.  Therefore, this variable is the same for all waves the respondent is 
present in the panel, since their previous work experience prior to the panel does not 
change over the panel.  I include two dummy variables indicating the number of years 
the respondent has had a labor force break for 6 or more months for care-giving prior 
to the panel.  The first is 1 to 2 years with a labor force break for 6 or more months, 
and the second is 3 or more years with a labor force break for 6 or more months.  The 
reference group is those who have never had any labor force break for 6 or more 
months for care-giving.  I tested several configurations of this construct to find the 
best measure of number of years with a break, by including more detailed categories 
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and also a continuous variable.  I also tested a dummy variable noting whether the 
respondent has had any break in the labor force for six or more months for care-
giving prior to the panel.  
Job characteristics
Occupation is included in the labor force exit models to test whether women 
employed in certain occupational categories are more likely to exit the labor force.  
Since it is unwieldy to include all occupations individually, I created six dummy 
variables broadly grouping six occupational categories: professional/managerial, 
sales, administrative, clerical, farm/forest/fisheries, and other.  Previous researchers 
(Becker and Moen 1999; Blair-Loy 2003; Moen and Yu 2000) argue that professional 
and managerial careers demand a high time investment in work.  These jobs also 
provide meaning to life and rewards (Blair-Loy 2003).  After testing the six dummy 
variable construct, I refined my occupation measure to one dummy variable coded 1 
if the married mother worked in a managerial or professional occupation, 0 otherwise, 
because the relationship was maintained by grouping all of the other occupation 
categories.
The class of worker is coded into the following 4 dummy variables: 1) Private 
for profit (reference group); 2) Private not for profit; 3) Government worker at the 
local, state and federal levels; and 4) Own business or family worker.  Public sector 
jobs and self-employment are theoretically more flexible than private sector jobs 
(Moen and Yu 2000), however, it is possible that private not for profit jobs are less 
time intensive than private for profit jobs.  Thus I include three dummy variables 
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indicating whether the married mothers 1) works in the private not for profit sector, 2) 
works in the public sector, or 3) is self-employed.
Jobs with benefits, such as health insurance, tend to retain employees (Tilly 
1996).  I include two dummy variables simultaneously indicating whether the mother 
has health insurance and the source of the health insurance.  The first dummy variable 
is coded 1 if the mother receives health insurance through her current job, and 0 
otherwise.  The second dummy variable is coded 1 if the mother does not have any 
health insurance, and 0 otherwise.  The reference category is married mothers with 
health insurance through someone else (most of the time this is their spouse, but it 
could also be someone else).
Family related measures
Children
Whether or not a mother is in the process of building a family, measured by 
the presence and number of young children, has shown positive effects on women’s 
labor force exits.  I created dummy variables of the age of the youngest child to 
correspond with specific stages of child development and with potential level of 
demands on a mother’s time: less than 1 year, 1 and 2 years, 3 through 5 years, 6 
through 9 years, and 10 through 14 years (reference category).  Number of children 
present was recoded to the following: one child (6 to 14 years old is the reference 
category), two children, and three or more children.
A change in family status through the birth of a new child has been well 
documented as a trigger for labor force exits.  I include a dummy variable indicating 
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whether a birth occurred in the previous wave (any of the four months) or the current 
wave (any of the four months).  Another dummy variable indicating whether a child 
(not including a new baby) recently entered the family in the previous wave (any of 
the four months) or the current wave (any of the four months) is also included in the 
models.
Timing of events—Age at first birth
Two measures were coded to explore early, on-time, and late life course 
transitions involving family formation and labor force transitions.  Age at first 
marriage and age at first birth questions are asked on the SIPP in wave 2, in the 
fertility and marital history topical modules.  Respondents who were never married or 
had never had a birth were tracked during the panel and given their age at first 
marriage or first birth as it occurred.  
Previous research has defined delayed childbearing as occurring after age 28 
(Coltrane and Ishii-Kuntz 1992), or after age 30 (Hofferth 1984; Martin 2000).  
Likewise, early childbearing has been defined as teenage childbearing (Hofferth and 
Moore 1979; Hofferth, Reid, and Mott 2001; Rich and Kim 1999; Taniguchi 1999).  
The timing of first childbirth was indexed in this dissertation by four categories based 
on the age at first birth: 1) first birth occurred at age less than 22, 2) first birth 
occurred at age 22 to 28 (reference group), 3) first birth occurred at age 29 or older, 
and 4) missing age at first birth data.  These cutoff points were based on an analysis 
of the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) vital statistics data that show that 
the mean age at first birth was 24.6 in 1996, was 24.7 in both in 1997 and 1998, and 
was 24.8 in 1999 (Mathews and Hamilton 2002), the years of the 1996 SIPP Panel.  
Creating a group to be on-time with a reasonable number of years around 25, I 
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created the grouping of on-time first birth to be age 22 to 28.  A first birth over age 28 
was thus considered late, and a birth prior to age 22 was considered early.
The age at first birth variable is the same for all waves the respondent is 
present in the panel, since the age at first birth does not change once it occurs.  In 
preliminary analyses, I included two life course transition variables (one measuring 
the age at first marriage and another measuring the age at first birth); however, they 
displayed the same results and were highly correlated.  Thus I dropped the age at first 
marriage variable and kept the age at first birth variable, as previous research has 
documented that the birth of a first child signals numerous changes in a woman’s life 
(Desai and Waite 1991). 
Family economics
When making labor force transition decisions, family economic resources are 
likely to be considered.  I include three measures of family economics in the models–
other family income (excluding the mother’s earnings), husband working 65 or more 
hours per week, and estimated market cost of child care.
Other monthly family income, not including the wife’s earnings, is included to 
measure the family income available to the family when the wife does not work.  
Other monthly family income primarily reflects the husband’s earnings, but also 
includes other forms of family income.  Family income is an average of earnings over 
the previous four months, not including any months with no income.  I include two 
specifications of monthly other family income in this dissertation.  The first is 
monthly other family income grouped into four categories, 1) less than $1,500 
(reference group), 2) $1,500 to $2,999, 3) $3,000 to $4,499, and 4) $4,500 and over.  
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I use this specification in the frequency distribution tables and in one specification of 
the final full labor force exits model.   The second specification is a continuous 
specification, the log of other family income.  This specification is included in most 
of the models.  In addition, dummy variables measuring the poverty status (in poverty 
and near-poor or 125 percent of poverty) were tested in the models but not included 
in the final models due to collinearity.  
Husband’s work hours
To test whether mothers married to husbands who work long hours are more 
likely to exit the labor force, I include a dummy variable coded 1 if the husband 
works over 65 hours per week, and 0 otherwise. I tested several other configurations 
of overtime as well, defining overtime as 45 or more hours, 50 or more hours, 55 or 
more hours, and 60 or more hours.  I chose the 65 or more measure because it 
represents a sufficient amount of overtime that would render the husband pretty much 
inaccessible to take on a meaningful amount of the child care and household domestic 
tasks (25 extra hours per week).
Child care costs
Research shows that child care costs influence mother’s labor force decisions: 
higher child care costs increase labor force exits and decrease the rates of entering the 
labor force (Anderson and Levine 2000; Baum 2002; Blau and Robbins 1989; 
Connelly 1992; Han and Waldfogel 2001; Hofferth and Wissoker 1992; Kimmel 
1995; Michalopoulos and Robins 2000; Ribar 1992).  According to neoclassical 
economic theory, child care costs act as a tax on women’s earnings and effectively 
lower their wage rate.  The omission of child care costs would introduce bias and 
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increase the error terms in my models.  However, the SIPP does not collect child care 
costs of those using child care for each month longitudinally, nor does it collect data 
on potential child care costs for those not using child care.  Child care questions are 
asked twice over the life of the 1996 SIPP panel (in wave 4 and wave 10 in the child 
care topical modules).  All arrangements used and total costs for each arrangement 
are collected.  Because child care arrangements and costs are not collected
longitudinally for each month in the panel, I impute estimates of the market child care 
costs for all families with children, regardless of the employment status of the mother, 
for each wave based on the wave 4 child care data.  This allows the estimated child 
care costs to change as family structure and other family characteristics change.5
Since the observed child care costs paid by child care users may not accurately reflect 
child care prices facing women who are not currently using child care, it would still 
be necessary to predict child care costs even if the SIPP did collect child care costs in 
every wave (Blau and Hagy 1998; Han and Waldfogel 2001). 
I predict child care costs using data on married women with at least one child 
under 15 who are employed and using paid child care in the 1996 SIPP Wave 4 
Topical Module (collected in the Spring of 1997).  Anderson and Levine (2000) 
describe several methodologies used in previous research to predict child care costs 
and make a concentrated effort to present a commonly-agreed-upon set of 
assumptions in order to bring the field closer to convergence on a standard approach.  
For this reason I follow Anderson and Levine (2000), and several other researchers 
5 Baum (2002) in his longitudinal study of child care costs does not allow the cost of child care to vary 
over the life of the panel; however I believe that as the determinants of child care cost change, for 
example, the number and ages of children change throughout the panel, the estimated market cost of 
child care for each family will also change.
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who use a similar methodology (Baum 2002; Han and Waldfogel 2001; Hofferth and 
Wissoker 1992).6  I use the SIPP child care topical module data to estimate a model to 
predict individual child care costs per hour worked.7  To determine the cost of care 
per hour worked, I divide the weekly child care expenses by the number of hours the 
mother works per week.  
I estimate the child care costs controlling for sample selection bias due to the 
fact that child care costs are only observed for women who are employed and using 
paid child care.  I correct the regression coefficients for sample selection bias using 
the standard two-stage technique developed by Heckman (1979).  Thus the selectivity 
equation estimates the joint decision of a mother to be employed and to use paid child 
care.  First I estimate a probit model to predict the probability of having child care 
costs (as opposed to having zero child care costs) and then use the results from that 
probit to control for sample selection bias in the main equation estimating child care 
costs.  The market price of care is specified as a function of demographic 
characteristics thought to influence the type of care chosen and the child care market 
characteristics, following Han and Waldfogel (2001) and Anderson and Levine 
(1999).  I identify the probability that a mother is employed and paying for child care 
by including the unemployment rate and the square of the mother’s age in the 
selectivity equation but not in the equation that predicts child care costs.  The 
unemployment rate may influence whether a mother is employed, but once she is 
6 I follow Han and Waldfogel (2001) very closely in the set of variables that I put in my model.  There 
is one difference in my model: I use a slightly different set of controls for the age of children.  Hence, 
like Han and Waldfogel (2001), my model differs from Anderson and Levine (2000) in that I include 
more detailed controls for the age of children, I do not include disability status, and do not distinguish 
between employed and unemployed other household members.
7 Connelly (1992) and Han and Waldfogel (1999) predicted the hourly cost of child care per hour 
worked, Ribar (1992) and Michalopoulos and Robins (2000) predicted the cost of child care per hour 
used, and Kimmel (1998), Anderson and Levine (1999) and Baum (2002) used both measures.
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employed and pays for care, the unemployment rate should have no effect on the 
amount paid for care.  Following Anderson and Levine (1999) and Han and 
Waldfogel (2001), I drop the five states that are not separately identified in the SIPP 
so that I can use the state unemployment rate to control for the tightness of the labor 
market in the probit.  
I estimate the following two models jointly:
Probability of paying for child care = Φ (β0 + β1 (mother’s age) + β2 (mother’s 
age squared) + β3 (mother has a high school degree) + β4 (mother has some 
college) + β5 (mother has college degree or higher) + β6 (black) + β7
(Hispanic) + β8 (number of children under 18) + β9 (any child less than 1) + 
β10 (any child 1 or 2) + β11 (any child 3 or 4) + β12 (any child 5 or 6) + β13 (any 
child 7, 8, 9, or 10) + β14 (log of other family income) + β15 (other adults at 
home other than parents) + β16 (urban) + β17 (South) + β18 (Midwest) + β19
(West) + β20 (state unemployment rate) + µ)
Log of CC costs per hour worked = β0 + β1 (mother’s age) + β2 (mother has a 
high school degree) + β3 (mother has some college) + β4 (mother has college 
degree or higher) + β5 (black) + β6 (Hispanic) + β7 (number of children under 
18) + β8 (any child less than 1) + β9 (any child 1 or 2) + β10 (any child 3 or 4) 
+ β11 (any child 5 or 6) + β12 (any child 7, 8, 9, or 10) + β13 (log of other 
family income) + β14 (other adults at home other than parents) + β15 (urban) + 
β16 (South) + β17 (Midwest) + β18 (West) + β19 (sample selection correction 
term λ) + ν
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Table 4.7 shows the results for the determinants of the probability of being 
employed and paying for child care and from the estimation of the cost of child care 
per hour worked.  The probability of being employed and paying for child care 
increases significantly with higher levels of education, as other family income 
increases, and when children aged 1 through 10 are present in the household.  Higher 
numbers of children in the household significantly decrease the probability that the 
mother is employed and paying for child care, as does the presence of other adults 
other than the parents in the household.  This probability decreases with the 
unemployment rate.
Column 2 of Table 4.7 shows that the estimated child care costs are 
significantly lower for Blacks and Hispanics than they are for Whites, but they are 
significantly higher for mothers with children aged 1 through 6.  As other family 
income rises, the cost of child care also rises significantly.  Mothers living in urban 
areas pay more for child care than their rural counterparts.  Furthermore, mothers in 
the South and Midwest pay less for child care.  The sample selection correction term, 
lamda, is negative and not statistically significant.  Han and Waldfogel’s  (2001)
results also show that the lamda for married mothers was not statistically significant.  
I use the regression coefficients of the predicted child care costs to 
impute a market cost of child care per hour worked for each married mother in my 
SIPP longitudinal sample for each wave that she is in the sample.  The mean value of 
this imputed hourly cost for the married mothers with children in my sample is $1.86.
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Intercept -1.1437 (0.4420) ** -0.3881 (0.6060)
Age 0.0129 (0.0235) 0.0045 (0.0039)
Age squared -0.0003 (0.0003) --
High school graduate 0.2524 (0.0811) *** 0.0559 (0.1024)
Some college 0.4097 (0.0801) *** 0.0885 (0.1361)
College or more 0.7041 (0.0843) *** 0.2206 (0.2043)
Black -0.0233 (0.0683) -0.1641 (0.0523) ***
Hispanic 0.0955 (0.0656) -0.0997 (0.0529) *
Number of children under 18 -0.1865 (0.0293) *** 0.0288 (0.0565)
Any child less than 1 0.1173 (0.0787) 0.0778 (0.0670)
Any child 1 or 2 0.4959 (0.0527) *** 0.4242 (0.1346) *** 
Any child 3 or 4 0.5577 (0.0496) *** 0.3851 (0.1491) **
Any child 5 or 6 0.4042 (0.0477) *** 0.1915 (0.1144) *
Any child 7, 8, 9, or 10 0.3122 (0.0482) *** 0.0334 (0.0959)
Log of other family income 0.0745 (0.0133) *** 0.0515 (0.0231) **
Other adults at home -0.1643 (0.0363) *** -0.0694 (0.0557)
Urban -0.0228 (0.0463) 0.1356 (0.0353) ***
South 0.0428 (0.0563) -0.1019 (0.0440) **
Midwest -0.0333 (0.0625) -0.0964 (0.0427) **
West 0.0683 (0.0601) -0.0462 (0.0466)
State unemployment rate -0.0460 (0.0211) ** --
Inverse Mills Ratio (lamda) -- -0.0247 (0.4007)
Number of observations 5118 5118
Standard errors in parentheses.  
* p < .10   ** p < .05   *** p < .001
   Probability of Paying 
for Care Cost per Hour Worked
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Gender egalitarianism between husband and wife
I include a measure of the wife’s earnings relative to her husband’s to 
examine the labor force patterns of women who are primary providers, women who 
are equal earners, and women who are married to husband’s who are the primary 
providers.  Three dummy variables are created following Nock’s (2001) discussion of 
mutually dependent spouses (MEDS) using the average monthly personal earnings of 
the four months of the previous wave of both spouses.  Equal providers are dual-
income couples where wives contribute at least 40% but less than 60% of the total 
couple earnings (reference group); wife main providers are dual-income couples 
where the wife contributes 60% or more of the total couple earnings; and husband 
main providers are dual-income couples where the wife contributes less than 40% of 
the total couple earnings.  
I also create a measure of wife’s relative education, with three dummy 
variables indicating the same education level (reference group), wife has a higher 
education level, and wife has a lower education level.  These dummy variables are 
constructed using the four educational categories (less than high school, high school, 
some college, and college graduate).  I also constructed a relative hours worked 
variable, but it was very highly correlated with the wife’s work hours so I did not 
include it in the models.
Control variables
The following variables are used as controls in this estimation.  I include a 
dummy variable indicating minority status to control for non-white race and ethnicity. 
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Previous research has shown differences in labor force exits of new mothers by race 
and ethnicity.  I also control for age, which was tested several ways.  First I tested 
five categories: 15 to 24, 25 to 34 (reference group), 35 to 44, 45 to 54, and 55 and 
older, with only the oldest age group showing significance.  Next, a continuous 
variable of age was included.  Since I exclude from the analyses the three cases that 
are continuously retired throughout the time they are in the panel, labor force exits 
among the oldest age group as an early retirement should not be an issue in this 
estimation.  In the final models, I control for age by including a continuous variable 
of age.  
A dummy variable indicating residence in a metro area was included to 
control for proximity to large urban metro markets, where more jobs can be found 
and higher wages are often paid.  A change in residence through a move has been 
well documented as a trigger for a married women’s labor force exit.  I include a 
dummy variable indicating whether a move occurred in the previous wave (any of the 
four months) or the current wave (any of the four months).  Several variables were 
tested as controls in preliminary analyses but then dropped due to consistent lack of 
significance across several specifications of the models.  These variables include 
season of labor force transition, disability status of the husband, disability status of 
the wife, and mother’s school enrollment. 
Labor force entrance models
All of the independent variables used in the labor force entrance models 
represent the characteristics at the wave prior to the transition, unless otherwise noted.  
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I include predicted hourly wages and a predicted wife’s relative hourly earnings to 
her husband’s hourly earnings in the labor force entrance models.    
Work related measures
Market value (potential)
Fewer market value measures can be included in the labor force entrance 
model because they are unknown prior to a labor force entrance, such as actual 
earnings or hours worked.  Mothers who do not enter will not demonstrate their actual 
wages, therefore, I predict hourly wages using the two step sample selection method.  
In the labor force entrance model, therefore, market value is captured by education 
level at the previous wave, predicted hourly wages, and cumulative work experience 
prior to the panel.  Education level and previous work experience are operationalized 
in the manner discussed above in the labor force exit models.
I predict married mothers’ hourly wages based on the same method used to 
predict child care costs outlined above.  I use the same data set to predict the hourly 
wages, namely I select married women with at least one child under 15 from the 1996 
SIPP Wave 4 file (collected in the Spring of 1997).  Again, I follow Anderson and 
Levine (2000) and Han and Waldfogel ( 2001).  To determine hourly wages, I divide 
the monthly earnings by the number of hours the mother works per month (based on 
the number of hours she works per week multiplied by 4).  
I estimate the hourly wages controlling for sample selection bias due to the 
fact that actual earnings are only observed for women who are employed and being 
paid for their work.  I correct the regression coefficients for sample selection bias 
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using the standard two-stage technique (Heckman 1979).  Thus the selectivity 
equation estimates the joint decision of a mother to be employed and to receive 
payment for that work.  First I estimate a probit model to predict the probability 
working for pay (as opposed to not being employed) and then use the results from 
that probit to control for sample selection bias in the main equation estimating hourly 
wages.  Hourly wages are specified as a function of demographic characteristics 
thought to influence the decision to work and market characteristics, following Han 
and Waldfogel (2001) and Anderson and Levine (1999).  I identify the probability 
that a mother is employed and receiving wages by including the square of the 
mother’s age, having a child less than 1, 1 or 2, 3 or 4, 5 or 6, or 7 to 10, the log of 
other family income, the presence of other adults in the household, and the 
unemployment rate in the selectivity equation but not in the equation that predicts 
hourly wages.  These variables may influence whether a mother is employed, but 
once she is employed and earning wages, they should have no effect on her 
compensation.  Following Anderson and Levine (1999) and Han and Waldfogel 
(2001), I drop the five states that are not separately identified in the SIPP so that I can 
use the state unemployment rate to control for the tightness of the labor market in the 
probit.  
I estimate the following two models jointly:
Probability of working for pay = Φ (β0 + β1 (mother’s age) + β2 (mother’s age 
squared) + β3 (mother has a high school degree) + β4 (mother has some 
college) + β5 (mother has college degree or higher) + β6 (black) + β7
(Hispanic) + β8 (number of children under 18) + β9 (any child less than 1) + 
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β10 (any child 1 or 2) + β11 (any child 3 or 4) + β12 (any child 5 or 6) + β13 (any 
child 7, 8, 9, or 10) + β14 (log of other family income) + β15 (other adults at 
home other than parents) + β16 (urban) + β17 (South) + β18 (Midwest) + β19
(West) + β20 (state unemployment rate) + µ)
Log of hourly wages = β0 + β1 (mother’s age) + β2 (mother has a high school 
degree) + β3 (mother has some college) + β4 (mother has college degree or 
higher) + β5 (black) + β6 (Hispanic) + β7 (number of children under 18) + β8
(urban) + β9 (South) + β10 (Midwest) + β11 (West) + β12 (sample selection 
correction term λ) + ν
Table 4.8 shows the results for the determinants of the probability of working 
for pay and from the estimation of the hourly wages.  The probability of a married 
mother working for pay increases significantly with age and with higher levels of 
education. This probability decreases as other family income increases, with higher 
numbers of children, and when preschoolage children are present in the household.  
Being Black significantly increases the probability of working for pay, and being 
Hispanic significantly decreases it.  Living in the South decreases the probability of 
working for pay, as does higher levels of unemployment.
108






Intercept 0.5643 (0.3613) 1.4048 (0.0992) ***
Age 0.0828 (0.0188) *** 0.0108 (0.0016) ***
Age squared -0.0013 (0.0003) *** --
High school graduate 0.5070 (0.0573) *** 0.2665 (0.0500) ***
Some college 0.7438 (0.0585) *** 0.4665 (0.0538) ***
College or more 0.9486 (0.0650) *** 0.8520 (0.0574) ***
Black 0.2394 (0.0665) *** 0.0010 (0.0392)
Hispanic -0.1176 (0.0525) * -0.1415 (0.0370) ***
Number of children under 18 -0.1216 (0.0246) *** -0.0212 (0.0147)
Any child less than 1 -0.3906 (0.0659) *** --
Any child 1 or 2 -0.3671 (0.0455) *** --
Any child 3 or 4 -0.2404 (0.0426) *** --
Any child 5 or 6 -0.2013 (0.0420) *** --
Any child 7, 8, 9, or 10 -0.0590 (0.0434) --
Log of other family income -0.1111 (0.0137) *** --
Other adults at home -0.0077 (0.0279) --
Urban -0.0905 (0.0433) 0.1525 0.0265 ***
South -0.1298 (0.0513) * -0.1060 0.0312 **
Midwest -0.0310 (0.0583) -0.0505 0.0322
West 0.0191 (0.0544) 0.0148 0.0340
State unemployment rate -0.0911 (0.0198) *** --
Inverse Mills Ratio (lamda) -- 0.1608 0.0818
Number of observations 6834 6834
Standard errors in parentheses.  
* p < .10   ** p < .05   *** p < .001
   Probability of Working 
for Pay
Earnings per Hour 
Worked
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Column 2 of Table 4.8 shows that the estimated hourly wages are significantly 
lower for Hispanics than they are for Whites, and are lower for those living in the 
South.  Predicted wages increase significantly with age and education.  Mothers 
living in urban areas earn more per hour than their rural counterparts.  The sample 
selection correction term, lamda, is positive and not statistically significant.  
I use the regression coefficients of the predicted hourly wages to impute an 
hourly wage for each married mother in my SIPP longitudinal sample for each wave 
that she is in the sample.  The mean value of this imputed hourly wage for the married 
mothers with children in my sample is $12.31.
Family related measures
Children and timing of first birth
Measures indicating the number of children, the age of youngest child, and the 
age at first birth are operationalized in the same way as they were for the labor force 
exit models (see discussion above).  
Family economic situation
Other monthly family income, whether the husband works overtime hours (65 or 
more hours per week), and estimated child care costs are included in the labor force 
entrance models.  These variables are constructed in a similar manner as they were in 
the labor force exit models (see discussion above).  
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Gender egalitarianism between husband and wife
The same measure of wife’s relative education is included in the labor force 
entrance model as operationalized for the labor force exits models (see discussion 
above).  I calculate a predicted relative earnings measure based on the wife’s 
estimated hourly wages related to her husbands actual hourly wages in the month 
prior to the labor force entrance.  In some families where the wife is not employed, 
wives and husbands may have similar education levels.  If this is the case, these wives 
may have the potential to be equal earners with their husbands, which may be 
reflected in the predicted relative earnings measure.
Table 4.9 shows how the estimated wife’s relative earnings compare with the 
actual relative earnings using unweighted person-wave data for employed married 
mothers.  Predicted hourly wages are lower than the actual hourly wages by roughly 
one dollar (actual hourly wages are $13.46 and predicted are $12.31). Column 1 in 
Table 4.9 shows the wife’s relative earnings to her husband using both spouses’ 
actual monthly earnings, a measure of the actual monetary contribution of each 
spouse.  Fifty-two percent of married mothers earn less than 40 percent of the total 
couple’s earnings, rendering their husband as primary provider.  Roughly 32 percent 
are equal providers and 17 percent of married mothers earn more than 60 percent of 
the total couple earnings, rendering them primary provider. In Column 2, we see 
wife’s relative earnings using both spouses’ actual hourly wages, a measure of actual 
monetary contributions per hour worked.  This measure shows an increase in the 
percent of married mothers who are equal (38 percent) and primary (21 percent) 
earners, suggesting that some wives earn more per hour than their husbands, but work 
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part-time hours, thus their total earnings are lower than their husbands.  Finally, 
Column 3 presents wife’s relative earnings using the predicted wife’s hourly wages 
and the actual husband’s hourly wages.  This measure predicts a similar percentage of 
wives to be the primary earner as the actual hourly wages did (21 percent), however 
the percentage of husbands as primary provider drops to 34 percent and the 
percentage of equal earners rises to 45 percent.  This is likely due to the small range 
of predicted values for wages (min is $4.44 and max is $24.55) compared with the 
range for actual values for wages (min is $0.01 and max is $1,072.75).  
Control variables
The control variables included in the labor force entrance models are 
operationalized in the same manner as the control variables included in the labor 
force exit models described above.  These variables include minority status, age, 
metro residence, and a move in the previous or current wave.
Table 4.9 Comparison of Estimated Wife's Relative Earnings and Actual Wife's  










Number of person waves 51,150 51,150 51,150
Mean hourly wage NA $13.46 $12.31
Wife's Relative Earnings (percent)
Husband primary provider 51.5 40.5 34.3
Equal providers 31.7 38.1 45.0
Wife primary provider 16.8 21.4 20.7
Source: 1996 SIPP Panel. Unit of analysis is person wave.
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Methods
This dissertation relies on discrete-time event history analysis to predict labor 
force transitions for married mothers.  This method is described below.
Discrete-time hazard models
To study transition rates, I use discrete-time hazard models and the person-
wave data file.  Events are defined in terms of a qualitative change that occurs at a 
specific point in time, a disjunction between what precedes and what follows (Allison 
1984).  This requires that I divide the observation period into several discrete 
intervals and create a separate unit of analysis for each interval.  In my case, the 
interval is every four months and coincides with an interview wave.  Thus, I create an 
observation for each wave for each individual and the unit of analysis is the woman-
wave.  This allows the baseline hazard rate to vary within the duration of a spell 
without having to specify the exact hazard-rate path (Drobnic, Blossfeld, and Rohwer 
1999).  Dividing the unit into discrete intervals assumes that the transition rate is 
constant within the intervals but can change between them.  
For the analysis of labor force exits, a record is produced for each person-
wave of exposure to the risk of entry.  For example, if a mother leaves the labor force 
in wave 6, six records will be produced.  In the first 5, the dependent outcome is 
coded zero (i.e. no labor force exit).  In the sixth, the dependent outcome is coded one 
(labor force exit).  In the example above, the dependent variable has a lagged effect, 
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with wave 5 independent variables predicting a change in labor force status from 
wave 5 to 6.  Each record, in addition to containing the dependent outcome, also 
contains fixed covariates (independent variables that do not vary over the life of the 
panel), like race and gender, as well as time-varying covariates, like age, income, and 
household composition, set to the values observed at the end of the previous wave.  
The analysis of labor force entrances follows the same methodology as the labor force 
exits, however now the dependent outcome is coded one when a labor force entrance 
occurs.
Discrete-time hazard models have two major advantages over other types of 
regression techniques.  First, these models allow the independent variables to change 
over time, variables such as age, income, or household composition.  Research has 
shown that this leads to less bias in the estimates (Allison 1982).  Another advantage 
of discrete-time hazard models is that they allow the inclusion of censored 
observations (that is, married mothers who have not exited the labor force at the end 
of the survey (Gupta and Leite 1999).
The model is essentially a logistic regression, with the dependent variable 
measuring the occurrence of a married mother with children under 15 who experience 
a labor force transition.  Specifically, the transition being measured at each wave is a 
labor force exit or labor force entrance.  The ratios represent the increased (or 
decreased) odds of experiencing a labor force transition for each wave.  The statistical 
model to be used in this analysis chapter is shown in equation 4-1 (adapted from 
Allison 1984, pages 88-89).
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(1 – Pk)   Equation 4-1.
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[exp(αti + βxti )]
Equation 4-1 gives the probability that a given response category (j) is 
observed at time t, where x = vector of independent variables, some of which are 
time-varying and others are time-invariant, β = vector of coefficients for employment 





shows that the estimates are aggregated over time (indicated by “i” 
beginning in the first unit of time (in my case waves) and going to n, the last unit of 





(1 – Pk) is a survival probability.  In the case where J = 2 (two response 
categories), equation 4-1 simplifies to the binary logistic regression function.  In sum, 
Equation 4-1 states that the probability that event j occurred in time t, divided by the 
probability that no event has occurred by time t, multiplied by the probability of 
surviving to time t yields the Maximum Likelihood (ML) function for multiple events 
over time. 
115
Step-wise analyses are conducted to show the mediating effects of clusters of 
variables.  Interactions are then introduced to explain variations in a more in-depth 
manner.  Multinomial event history analyses are run to predict the determinants of 
labor force exits for full-time mothering reasons or for other reasons and to predict 
the determinants of labor force entrances from full-time mothering reasons or from 
other reasons. The models are run predicting determinants of the first labor force exit 
as well as for the first labor force entrance.  The following equations are estimated for 
the first labor force exit and the first labor force entrance.
Equation for exits
Probability of a labor force exit = β0 + β1 (less than HS) + β2 (some college) + 
β3 (college degree or higher) + β4 (part time) + β5 (log of earnings) + β6 (LF 
break for 6+ months for 1 to 2 years) + β7 (LF break for 6+ months for 3 or 
more years) + β8 (manager or professional) + β9 (private not for profit sector) 
+ β10 (government worker) + β11 (self employed) + β12 (health insurance 
through current job) + β13 (no health insurance) + β14 (log of other family 
income) + β15 (husband works 65 or more hours per week) + β16 (log of 
estimated child care costs) + Β17 (two children) + Β18 (three or more children) 
+ β19 (youngest child less than 1) + β20 (youngest child 1 or 2) + β21 (youngest 
child 3 to 5) + β22 (birth in previous or current wave) + β23 (older child enters 
household in previous or current wave) + β24 (young first birth) + β25 (old first 
birth) + β26 (missing first birth data) + β27 (husband works 65 or more hours 
per week) + β28 (husband primary provider) + β29 (wife primary provider) + 
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β30 (wife lower education) + β31 (wife higher education) + β32 (minority) + β33
(age) + β34 (metro) + β35 (move in previous or current wave) 
Equation for entrances
Probability of a labor force entrance = β0 + β1 (less than HS) + β2 (some 
college) + β3 (college degree or higher) + β4 (predicted hourly wages) + β5
(LF break for 6+ months for 1 to 2 years) + β6 (LF break for 6+ months for 3 
or more years) + β7 (log of other family income) + β8 (husband works 65 or 
more hours per week)+ β9 (log of estimated child care costs) + Β10 (two 
children) + Β11 (three or more children) + β12 (youngest child less than 1) + 
β13 (youngest child 1 or 2) + β14 (youngest child 3 to 5) + β15 (birth in previous 
or current wave) + β16 (older child enters household in previous or current 
wave) + β17 (young first birth) + β18 (old first birth) + β19 (missing first birth 
data) + β20 (husband primary provider) + β21 (wife primary provider) + β22
(wife lower education) + β23 (wife higher education) + β24 (minority) + β25
(age) + β26 (metro) + β27 (move in previous or current wave) 
Summary
The proposed analyses will go beyond prior studies of mother’s labor force 
exits and entrances in several ways.  First, these analyses will include the transitions 
of all married mothers with children under 15, rather than just those with a first birth 
or a new child in the family.  As such, a more definitive look at the complexity of 
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labor force transitions and family decision making in general will be conducted.  
Second, the wide array of variables measuring a variety of aspects of the family 
decision-making process enables a broad examination of the determinants of married 
mothers’ labor force participation.  Third, by making a first foray into a new 
definition of the full-time mother family with respect to the main reason for 
nonemployment and looking at transitions into and out of this family state, the 
standard approach to looking at women’s labor force exits and entrances will be 
examined with an eye for improvement and clarification.  Thus, these analyses will 
answer some questions left unanswered in the existing literature by providing a broad 
assessment of what factors influence the decision to either exit or enter the labor 
force, as well as provide insight into the possible implications of that labor force 
transition in terms of gender equality in the work place and the home.
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Chapter 5: Determinants of Labor Force Exits
This chapter examines labor force exits of married mothers with children 
under 15 using discrete-time event history analysis. This chapter proceeds as follows: 
As a first step, I examine descriptive statistics for the sample as a whole comparing 
married mothers with children under 15 at wave 1 by their employment status at wave 
1.  This comparison provides a backdrop from which to understand labor force 
exits—the principal focus of this chapter.  I then examine descriptive statistics of the 
sample of married mothers who were employed at wave 1 by their subsequent labor 
force participation pattern during the panel.   Next, using step-wise analysis, I build a 
discrete-time event history regression model predicting the first labor force exit 
during the panel controlling for married mothers’ work and family related 
characteristics, and demographic controls.  Interactions are then tested to query 
specific variables further and to gain a better understanding of the results.  After that, 
a multinomial regression is run to see whether the predictors of labor force exits vary 
by the reason for the exit.  The chapter concludes with a summary of key findings.
Labor force participation: Married mothers with children 
Wave 1 sample characteristics 
Table 5.1 presents the weighted characteristics of all married mothers with 
children at wave 1 of the 1996 SIPP Panel by their employment status at wave 1.  I 
restrict the analysis sample to those present in wave 1 because several of the variables 
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that measure the mother’s labor force continuity and work experience are asked in the 
work history topical module administered in wave 1 of the panel.   Married mothers 
who are employed in wave 1 are at risk of a labor force exit in subsequent waves.  
Comparing employed and nonemployed mothers at wave 1 can shed light on the 
measures that might play a role in labor force exits.
Looking at Table 5.1, we see higher educational attainment among the 
employed mothers, with 28 percent graduating from college and 8 percent holding a 
master’s degree or higher while only 18 percent of the nonemployed mothers 
graduated from college and 4 percent hold a master’s degree or higher.  Under half 
(43 percent) of all married mothers with children under 15 have had a break in the 
labor force for 6 or more months specifically for care-giving prior to the start of the 
panel.  The percentage is higher for nonemployed mothers (65 percent) than 
employed mothers (33 percent).8  Employed mothers in wave 1 who took a break 
from the labor force at some point to care for children and/or family, tend on average 
to spend a shorter number of cumulative years away from the labor force for 6 or
more months (7.2 years compared with 9.3 years, respectively).  
8 Note that this variable measures breaks in the labor force for 6 or more months specifically for care-
giving prior to the start of the panel.  While married mothers may have taken breaks in the labor force 
for 6 or more months for other reasons (school, health reasons, etc.), those breaks would not be 
included in this measure.
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Table 5.1 Weighted Comparison of Married Mothers with Children under 15 in  
  Wave 1 by Employment Status in Wave 1
Characteristics at Wave 1 All women
  Employeda 
in Wave 1
     Not 
employeda 
in Wave 1




Less than high school 12.5 8.0 * 22.4
High school degree 31.1 30.0 * 33.5
Some college 31.4 33.9 * 26.0
College graduate 25.0 28.1 * 18.2
    Master's degree or higher 6.5 7.7 * 3.9
Labor force continuity
Break in LF for caregiving 6+months1 43.2 33.3 * 65.2
  No break in LF for caregiving 56.8 66.7 * 34.8
  1 to 2 yrs with 6+ month break 8.9 8.9 * 9.0
  3 to 5 yrs with 6+ month break 11.6 9.8 * 15.5
  6 to 10 yrs with 6+ month break 10.7 7.0 * 18.9
  11 or more yrs with 6+ month break 12.0 7.7 * 21.8




One 39.0 42.1 * 32.0
Two 40.2 40.9 38.6
Three or more 20.8 17.0 * 29.4
Mean number of children 1.9 1.8 * 2.1
Age of youngest child
Less than 1 16.4 14.7 * 20.4
1 to 2 19.5 17.7 * 23.7
3 to 5 21.4 21.1 22.3
6 to 9 21.4 23.0 * 17.8
10 to 14 21.2 23.6 * 15.9
Mean age youngest child 5.2 5.6 * 4.4
Birth during panel
Yes 18.0 17.2 * 19.8
TIMING OF LIFE EVENTS
Age at first birth
Younger, under 22 29.9 28.5 * 33.4
On-time, 23-28 31.1 29.5 * 34.9
Older, 29 and over 41.5 43.1 * 38.0
Missing 19.3 19.6 18.7
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TABLE 5.1 CONTINUED
Characteristics at Wave 1 All women
  Employed 
in wave 1




Monthly other family income2
Less than $1,500 21.3 20.2 * 23.9
$1,500 - $2,999 33.6 35.3 * 30.1
$3,000 - $4,499 22.8 24.5 * 18.9
$4,500 or more 22.3 20.0 * 27.2
Mean monthly family income $3,358 $3,375 * $3,901
Husband's work hours
Husband works 65+ hours per week 11.3 11.2 11.6
Predicted market cost of child care 




Husband primary provider 65.4 54.7 * 89.4
Equal providers 19.3 27.9 * 0.0
Wife primary provider 12.0 17.4 * 0.0
No family income 3.3 0.0 * 10.6
Relative education level4
Husband higher education 24.1 21.8 * 29.3
Equal education 53.6 53.5 54.0
Wife higher education 22.2 24.7 * 16.7
CONTROLS
Minority 25.5 23.0 * 31.0
Age
15 to 24 7.3 5.9 * 10.3
25 to 29 15.0 14.5 16.0
30 to 34 23.9 24.5 22.7
35 to 39 25.4 25.8 24.6
40 to 44 17.5 18.8 * 14.5
45 to 60 11.0 10.5 12.0
Average age 35.4 35.6 * 34.9
Metro residence 77.3 76.9 78.0
Move during panel 28.5 27.0 * 32.1
Average number of waves in panel 10.3 10.3 10.2
N 8,316 5,696 2,620
Source: 1996 SIPP Panel. Unit of analysis is married mother with children under 15 at wave 1.
a Employed is defined as having a paid job and positive earnings.
1 Includes only labor force breaks for 6 or more months prior to the start of the panel (ie., Wave 1).
2 Excludes mother's earnings.
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Employed mothers tend to have on average fewer and older children than 
nonemployed mothers.  A lower proportion experienced a birth of a child during the 
panel and a higher proportion of mothers employed at wave 1 began child bearing at 
older ages (after age 28) than those not employed at wave 1.  Families with an 
employed mother have lower average incomes, other than the mother’s earnings, than 
families where the mother is not employed.  Married mothers employed at wave 1 
have lower predicted child care costs than their nonemployed counterparts.  A greater 
proportion of employed mothers are better educated than their husbands compared 
with nonemployed mothers.
A lower proportion of employed mothers are a minority, and they tend to be 
older than their nonemployed counterparts.  Mothers employed at wave 1 were less 
likely to experience a move during the panel than those nonemployed at wave 1.
Labor force exits: Married mothers with children 
Table 5.2 provides descriptive statistics of those employed at wave 1 
depending on their subsequent labor force participation in the panel.  Table 5.2 
TABLE 5.1 CONTINUED
3 This measure follows Nock's (2001) classification of marriages of equally dependent spouses 
  (MEDS) where the husband is the primary provider if the wife earns less than 40 percent of the 
  combined wife and husband earnings; they are equal earners if the wife earns between 40 and 59 
  percent of the combined earnings; and the wife is the primary earner if she earns 60 percent or
  more of the combined earnings.
4 This measure is calculated using four education categories (less than high school, high school 
  degree, some college, and college degree) and comparing the wife's education with the husband's. 
* statistically significant difference between employed and not employed at the 90 percent 
  confidence interval.
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presents weighted characteristics at wave 1 for those who are employed for the entire 
panel and those who are employed at wave 1 but then exit the labor force sometime 
during the panel.  
Work related variables
Those who exit the labor force clearly have lower human captial and labor 
force continuity prior to their labor force exit than those who remain employed 
throughout the panel.  Mothers who exit the labor force have a lower education level, 
are more likely to work part-time hours, and earn much less per month than those 
who do not exit.  In fact, almost three fourths of the mothers that exit earn less than 
$1,500 per month, some of which is likely due to the large concentration of part-time 
workers in this group.  One quarter of the mothers who exit the labor force 
experienced a previous labor force break of 6 or more months for care-giving and on 
average they have had 8 years where they did not work 6 or more months.  Taken 
altogether, mothers who exit the labor force during the panel appear to have less 
cumulative previous work experience and work commitment than mothers who 
remain employed throughout the panel.
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TABLE 5.2 Weighted Comparison of Employed Married Women with Children in  
  Wave 1 by Labor Force Participation During the Panel
Characteristics at Wave 1
Employed entire 
time during panel
Exit labor force 
during panel




Less than high school 6.1 * 13.3
High school degree 29.8 30.5
Some college 33.7 34.2
College graduate 30.4 * 22.1
  Master's degree or higher 8.9 * 4.5
Hours worked
Part-time 29.7 * 48.2
Full-time 70.3 * 51.8
Monthly personal earnings
Less than $1,500 46.8 * 68.5
$1,500 - $2,999 36.3 * 21.9
$3,000 - $4,499 11.8 * 6.6
$4,500 or more 5.1 * 3.0
Average earnings $1,970 * $1,346
Labor force continuity
Break in LF for caregiving 6+months1 31.8 * 27.1
  No break if LF for caregiving 68.2 * 62.9
  1 to 2 yrs with 6+ month break 9.3 7.8
  3 to 5 yrs with 6+ month break 8.8 * 12.5
  6 to 10 yrs with 6+ month break 6.7 7.7
  11 or more yrs with 6+ month break 7.0 9.1
Mean number of years 7.0 7.5
JOB CHARACTERISTICS
Occupation
Managerial/Proffesional 36.5 * 24.6
Service 14.2 * 23.3
Technical/Sales/Office 39.6 38.7
Production/Craft/Repair 2.2 2.9




Private for profit 60.3 * 66.8
Private not for profit 10.8 * 7.5
Government worker 20.5 * 11.9
Own business 8.4 * 13.8
EMPLOYED AT WAVE 1
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TABLE 5.2 CONTINUED
Characteristics at Wave 1
Employed entire 
time during panel
Exit labor force 
during panel
Health insurance 
Health insurance through husband/other 52.2 * 64.0
Health insurance through current job 41.9 * 19.9






Three or more 16.2 18.6
Mean number of children 1.8 1.9
Age of youngest child
Less than 1 12.9 * 19.5
1 to 2 16.7 * 19.8
3 to 5 20.6 23.3
6 to 9 23.9 * 20.5
10 to 14 25.9 * 16.9
Mean age youngest child 5.9 * 4.8
Birth during panel
Yes 13.5 * 27.8
TIMING OF LIFE EVENTS
Age at first birth
Younger, under 22 27.9 * 33.2
On-time, 23-28 44.4 40.7
Older, 29 and over 20.4 17.5
Missing 7.3 8.6
FAMILY ECONOMICS
Other family income 
Less than $1,500 18.6 * 23.7
$1,500 - $2,999 36.0 33.8
$3,000 - $4,499 25.3 23.0
$4,500 or more 20.2 19.6
Mean family income $3,396 $3,319
Husband's work hours
Husband works 65+ hours per week 10.7 11.9
Child care cost
Mean amount paid for child care $1.80 $1.81
EMPLOYED AT WAVE 1
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TABLE 5.2 CONTINUED
Characteristics at Wave 1
Employed entire 
time during panel
Exit labor force 
during panel
GENDER EGALITARIANISM BETWEEN SPOUSES
Relative monthly earnings3
Husband primary provider 50.6 * 65.5
Equal providers 31.4 * 18.6
Wife primary provider 18.0 15.9
Relative education level4
Husband higher education 20.4 * 26.3
Equal education 53.8 52.2
Wife higher education 25.8 * 21.6
CONTROLS
Minority 22.0 * 25.7
Age
15 to 24 5.0 * 7.4
25 to 29 12.2 * 21.3
30 to 34 24.1 25.5
35 to 39 27.5 * 20.7
40 to 44 20.2 * 15.4
45 to 60 11.0 9.6
Average age 36.1 * 34.5
Metro residence 77.2 76.2
Move during panel 22.8 * 37.3
Average number of waves in panel 10.1 * 10.9
N 4,259 1,152
Source: 1996 SIPP Panel. Unit of analysis is married mother with children under 15 at wave 1.
a Employed is defined as having a paid job and positive earnings.
1 Includes only labor force breaks for 6 or more months prior to the start of the panel (ie., Wave 1).
2 Excludes mother's earnings.
3 This measure follows Nock's (2001) classification of marriages of equally dependent spouses 
  (MEDS) where the husband is the primary provider if the wife earns less than 40 percent of the 
  combined wife and husband earnings; they are equal earners if the wife earns between 40 and 59 
  percent of the combined earnings; and the wife is the primary earner if she earns 60 percent or
  more of the combined earnings.
4 This measure is calculated using four education categories (less than high school, high school 
  degree, some college, and college degree) and comparing the wife's education with the husband's. 
* statistically significant difference between employed and not employed at the 90 percent 
  confidence interval.
EMPLOYED AT WAVE 1
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Some jobs are easier to balance with parenting, as they encompass qualities 
such as flexibility, set hours and schedules, and do not require overtime (Glass 1988; 
Hofferth 1996).  A higher proportion of mothers who are employed throughout the 
panel are managers or professionals, compared with mothers who exit during the 
panel.  However, a larger proportion of mothers who exit are employed in a service 
occupation.  Although a majority of both groups of mothers work for a private, for 
profit company, a larger proportion of mothers who exit the labor force worked in 
that sector.  A larger proportion of mothers who remain employed throughout the 
panel are employed in the private, not for profit sector, work in the government or are 
self employed in their own business, sectors that are potentially more flexible and less 
time intensive, than the private, for profit sector.  More than four in ten of mothers 
who remain employed throughout the panel receive health insurance through their 
job, while half as many, two in ten of the mothers who exit the labor force receive 
this job benefit.  
Family related variables
While these two groups of women have roughly the same number of children, 
a greater proportion of mothers who exit have very young children.  In fact, about 20 
percent have a child under one year old compared with only 13 percent of the mothers 
who remain employed for the entire panel.  Twice as many mothers who exit the 
labor force during the panel experience a birth during the panel compared with 
mothers who remain employed throughout the panel (28 percent compared with 14 
percent).
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A higher proportion of mothers who exit the labor force began family building 
at an early age (33 percent began childbearing before age 23) compared with those 
who remain employed (28 percent).  Similar proportions of mothers who exit the 
labor force began family building at a late age (after 28 years).  
These two groups of mothers have generally comparable other family income 
(not including the wife’s earnings), although a higher proportion of mothers who exit 
the labor force live in families with less than $1,500 per month generated from other 
family income than those mothers who remain employed.  A similar percentage of 
mothers in both groups are married to men who work long overtime hours (roughly 
10 percent).  The estimated market cost of child care is similar for both groups of 
married mothers. 
Mothers who exit the labor force at some point in the panel appear to live in 
families where the husband is the primary earner in wave 1 more frequently than 
those who remain employed (66 percent compared with 51 percent).  On the other 
hand, mothers who remain employed are more likely to share equally in the economic 
provider role with their husbands than those who exit (31 percent compared with 19 
percent).  The proportions of married employed mothers who are the primary 
provider at wave 1 are not statistically different depending on their subsequent labor 
force participation.  Descriptive statistics suggest that married mothers exit the labor 
force when they earn less than their husband, supporting the notion advanced by 
neoclassical economic theory that the spouse with the greater market comparative 
advantage remains the primary provider. But these statistics in Table 5.2 do not reveal 
a clear relationship when the wife outearns her husband, if anything they imply that 
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there would not be a difference between mothers who outearn their husbands 
regarding labor force exits.  Results from a bivariate regression of labor force exits on 
wife’s relative earnings suggest a counter-intuitive relationship between labor force 
exits and wife’s who are the primary provider (see Appendix Table 5.A).  Here, we 
see that wives who outearn their husbands are more likely to exit the labor force 
compared with wives who are equal providers.  Bivariate results also show that 
married mothers with husbands who are the primary provider are more likely to exit 
the labor force, again compared with wives who are equal providers.
A slightly higher proportion of mothers who exit are minorities, and they tend 
to be younger than mothers who remain employed throughout the panel.  A higher 
proportion of those who exit the labor force during the panel also experience a move 
during the panel, than those who remain continuously employed throughout the panel. 
Event History Analysis Models Predicting Labor Force Exits
Recall that the event history analyses use a sample of person waves of married 
mothers.  Table 5.3 presents the total sample at risk for a labor force exit and the 
dependent variable, the first labor force exit, to be used in the analyses of labor force 
exits.  Table 5.3 shows that there are 51,150 waves where a married mother is 
employed, or at risk of a labor force exit during the SIPP panel, and in 1,848 waves a 
married mother exits the labor force.  In 1,432 waves, married mothers exit for full-
time motherhood reasons and in 416 waves, they exit for other reasons.  
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Step-wise analyses
Table 5.4 shows a series of four event history regression models predicting 
whether a married mother exits the labor force during the panel.  Model 1 predicts the 
effect of wife’s relative earnings and wife’s relative education on labor force exits, 
Model 2 adds work related variables, Model 3 adds family related variables, and 
Model 4 adds demographic controls.  This analytical strategy allows the effect of 
wife’s relative earnings and education to change as other co-variates are added to the 
model.
The results from Model 1 show that wives exit the labor force when their 
husband has the comparative market advantage compared with wives who are equal 
earners, supporting neoclassical economic theory.  Model 1 also shows that wives exit 
when they have the comparative market advantage compared with wives who are 
equal earners, contrary to neoclassical economic theory but in line with the 
hypothesized relationship offered by the gender perspective.9  The effect of relative 
9 A correlation matrix revealed that several variables have correlations of 0.450 or higher, significant at 
the 0.05 level.  These include husband primary provider and some college (-0.452); wife primary 
Table 5.3 Labor Force Exit Dependent Variables 
Labor force 
exits sample
Total sample size, person-waves 51,150
Dependent variables
Labor force exits
First labor force exit 1,848
  For motherhood reasons 1,432
  For other reasons 416
Source: 1996 SIPP Panel.  Unit of analysis is person-wave.
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education is in line with neoclassical economic theory—we see a higher propensity 
for labor force exits among wives with lower educational attainment than their 
husbands and a lower propensity among those with higher educational attainment 
than their husbands.
Model 2 adds the human capital and work related variables.  The effect of a 
wife being the primary provider is reduced, yet the relationship remains positive and 
statistically significant.  Similarly, the effect of the husband being the primary 
provider is also reduced, but remains positive and statistically significant.  However, 
the effect of wife’s relative education on labor force exits is mediated by the other co-
variates in the model.  With the addition of the work related variables in Model 2, the 
effect of wife’s relative education is removed and lessened.  Several of the work 
related variables are correlated with labor force exits, and the direction of the effect of 
the variables is consistent with previous research.  Having less than a high school 
education increases the odds that a married mother exits the labor force, as does 
having a college degree.  In Model 2, working part-time hours is negatively 
associated with labor force exits.  Higher mothers’ personal earnings reduce the 
likelihood of a labor force exit.  Married mothers who have had several labor force 
breaks of 6 or more months prior to the start of the panel are more likely to exit the 
labor force.  
provider and other income less than $1,500 per month (0.455); age and youngest child between 6 and 
14 (0.457); equal provider and log of earnings (-0.476); husband primary provider and log of earnings 
(-0.487); manager/professional and college graduate (0.498); log of child care costs and youngest child 
1 to 2 (0.524); wife primary provider and log of other family income (-0.525); and log of child care 
costs and youngest child 6 to 14 (-0.632).
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Table 5.4 Step-Wise Event History Analysis Predicting Labor Force Exit Among Married Mothers with Children Under 15
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Parameter Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
GENDER EGALITARIANISM BETWEEN SPOUSES
Relative monthly earnings1
Husband primary provider 0.805 *** 0.211 ** 0.288 *** 0.290 ***
Equal providers R R R R
Wife primary provider 0.416 *** 0.351 *** 0.217 ** 0.298 ***
Relative education level2
Husband higher education 0.130 *** 0.009 -0.011 -0.008
Equal education R R R R




Less than high school 0.322 *** 0.386 *** 0.363 ***
High school degree R R R
Some college 0.019 -0.047 -0.058
College graduate 0.143 * -0.059 -0.070
Hours worked 
Part-time -0.086 * -0.101 -0.082
Full-time R R R
Monthly personal earnings 
Log of personal earnings -0.442 *** -0.441 *** -0.451 ***
Labor force continuity
Break in LF for caregiving 6+months3
  No break in LF for caregiving R R R
  1 to 2 yrs with 6+ month break -0.084 -0.068 -0.080
  3 or more yrs with 6+ month break 0.076 * 0.208 *** 0.260 ***
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Table 5.4 CONTINUED 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Parameter Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
JOB CHARACTERISTICS
Occupation
Managerial/Proffesional -0.088 -0.092 -0.094
Class of worker
Private for profit R R R
Private not for profit -0.397 *** -0.392 *** -0.373 ***
Government worker -0.412 *** -0.382 *** -0.380 ***
Own business -0.141 * -0.161 ** -0.133 *
Health insurance  
Health insurance through husband (or other) R R R
Health insurance through current job -0.922 *** -1.081 *** -1.133 ***





Two -0.192 *** -0.217 ***
Three or more -0.197 *** -0.219 ***
Age of youngest child
Less than 1 0.764 *** 0.600 **
1 to 2 0.068 -0.144 **
3 to 5 0.008 -0.139
6 to 14 R R
Child enters household in previous or current wave
New baby 0.454 * 0.402 *
Older child enters 0.585 0.528
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Table 5.4 CONTINUED 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Parameter Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
TIMING OF LIFE EVENT
Age at first birth
Younger, under 22 0.028 -0.011
On-time, 23-28 R R
Older, 29 and over 0.176 *** 0.258 ***
Missing 0.359 *** 0.261 **
FAMILY ECONOMICS
Other family income4 
Log of other family income -0.096 *** -0.085 ***
Husband's work hours
Husband works 65+ hours per week 0.316 *** 0.313 ***
Child care costs
Log of predicted child care costs 0.424 *** 0.557 ***
DEMOGRAPHIC CONTROLS
Race and ethnicity 
Minority 0.233 ***
White, not Hispanic R
Age 




Move in previous or current wave 0.519 ***
Intercept -3.520 *** 0.076 0.281 0.730 ***
-2 Log Likelihood 15,654.422 14,483.859 14,184.382 14,107.980
X2 302.603 1,473.166 1,772.643 1,849.044
Degrees of freedom 4 17 30 34
Number of observations 51,150 51,150 51,150 51,150
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Table 5.4 CONTINUED 
Source: 1996 SIPP Panel.  Unit of analysis is person-wave.  p-values: * p<.05    ** p<.01   *** p<.001        R: Reference group
1 This measure follows Nock's (2001) classification of marriages of equally dependent spouses (MEDS) where the husband is the primary provider 
if the wife earns less than 40 percent of the combined wife and husband earnings; they are equal earners if the wife earns between 40 and 
59 percent of the combined earnings; and the wife is the primary earner if she earns 60 percent or more of the combined earnings.
2 This measure is calculated using four education categories (less than high school, high school graduate, some college, and college graduate) 
and comparing the wife's education with the husband's. 
3 Includes only labor force breaks for 6 or more months prior to the start of the panel (ie., Wave 1).            4Excludes mother's earnings.
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A married mother’s occupation is not significantly related to labor force exits, 
however, the sector that she works in is.  Married mothers who work in the private, 
not for profit sector, are government employees, or are self-employed are all less 
likely to exit the labor force than mothers working in the private, for profit sector.  
Having health insurance through the current job reduces the odds of a labor force exit, 
while having no health insurance increases the odds.  Virtually all the work related 
variables that exhibited a bivariate relationship noted in Table 5.2 remain statistically 
significant predictors at the time of a labor force exit.
In Model 3, the family related variables are added. The effect of a husband 
being the primary provider and the effect of the wife being the primary provider 
remains statistically significant—both are positive predictors of married mothers’ 
labor force exits.  With the introduction of family related variables, the effect of 
having a college degree and the effect of working part-time are no longer significant 
predictors of married mothers’ labor force exits.10
Mothers with a youngest child under the age of 1 or those with the recent 
addition of a new baby face higher odds of a labor force exit.  The effect of higher 
numbers of children is negative.11  The coefficient for delayed child bearing shows a 
significant and positive relationship to labor force exits.  Recall that neoclassical 
10 Appendix Table 5.A shows that in a bivariate model, married mothers working part-time hours have 
a higher propensity to exit the labor force than married mothers working full-time hours.  Furthermore, 
in a separate full model (not shown) working part-time is a significant and positive predictor of 
married mother’s labor force exits when the mother’s earnings are included as three dummy variables 
rather than as a continuous logged variable.
11 Although I expected mothers with higher numbers of children to be more likely to exit the labor 
force, Klerman and Leibowitcz (1999) found that mothers self select at the birth of their first child into 
homemakers and paid workers.  They found that mothers who are employed after their first birth, also 
are employed after their second, and their third.  Because my sample includes all mothers, not just 
first-time mothers or new mothers, the negative effect of a higher number of children on mother’s 
labor force exits is not surprising.
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economic theory suggests that mothers who delay child bearing invest in their 
education and build stronger ties to the labor force.  As such, the effect of delayed 
child bearing should be negative under this theoretical stream.  On the other hand, the 
life course perspective allows for differential impacts on labor force participation 
depending on the age at first birth.  Women who have built the foundation of their 
careers may be able to take time off from the labor force without suffering downward 
mobility in the future.  This relationship is curious and is explored in further detail 
below.  
The effect of family income, other than the wife’s earnings, is negative 
contrary to my hypotheses based on neoclassical economic theory and the life course 
perspective.  Wives married to husbands who work overtime (65 hours per week or 
more) face higher risks of exiting the labor force (odds ratio = 1.3) than wives whose 
husbands do not.  Finally, higher predicted child care costs raise the risk of a labor 
force exit for married mothers, consistent with the literature.  
In model 4, I add demographic controls.  The relationship of wife’s relative 
earnings on labor force exits again is unchanged.  Net of the work, family, and 
demographic control variables, wives who outearn their husbands are more likely to 
exit the labor force compared with wives who are equal providers, as are wives in 
couples where the husband is the primary provider.  The coefficients for the work 
related indicators and the family related indicators are similar in Model 3 and 4, 
suggesting that the relationships between work and family characteristics on labor 
force exits are strong.  Having a youngest child aged one or two now reduces the 
likelihood of a labor force exit compared with having a youngest child aged 6 to 14, 
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however having a youngest child under the age of 1 or having a recent new baby both 
remain significant and positive predictors of married mothers’ labor force exits.
Three of the demographic controls are significantly related to labor force 
exits.  Being a minority or experiencing a recent move are both positively associated 
with a labor force exit.  As age increases, married mothers are less likely to exit the 
labor force.
In sum, the step-wise analyses in Table 5.4 reveal several interesting findings.  
First, the effect on a labor force exit of a wife being the primary provider (relative to 
being an equal provider) remains positive controlling for work, family, and 
demographic variables.  Whether this positive effect varies systematically by other 
family income and the age of youngest child is tested in subsequent analyses.  The 
effect of wife’s relative education becomes statistically insignificant once other co-
variates are included, thus this variable is removed from any subsequent analyses.  
The final full model without the wife’s relative education is shown in Table 5.5.  The 
effect of delayed child bearing on labor force exits is positive, supporting the life 
course perspective’s assertion that women who have built the foundation of their 
careers may be able to take time off from the labor force without suffering downward 
mobility in the future as Blackburn et al., (1993) and Tanigushi (1999) argue.  
Interactions are run to better understand the dynamics involved in this positive 
relationship between age at first birth and married mothers’ labor force exits.
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Table 5.5 Full Model, Event History Analysis Predicting Labor Force Exit Among 
Married Mothers with Children Under 15
Standard Odds
Parameter Coefficient Error Ratio
GENDER EGALITARIANISM BETWEEN SPOUSES
Relative monthly earnings1
Husband primary provider 0.295 *** 0.085 1.343
Equal providers R




Less than high school 0.381 *** 0.070 1.464
High school degree R
Some college -0.080 0.034 0.923
College graduate -0.096 0.053 0.908
Hours worked 
Part-time -0.079 0.051 0.924
Full-time R
Monthly personal earnings 
Log of personal earnings -0.450 *** 0.025 0.637
Labor force continuity
Break in LF for caregiving 6+months2
  No break in LF for caregiving R
  1 to 2 yrs with 6+ month break -0.081 0.069 0.923
  3 or more yrs with 6+ month break 0.261 *** 0.036 1.299
JOB CHARACTERISTICS
Occupation
Managerial/Professional -0.088 0.060 0.916
Class of worker
Private for profit R
Private not for profit -0.373 *** 0.043 0.683
Government worker -0.381 *** 0.073 0.877
Own business -0.131 * 0.058 0.688
Health insurance  
Health insurance through husband (or other) R
Health insurance through current job -1.137 *** 0.090 0.320





Two -0.217 *** 0.042 0.805




Parameter Coefficient Error Ratio
Age of youngest child
Less than 1 0.599 *** 0.181 1.820
1 to 2 -0.145 ** 0.048 0.865
3 to 5 -0.141 0.077 0.869
6 to 14 R
Child enters household in previous or current wave
New baby 0.401 * 0.189 1.494
Older child enters 0.525 0.522 1.692
TIMING OF LIFE EVENTS
Age at first birth
Younger, under 22 -0.016 0.052 0.984
On-time, 23-28 R
Older, 29 and over 0.262 *** 0.042 1.299
Missing 0.258 ** 0.088 1.297
FAMILY ECONOMICS
Other family income3
Log of other family income -0.084 *** 0.013 0.919
Husband's work hours
Husband works 65+ hours per week 0.312 *** 0.059 1.366
Child care costs
Log of predicted child care costs 0.562 *** 0.100 1.754
DEMOGRAPHIC CONTROLS
Race and ethnicity
Minority 0.229 *** 0.055 1.258
White, not Hispanic R
Age 
Continuous variable of age -0.018 *** 0.003 0.983
Residence
Metro residence 0.018 0.046 1.019
Move
Move in previous or current wave 0.518 *** 0.069 1.681
Intercept 0.694 *** 0.201
-2 Log Likelihood 14,110.240
X2 1,846.784
Degrees of freedom 32
Number of observations 51,150
Source: 1996 SIPP Panel.  Unit of analysis is person-wave. 
1 This measure follows Nock's (2001) classification of marriages of equally dependent spouses (MEDS)
where the husband is the primary provider if the wife earns less than 40 percent of the combined
wife and husband earnings; they are equal earners if the wife earns between 40 and 59 percent 
of the combined earnings; and the wife is the primary earner if she earns 60 percent or more of
the combined earnings.
2 Includes only labor force breaks for 6 or more months prior to the start of the panel (ie., Wave 1).
3 Excludes mother's earnings.  p-values: * p<.05    ** p<.01   *** p<.001        R: Reference group
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The negative relationship for other family income, excluding the mother’s 
personal earnings, is contrary to previous literature and neoclassical economic 
theory’s contention that mothers exit the labor force as other family income rises 
because this reduces her opportunity costs of not working.  I ran several models 
varying only the specification of other monthly family income to examine the 
relationship more closely (see Table 5.6).  The other co-variates in the models are 
those shown in the full model in Table 5.5.  Model 1 specifies other family income as 
the log of other family as in Table 5.5, and shows that other family income is 
negatively associated with married mothers’ labor force exits.  With every dollar 
increase in other family income, the likelihood of a married mother’s labor force exit 
decreases by 8.4 percent.  In Models 2 – 7, other family income is specified as 
categorical variables, with a different reference group in each model.  In Model 2, the 
reference category is the lowest other earning group, $1,500 or less. The coefficients 
for all three other income categories are negative, showing the same negative 
relationship between other family income and labor force exits exhibited in Model 1.  
Model 3 changes the reference group to other family income between $1,500 and 
$2,999.  Mothers living in the lowest other income group are more likely to exit the 
labor force, probably because the costs associated with working outweigh the gains 
from working.  The coefficients for the two higher other family income groups are 
both negative, but only the coefficient for mothers living in families with other family 
income between $3,000 and $4,499 per month is significant.  Model 4 shows that 
mothers with the highest and lowest other family income are more likely to exit the 
labor force, compared with mothers living with other family income between $3,000 
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and $4,499.  When the reference group is changed to the highest other income group 
(as in Model 5), $4,500 or more per month, mothers living with other family income 
in the two middle groups are significantly less likely to exit the labor force.  
Finally, I tested for a curvilinear effect of other family income to see if 
mothers with very low other family income and mothers with high other family 
income exhibit the same effect on mothers’ labor force exits, namely a positive effect.  
Model 6 shows that both coefficients are positive, but only the coefficient for the 
lowest other family income group is significant.  It is possible that the cut point for 
the highest other family income category is not sufficiently high enough to push a 
mother to exit.  Roughly translated into annual income, $4,500 per month yields 
about $52,000 annually.  To test this, I changed the two highest other income 
categories to be between $3,000 and $6,249 and $6,250 and higher ($6,250 per month 
is roughly equivalent to $75,000 annual other family income).  Model 7 shows that 
compared to mothers living in families with between $1,500 and $6,249 monthly 
other income, mothers with very low income and mothers with very high income 
(under $1,500 and over $6,250 per month, respectively) are more likely to exit the 
labor force, suggesting that a curvilinear relationship exits between other family 
income and mothers’ labor force exits.  Regardless of the specification of other family 
income shown in Table 5.6, the coefficients for the other co-variates in the model 
remained stable.  Appendix Table 5.B shows the full model with other family income 
specified as in Model 7 in Table 5.6. 
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Table 5.6 Different Specifications of Other Family Income, Event History Analysis
 Predicting Labor Force Exit Among Married Mothers with Children Under 15
Standard
Parameter Coefficient Error
Different specifications of other family income1
MODEL 1
Log of other family income -0.084 *** 0.013
Other family income categories
MODEL 2
Less than $1,500 R
$1,500 - $2,999 -0.317 *** 0.052
$3,000 - $4,499 -0.458 *** 0.057
$4,500 or more -0.301 *** 0.075
MODEL 3
Less than $1,500 0.189 *** 0.054
$1,500 - $2,999 R
$3,000 - $4,499 -0.173 *** 0.042
$4,500 or more -0.010 0.052
MODEL 4
Less than $1,500 0.269 *** 0.064
$1,500 - $2,999 0.050 0.048
$3,000 - $4,499 R
$4,500 or more 0.095 ** 0.037
MODEL 5
Less than $1,500 0.097 0.074
$1,500 - $2,999 -0.121 * 0.052
$3,000 - $4,499 -0.239 *** 0.031
$4,500 or more R
MODEL 6
Less than $1,500 0.234 *** 0.052
$1,500 - $2,999 R
$3,000 - $4,499 R
$4,500 or more 0.069 0.038
MODEL 7
Less than $1,500 0.235 *** 0.052
$1,500 - $2,999 R
$3,000 - $6,249 R
$6,250 or more 0.210 *** 0.040
Source: 1996 SIPP Panel.  Unit of analysis is person-wave.  p-values: * p<.05  ** p<.01  *** p<.001
1 Excludes mother's earnings.
Note: All models control for variables specified in Table 5.5, with only the specification of
  other family income changing.
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Another possibility is that this sample of married employed mothers with 
children under 15 is a somewhat select group.  Recall from Table 5.1 that mothers 
who were not employed in wave 1 had higher average other family income than those 
who were employed at wave 1.  If higher other family income gives married mothers 
a “choice” of exiting the labor force, this suggests that those married mothers who 
wanted to exit and could afford to exit due to higher other family income may have 
already done so.  If this is the case, the employed married mothers with higher other 
family income in my sample are made up of mothers with stronger ties to the labor 
force with a low inclination to exit.  Recall also that this analysis is not looking at 
labor force patterns of new mothers, or labor force exits after the birth of a child, 
when the value of a mother’s time in the home is especially high and other family 
income exerts a strong positive effect on labor force exits, as prior research has 
shown.  In any case, the results from my models show that the effect of other family 
income on married mothers’ labor force exits is negative, or possibly curvilinear with 
labor force exits likely at low and very high other family income levels.
Interactions with wife’s relative earnings
Other family income
It is possible that the relationship between wife’s relative earnings and labor 
force exits are moderated by the amount of other family income available (not 
including her earnings).  When other family income is low, a wife who is the primary 
provider would likely be hesitant to exit the labor force because her income plays a 
crucial role in keeping the family solvent.  However, when other family income is 
145
high, a wife who is the primary provider may be more apt to exit the labor force 
because the family can “make it” on the husbands earnings alone.
To test this possibility, I add an interaction term between the wife’s relative 
earnings and other family income, not including the wife’s earnings, to the full model.  
An interaction effect refers to the case where the nature of the relationship between 
one of the independent variables and the dependent variable changes as a function of 
another independent variable (Jaccard 1983; Jaccard, Turrisi, and Wan 1990).
 Because my interest is in the effect of the wife’s relative earnings as 
moderated by other family income, Table 5.7 shows the coefficients for the wife’s 
relative earnings, other family income, and the interaction terms, controlling for the 
work, family, and demographic control variables.  Table 5.7 shows two interaction 
models.  Model 1 presents a multiplicative model with an interaction of the two 
dummy variables measuring the wife’s relative earnings and the log of other monthly 
family income (the additive model, or main effects only model, is shown in Table 
5.5).  Model 2 in Table 5.7 shows the multiplicative model with an interaction of the 
two dummy variables measuring the wife’s relative earnings and three categories of 
other family income: Other monthly family income of $1,500 or less, other monthly 
family income of $1,500 to $6,249 (reference category), and other monthly family 
income of $6,250 or more (the additive model, or main effects only model, is shown 
in Appendix Table 5.B).  The complete models with all the independent variables 
included are shown in Appendix Table 5.C and 5.D. 
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The interaction term measuring the wife as the primary earner and the log of 
other family income in Model 1 is significant, indicating that the nature of the 
Table 5.7 Event History Analysis Predicting Labor Force Exit Among Married Mothers 
with Children Under 15 With Interaction of Wife's Relative Earnings and  
Other Family Income
Parameter
GENDER EGALITARIANISM BETWEEN SPOUSES
Relative monthly earnings1
Husband primary provider -0.424 0.332 ***
Equal providers R R
Wife primary provider -0.796 ** 0.797 ***
MODEL 1
Interaction with log of other family income
Husband primary * log other family income 0.099 *
Wife primary * log other family income 0.152 ***
Other family income2
Log of other family income -0.221 ***
MODEL 2
Interaction with other family income categories
Husband primary * other income less than $1,500 -0.071
Husband primary * other income $6,250 or more 0.168
Wife primary * other income less than $1,500 -0.651 ***
Wife primary * other income $6,250 or more 0.068
Other family income
Less than $1,500 0.414 ***
$1,500 - $6,249 R
$6,250 or more 0.060
Source: 1996 SIPP Panel.  Unit of analysis is person-wave.
1 This measure follows Nock's (2001) classification of marriages of equally dependent spouses (MEDS)
where the husband is the primary provider if the wife earns less than 40 percent of the combined
wife and husband earnings; they are equal earners if the wife earns between 40 and 59 percent 
of the combined earnings; and the wife is the primary earner if she earns 60 percent or more of
the combined earnings.
2 Excludes mother's earnings.  p-values: * p<.05    ** p<.01   *** p<.001        R: Reference group
Note: All models control for variables specified in Table 5.5, with only the specification of
  other family income and the interactions changing.
Coefficient Coefficient
Model 1 Model 2
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relationship between the wife being the primary earner does vary systematically 
depending on other family income.  Recall from Table 5.5 that the main effect of the 
wife being a primary provider was statistically significant and positively related to 
labor force exits in the additive model (coefficient=0.299).  Table 5.7 shows that the 
main effect of the wife being a primary provider in the multiplicative model is 
negative and statistically significant.  This makes sense because the interpretation of 
the main effect is conditional on the other independent variable, when it is equal to 0 
(Jaccard et. al 1990).  Thus, at very low other family income levels, wives who 
outearn their husbands have a lower propensity to exit the labor force.  The main 
effect of the log of other family income is negative and significant, meaning that as 
other family income rises, wives who are equal earners with their husbands are less 
likely to exit the labor force.   The interaction term is positive and statistically 
significant.  For every dollar increase in other family income, the slope of the wife 
being a primary provider on labor force exits increases by 0.152 units, meaning that 
the likelihood of an exit increases by 0.152 for wives who outearn their husbands as 
other family income rises.  Thus, in general the interaction intensifies the positive 
effect of the wife being the primary provider on labor force exits by pushing up the 
slope as other family income rises.
Model 2 provides insight into how other family income categories moderate 
the relationship between wife’s relative earnings and labor force exits.  One of the 
interaction terms measuring the wife as the primary earner and the other family 
income categories in Model 2 is significant, indicating that the nature of the 
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relationship between the wife being the primary earner does vary depending on some 
of the other family income categories.  
Appendix Table 5.B shows that the main effect of the wife being a primary 
provider was statistically significant and positively related to labor force exits in this 
additive model (coefficient=0.419), when other family income is specified as the 
three dummy variables shown in Model 2.  Model 2 in Table 5.7 shows that the main 
effect of the wife being a primary provider in the multiplicative model is positive and 
statistically significant.  Again, this makes sense because now the reference group is 
other family income between $1,500 and $6,249.  Thus, at moderate to middle other 
family income levels, wives who outearn their husbands have a higher propensity to 
exit the labor force.  The main effect of very low other family income is positive and 
significant, meaning that at very low other income levels, wives who are equal 
earners with their husbands are more likely to exit the labor force.  The main effect of 
very high other family income is positive but not statistically significant.  The 
interaction term between very low other family income and wife as primary provider 
is negative and statistically significant.  Thus, if the wife is the primary provider and 
the husband is a very low earner, the slope of wife being a primary provider on labor 
force exits decreases by 0.651 units.  Thus, the interaction effect in general softens 
the positive main effect of wives who outearn their husbands having a higher 
propensity to exit the labor force by pushing the slope down when other family 
income is very low.  The interaction term between very high other family income and 
wife as primary provider is positive but is not statistically significant.  Neither of the 
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interaction terms between husband as primary provider and other family income 
categories is statistically significant.
Age of youngest child
It is also possible that the effect of wife’s relative earnings on labor force exits 
varies by the intensity of her family care responsibilities.  Previous research shows 
that the pull of family tends to be strongest during times of family building, when 
children are young and if there are many children.  Could the increased propensity of 
labor force exits among wives who outearn their husbands be due, in part, to the age 
of their youngest child?  To test this, I add an interaction term between the wife’s 
relative earnings and the age of her youngest child to the full model presented in 
Table 5.5.  Results for the interaction terms and the main effects are presented in 
Table 5.8, controlling for the work, family, and demographic control variables.  The 
complete model with all the covariates is shown in Appendix Table 5.E.
The interaction term measuring the wife as the primary earner and the 
continuous variable of age of youngest child is not significant, indicating that the 
nature of the relationship between the wife being the primary earner does not vary 
systematically depending on the age of the youngest child.  Table 5.8 shows that the 
main effect of the wife being a primary provider in the multiplicative model is 
positive and statistically significant.  This makes sense because the interpretation of 
the main effect is that when there is a very young child in the household, wives who 
outearn their husbands have a higher propensity to exit the labor force.  The main 
effect of the age of youngest child is positive but not significant.  The interaction term 
of wife as primary provider and age of youngest child is negative and not statistically 
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significant.  However, the interaction term of husband as primary provider and age of 
youngest child is negative and statistically significant.  
Interactions with age at first birth
Recall the finding from the final full model that married mothers who delayed 
child bearing were significantly more likely to exit the labor force compared with 
those who began child bearing on-time (see Appendix Table 5.F, the same final full 
model but now it shows the coefficients for age at first birth at the top of the table).  
Table 5.8 Event History Analysis Predicting Labor Force Exit Among Married Mothers  




GENDER EGALITARIANISM BETWEEN SPOUSES
Relative monthly earnings1
Husband primary provider 0.531 *** 0.102
Equal providers R
Wife primary provider 0.436 *** 0.138
Interactions 
Husband primary * age of youngest child -0.042 *** 0.012
Wife primary * age of youngest child -0.023 0.015
Age of youngest child
Continuous variable of age of youngest child 0.015 0.011
Source: 1996 SIPP Panel.  Unit of analysis is person-wave.
1 This measure follows Nock's (2001) classification of marriages of equally dependent spouses (MEDS)
where the husband is the primary provider if the wife earns less than 40 percent of the combined
wife and husband earnings; they are equal earners if the wife earns between 40 and 59 percent 
of the combined earnings; and the wife is the primary earner if she earns 60 percent or more of
the combined earnings.
p-values: * p<.05    ** p<.01   *** p<.001        R: Reference group
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According to neoclassical economic theory, women who delay child bearing invest 
more in their career and market value through higher education and work experience, 
and have higher earnings, so they would be less likely to exit the labor force because 
their actual wage would be higher than their reservation wage.  However, the results 
support the life course perspective’s argument that this higher investment in market 
value leads married mothers who delay child bearing to believe that they can easily 
reenter the labor force and would not be disadvantaged from a labor force break 
(Blackburn et al. 1993; Tanigushi 1999).  
To test whether married mothers who delay child bearing and have high 
market value face a higher risk of a labor force exit, I add two interactions separately 
into the full model: one interaction of the age at first birth and the mother’s personal 
earnings (model 1) and the second interaction of the age at first birth and the mother’s 
education level (model 2).  My interest is on the effect of age at first birth as 
moderated by mother’s personal earnings or by mother’s education level, thus Table 
5.9 shows the coefficients for age at first birth, mother’s personal earnings, and the 
interaction terms, controlling for the work, family, and demographic control 
variables.  Model 1 displays the coefficients for the model that interacts age at first 
birth with mother’s personal earnings.  Model 2 displays the coefficients for the 
model that interacts age at first birth with mother’s education level.  Complete models 
are shown in Appendix Table 5.G (interaction with mother’s personal earnings) and 
Appendix Table 5.H (interaction with mother’s education level).
The interaction term of old age at first birth and log of personal earnings in 
Model 1 is significant, indicating that the nature of the relationship between delayed 
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childbearing does vary systematically depending on earnings.  Recall from Table 5.5 
that the main effect of delayed childbearing was statistically significant and positively 
related to labor force exits in the additive model (coefficient=0.262).  Table 5.9 shows 
that the main effect of delayed childbearing in the multiplicative model is negative 
and statistically significant.  This makes sense because the interpretation of the main 
effect is conditional on the other independent variable, personal earnings.  When 
personal earnings are very low, mothers who delay childbearing have a lower 
propensity to exit the labor force.  The main effect of the log of personal earnings is 
negative and significant, meaning that as earnings rise, mothers who begin 
childbearing on-time are less likely to exit the labor force.   The interaction term is 
positive and statistically significant.  For every dollar increase in personal earnings, 
the slope of delayed childbearing on labor force exits increases by 0.139 units, 
meaning that the likelihood of an exit increases by 0.139 for delayed childbearers as 
their earnings rises.  Thus, in general the interaction intensifies the positive effect of 
delayed childbearing on labor force exits by pushing up the slope as personal earnings 
rise.
Model 2 includes an interaction of delayed child bearing and education 
level.12  The interaction of delayed childbearing and college graduate is statistically 
significant and negative, indicating that the nature of the relationship between delayed 
childbearing does vary to some extent depending on education.  Model 2 in Table 5.9 
shows that the main effect of delayed childbearing in the multiplicative model is 
positive and statistically significant, meaning that high school graduates who delay 
12 In a previous model, I estimated a full interaction of all the age at first birth dummy variables and the 
education categories, but removed them because none of the interactions were significant for early 
childbearing or missing on age at first birth.
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childbearing are more likely to exit the labor force.  The main effect of having less 
than a high school degree is positive and significant, and the main effect of having 
some college education is negative and significant.  Thus early, on-time and those 
missing age at first birth data who have less than a high school degree are more likely 
to exit the labor force, but those with some college are less likely to exit.  The 
interaction effect of delayed childbearing and having a college degree is negative and 
significant.  Being a college graduate decreases the slope of delayed childbearing on 
labor force exits by 0.394 units, meaning that the likelihood of an exit decreases by 
0.394 for college graduates who delay childbearing. Thus, in general the interaction 
intensifies the negative effect of delayed childbearing on labor force exits by pushing 
the slope down.
While Model 1 shows that delayed childbearers are more likely to exit the 
labor force as their earnings rise, Model 2 shows that college graduates who delay 
childbearing are less likely to exit the labor force.  Thus, my results provide mixed 
support for the life course perspective’s argument that mothers who delay child 
bearing and have a higher market value may believe they can reenter the market place 
easily after a labor force break.
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Full-time Motherhood
Next, this dissertation examines the extent to which the explanatory factors 
differ depending on the primary reason for the labor force exit.  Mothers exit the labor 
Table 5.9 Event History Analysis Predicting Labor Force Exit Among Married Mothers 
with Children Under 15 With Interaction of Age at First Birth and Mother's 
Earnings and Education
Model 1 Model 2
Parameter Coefficient Coefficient
TIMING OF PREVIOUS LIFE EVENTS
Age at first birth
Younger, under 22 -0.491 R
On-time, 23-28 R R
Older, 29 and over -0.663 * 0.407 ***
Missing -0.165 R
MODEL 1
Interaction with log of personal monthly earnings
Young first birth * log of earnings 0.073
Old first birth * log of earnings 0.139 ***
Missing first birth * log of earnings 0.065
Monthly personal earnings 
Log of earnings -0.508 ***
MODEL 2
Interaction with education
Old first birth * less than high school -0.085
Old first birth * some college -0.048
Old first birth * college graduate -0.394 ***
Education level
Less than high school 0.388 ***
High school degree R
Some college -0.088 *
College graduate 0.018
Source: 1996 SIPP Panel.  Unit of analysis is person-wave.
p-values: * p<.05    ** p<.01   *** p<.001        R: Reference group
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force for a variety of reasons, but most mothers, when asked, respond that they left 
the labor force primarily 1) to take care of children and family or 2) due to 
childbirth/pregnancy (see Table 4.4).  In this dissertation, I consider these reasons to 
be full-time motherhood reasons.  Other reasons to exit the labor force include health 
reasons, going to school, not able to find a job, and other reasons.
Labor force exits for full-time motherhood reasons or other reasons
Table 5.10 shows the results from a multinomial discrete-time event history 
analysis predicting whether a married mother exits the labor force for full-time 
motherhood reasons or for other reasons.  Studies of mother’s labor force exits tend to 
rely on data collected on observed labor force behavior, such as in the labor force or 
not, without examining the reason for the behavior.  If major differences in the effect 
of the coefficients exist by reason for the labor force exit, then the study of married 
mother’s labor force exits should include a control for the reason or study these two 
groups separately.  On the other hand, if very few discrepancies exist or if the effects 
seen in the final full model (see Table 5.5 for a review) reflect the effects seen for 
full-time motherhood reasons in the multinomial model, then no such control is 
necessary.  
At first glance, the results presented in Table 5.10 show similar relationships 
between the covariates and the likelihood of exiting the labor force for full-time 
motherhood reasons and for other reasons.  Relationships generally are in the same 
direction, although at varying levels of significance.  However, important variations 
do exist.
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Looking first at mother’s relative earnings, the relationships seen in previous 
tables appear to be driven by mother’s who exit for full-time motherhood.  Wives are 
more likely to exit the labor force if they are the primary provider or if their husband 
is the primary provider, compared with wives who are equal providers, only among 
married mothers who exit for full-time motherhood.  
Turning to work related variables, married mothers with less than a high 
school degree are more likely to exit the labor force for full-time motherhood reasons 
and for other reasons compared with mothers who graduated from high school.  
Married mothers with some college do not differ statistically from high school 
graduates in their propensity to exit the labor force regardless of their reason for the 
exit.  Yet, being a college graduate is only statistically associated with a decreased 
risk for a labor force exit among those married mothers who exited the labor force for 
reasons not related to motherhood.  This negative effect of having a college degree is 
also found in the full model, and seems to be attributable only to those who exit for 
other reasons, not for full-time motherhood reasons.  
The effect of working part-time hours is negative regardless of the reason for 
the exit, but is only significant for those who exit for other reasons.  As personal 
earnings increase, married mothers are less likely to exit the labor force regardless of 
the reason for the exit.  The increased risk of a labor force exit for mothers who have 
had 3 or more breaks from the labor force for 6 or more months seen in the full model 
apparently is driven by those who exit for full-time motherhood reasons.  The more 
times a married mother has exited to care for family and children, the greater her risk 
is to exit again for those reasons.
157
Table 5.10 Discrete-time Event History Analysis Predicting Labor Force Exit for Employed Married Mothers With






GENDER EGALITARIANISM BETWEEN SPOUSES
Relative monthly earnings1
Husband primary provider 0.422 *** 0.086 -0.070 0.142
Equal providers R R




Less than high school 0.401 *** 0.091 0.309 * 0.156
High school degree R R
Some college -0.069 0.072 -0.104 0.126
College graduate 0.021 0.097 -0.487 * 0.189
Hours worked 
Part-time -0.023 0.065 -0.283 * 0.122
Full-time R R
Monthly personal earnings 
Log of personal earnings -0.441 *** 0.030 -0.462 *** 0.055
Labor force continuity
Break in LF for caregiving 6+months1
  No break in LF for caregiving R R
  1 to 2 yrs with 6+ month break -0.077 0.098 -0.093 0.187












Managerial/Professional -0.143 0.077 0.099 0.138
Class of worker
Private for profit R R
Private not for profit -0.342 ** 0.112 -0.463 * 0.212
Government worker -0.404 *** 0.099 -0.293 0.165
Own business -0.059 0.082 -0.419 * 0.169
Health insurance  
Health insurance through husband (or other) R R
Health insurance through current job -1.073 *** 0.093 -1.342 *** 0.165





Two -0.184 ** 0.069 -0.232 * 0.119
Three or more -0.072 0.088 -0.619 *** 0.171
Age of youngest child
Less than 1 0.625 *** 0.105 0.304 0.211
1 to 2 -0.142 0.119 -0.194 0.220
3 to 5 -0.104 0.093 -0.285 0.173
6 to 14 R R
Child enters in previous or current wave
New baby 0.480 *** 0.101 -0.276 0.299










TIMING OF LIFE EVENTS
Age at first birth
Younger, under 22 -0.090 0.072 0.131 0.124
On-time, 23-28 R R
Older, 29 and over 0.360 *** 0.084 0.052 0.157
Missing 0.213 * 0.100 0.377 * 0.179
FAMILY ECONOMICS
Other family income3
Log of other family income -0.085 *** 0.023 -0.092 ** 0.035
Husband's work hours
Husband works 65+ hours per week 0.335 *** 0.078 0.227 0.153
Child care costs
Log of predicted child care costs 0.490 ** 0.168 0.651 * 0.330
DEMOGRAPHIC CONTROLS
Race and ethnicity
Minority 0.191 ** 0.069 0.341 ** 0.120
White, not Hispanic R R
Age 
Continuous variable of age -0.036 *** 0.005 0.026 *** 0.008
Residence
Metro residence 0.033 0.076 -0.004 0.138
Move





Intercept 0.827 0.341 -1.659 ** 0.570
-2 Log Likelihood 15,887.950
X2
Degrees of freedom 66
Number of observations 51,150
Source: 1996 SIPP Panel.  Unit of analysis is person-wave.  p-values: * p<.05    ** p<.01   *** p<.001        R: Reference group
1 This measure follows Nock's (2001) classification of marriages of equally dependent spouses (MEDS) where the husband is the primary provider 
if the wife earns less than 40 percent of the combined wife and husband earnings; they are equal earners if the wife earns between 40 and 
59 percent of the combined earnings; and the wife is the primary earner if she earns 60 percent or more of the combined earnings.
2 This measure is calculated using four education categories (less than high school, high school graduate, some college, and college graduate) 
and comparing the wife's education with the husband's. 
3 Includes only labor force breaks for 6 or more months prior to the start of the panel (ie., Wave 1).            4Excludes mother's earnings.
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Married mothers working in the private, not for profit sector, working for the 
government, and self-employed mothers are less likely to exit the labor force for full-
time motherhood than their counterparts in the private, for profit sector.  While 
working in the private, not for profit sector and being self employed reduce the 
likelihood of a labor force exit for other reasons, working for the government is not 
statistically significant for this group of mothers.  Having health insurance through a 
current job reduces the propensity for a labor force exit for both full-time motherhood 
and other reasons, not having health insurance increases the propensity for labor force 
exit for full-time motherhood reasons only.
Looking now at family related variables, mothers with more than one child are 
less likely to exit the labor force, regardless of the reason for the exit. However, 
mothers with a youngest child under the age of 1 and mothers with a new baby are 
more likely to exit the labor force for full-time motherhood reasons only.  The 
positive effect of delayed child bearing on labor force exits seen in the full model is 
only evident for mothers who exit for full-time motherhood reasons.
The effect of two of the indicators of family economics on labor force exits is 
the same for both groups of mothers.  Higher levels of other family income decrease 
the likelihood of labor force exits, while higher child care costs increase the 
likelihood of labor force exits, regardless of the reason for the exit.  But having a 
husband who works overtime (65 or more hours per week) increases the likelihood of 
a labor force exit only for those who exit for full-time motherhood reasons.  Al the 
demographic control variables exhibit the same effect regardless of the reason for the 
exit.
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Despite the differences found in the determinants of exiting the labor force for 
full-time motherhood reasons and for other reasons, similar relationships exist in the 
full model as in the full-time motherhood model.  Therefore, the standard approach of 
using nonemployment as a proxy for full-time motherhood appears to be a valid 
approach to studying labor force exits of mothers.  
Discussion
These analyses add breadth and depth to the discussion of mothers labor force 
exits by building upon previous research.  One key finding is that mothers who 
outearn their husbands are more likely to exit the labor force, all else equal.  This 
result adds an important element to the discussion on married mothers’ labor force 
exits—the element of marital power as a potential factor influencing labor force 
participation decisions.  A second key finding is that mothers who delay child bearing 
are more likely to exit the labor force, net of all the co-variates in the model.  This 
result opens the possibility that the timing of a pivotal life event—the onset of child 
bearing—can have differential impacts on the life trajectory of women, such that 
married mothers who delay child bearing may be able to take time off from the labor 
force without suffering downward mobility.  These two findings are elaborated upon 
further below.
My results show that the effect of a mother being the primary provider is 
positively associated with labor force exits, contrary to my expectation and to 
neoclassical economic theory.  To better understand the dynamics involved in this 
relationship I interacted wife’s relative earnings to her husband with other family 
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income.  The interactions shed light on important distinctions of which married 
mothers exit the labor force.  When the wife’s relative earnings are interacted with the 
log of other family income, the main effect of having the wife as a primary provider 
is large, negative and statistically significant.  But in these models, the effect for other 
family income is also negative and the interaction effect attenuates or softens these 
two negative main effects.  That is, the interaction effect is positive and significant.  
This suggests that at very high income levels where wives are the primary earners—
where one might expect very low exit rates—exit rates are no lower, indeed may be 
somewhat higher, than for primary earners with somewhat lower family income. 
These are the married mothers who in essence have the most choice.  Mothers who 
outearn their husbands, but are in somewhat lower income families, remain 
employed.  Why might high earning wives who outearn their high earning husbands 
exit the labor force?  These are the women Belkin (2004) is referring to in her NY 
Times article, the very women poised to compete evenly with men in the market 
place, and break glass ceilings—the lawyers, doctors, professionals, and Blair-Loy’s 
(2003) finance executives.  One can look to the gender perspective for interpretation 
of these findings.  Research suggests that there is a discomfort among couples when 
the wife is the primary breadwinner (Tichenor 2005).  Under a gender perspective, 
these results suggest that high earning wives who outearn their high earning husbands 
compensate for their gender deviance of being the primary breadwinner by exiting the 
labor force.  While low earning wives who outearn their husbands may not be able to 
afford to exit, previous research has shown that they appear to compensate for their 
gender deviance by doing more housework (Brines 1994; Bittman et al. 2003; 
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Greenstein 2000) or by other behaviors that maintain men’s marital dominance and 
power (Tichenor 1999, 2005).  However, my research cannot definitively answer the 
question of why these wives exit the labor force—whether the labor force exit is an 
enactment of gender or is due to affordability.  
The positive effect of delayed child bearing on labor force exits among 
married mothers also is noteworthy.  This result contradicts the expectation based on 
neoclassical economic theory, but is consistent with the life course perspective.  
Using a life course lens allows for the interpretation that married mothers who delay 
child bearing and invest in building their market value are better poised to take time 
off from the labor force without suffering downward mobility.  By interacting the age 
of first birth with personal earnings and education level, I was able to see whether 
married mothers who had invested in their market value—those with higher earnings 
and education—were systematically more likely to exit the labor force.   The results 
showed that mothers who delayed child bearing and were high earners were more 
likely to exit the labor force, but those with high education were less likely to exit 
than those with a high school degree.  These results provide mixed support for the 
notion that the timing of a life event, such as the birth of a first child, can have 
differential impacts.  Missing from this analysis is whether delayed child bearers 
reenter the labor force without suffering downward mobility, whether their high 
market value actually translates into high earnings after “time off” from the labor 
force, as the theory speculates.13
13 This dissertation does not attempt to answer this question, although this is fertile ground for further 
research.
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In general, the remaining results from these analyses are consistent with 
previous studies on mothers labor force participation.  The results for work related 
measures are consistent with previous literature and with neoclassical economic 
theory.  My results show that mothers with higher human capital do not transition out 
of the labor force and those with lower human capital do.  Family building—having 
an infant or a new baby—is associated with labor force exits, supporting previous 
research.  Mothers facing higher child care costs have a higher risk of a labor force 
exits than those with lower child care costs.
Having a husband who works 65 or more hours per week, a nontrivial amount 
of overtime, increases the propensity that a married mother will exit the labor force, 
as expected.  All three theoretical perspectives hypothesize that the direction of the 
relationship between being married to a husband who works long hours will be 
positively associated with labor force exits (recall the discussion of the conceptual 
framework from Chapter 3).  It is unclear from the analysis whether this is an 
example of an adaptive strategy as the life course perspective argues, or a display of 
gender as the gender perspective contends, or just goes along with the territory of 
men having the comparative market advantage as neoclassical economic theory 
suggests.
The effect of other family income is negative, contrary to my expectations 
based on neoclassical economic theory.  However, as previously discussed, the 
relationship is possibly curvilinear and my sample may be made up of a group of 
married mothers who have strong ties to the labor force or greater financial need.  
Similarly, the effect of having two or more children is negative, contrary to my 
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expectation based on both neoclassical economic theory and the life course 
perspective.  Again, this may be due to my sample being composed of all mothers 
with children under 15, rather than first-time mothers.
The results for the demographic controls are also consistent with the literature: 
the probability of a labor force exit increases with age; being a minority increases the 
probability of a labor force exit, as does moving.
This chapter sheds light on one part of the puzzle of married mothers labor 
force participation by showing which factors are related to married mothers’ labor 
force exits.  The following chapter investigates the second part of the puzzle by 
answering this question—what factors influence married mothers’ labor force 
entrances?  
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Chapter 6:  Determinants of Labor Force Entrances
Women’s labor force patterns fluctuate, such that at any given point some 
women are making the decision to exit the labor force and others are making the 
decision to enter it.  Granted there is a small core of women who exit the labor force 
never to reenter, many women today enter and leave the labor force for various 
reasons over the course of their work lives.  This chapter examines the factors that 
determine married mothers labor force entrances using the same theoretical 
framework discussed in Chapter 3.  Specifically, I explore whether and how a 
mother’s work and family characteristics play a role in labor force entrances using 
neoclassical economic theory, the life course perspective, and the gender perspective.
This chapter proceeds as follows: As a first step, I review the descriptive 
statistics for the sample as a whole comparing married mothers with children under 
15 at wave 1 by their employment status at wave 1.  I then examine descriptive 
statistics of the sample of married mothers who were not employed at wave 1 by their 
subsequent labor force participation pattern during the panel.   Next, I build an event 
history analysis regression model predicting the first labor force entrance during the 
panel controlling for married mothers’ market value and family related 
characteristics, and demographic controls.  I then investigate whether married 
mothers enter the labor force for part- or full-time hours using both multinomial and 
logistic event history regression techniques.  Finally, a multinomial regression is 
presented to explore whether the predictors of labor force entrances vary by the 
reason for being nonemployed just prior to the entrance.
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Wave 1 Sample Characteristics
Recall from Chapter 5 that fewer married mothers are not employed in wave 1 
of the SIPP than are employed (31 percent compared with69 percent) (refer to Table 
5.1 for details).  This means that fewer married mothers are “at risk” for a labor force 
entrance than for a labor force exit.  In general, married mothers who are not 
employed at wave 1 have lower market value than married employed mothers (lower 
education levels and less work experience) and have a higher average family income 
from other sources.  Non-employed married mothers are family building to a greater 
extent than employed married mothers (a higher proportion have more children under 
15 and younger children) and are more likely to have begun family building at an 
earlier age.  Similar proportions are married to a spouse who works 65 or more hours 
per week.  Married non-employed mothers are more likely to be married to a husband 
who has a higher education than they do, however both groups are most likely to have 
the same education as their husband.  Only 17 percent of non-employed married 
mothers have a higher education than their husband compared with 25 percent among 
the employed married mothers.  Finally, larger proportions of nonemployed married 
mothers are minorities and are younger (15 to 24 years old) than married employed 
mothers.
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Labor Force Entrances: Married Mothers with Children under 15
Table 6.1 compares labor force participation during the panel for two groups 
of mothers who were not employed at wave 1: the half of the married mothers not 
employed at wave 1 who enter the labor force during the panel, and the other half 
who remain out during the entire time they are observed in the panel.  When looking 
at the frequency distributions presented in Table 6.1, these two groups of mothers 
appear very similar on many dimensions, with only a few notable exceptions.  A 
lower proportion of married mothers with less than a high school education enter the 
labor force, while a higher proportion of those with a high school degree enter 
compared with married mothers who remain out of the labor force for the entire 
panel.  Married mothers who have greater economic need appear to enter the labor 
force, while those with higher levels of other family income remain out.  A higher 
proportion of mothers who remain out of the labor force have predicted relative 
hourly wages that are less than or equal to their husband than mothers who enter, 
while similar proportions have higher predicted wages.  Mothers who remain out of 
the labor force are slightly older and live in metro areas to a greater extent than 
mothers who enter the labor force.
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Table 6.1: Weighted Comparison of Non-Employed Married Women with Children in 
  Wave 1 by Labor Force Participation During the Panel
Characteristics at Wave 1
Never employed 
during panel
Enter labor force 
during panel




Less than high school 26.4 * 19.3
High school degree 31.0 * 38.2
Some college 23.1 26.2
College graduate 19.6 16.3
  Master's degree or higher 4.0 4.0
Earnings
Mean average predicted hourly wage $11.04 $10.83
Labor force continuity
Break in LF for caregiving 6+months1
  No break in LF for caregiving 32.9 32.9
  1 to 2 yrs with 6+ month break 7.5 * 10.6
  3 to 5 yrs with 6+ month break 14.2 * 19.0
  6 to 10 yrs with 6+ month break 20.8 18.4
  11 or more yrs with 6+ month break 24.6 * 19.2






Three or more 30.6 28.5
Mean number of children 2.1 2.1
Age of youngest child
Less than 1 22.9 18.8
1 to 2 23.5 24.8
3 to 5 22.0 23.0
6 to 9 16.5 18.7
10 to 14 15.1 14.8




Age at first birth
Younger, under 22 32.4 36.2
On-time, 22-28 38.3 37.8
Older, 29 and over 20.0 18.1
Missing 9.4 7.9
NOT EMPLOYED AT WAVE 1
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TABLE 6.1 CONTINUED
Characteristics at Wave 1
Never employed 
during panel




Less than $1,500 22.0 26.2
$1,500 - $2,999 28.1 32.0
$3,000 - $4,499 18.2 20.1
$4,500 or more 31.7 * 21.7
Mean family income $4,121.50 * $3,249.30
Husband's work hours
Husband works 65+ hours per week 10.1 11.4
Log of predicted child care costs 2.1 2.0
GENDER EGALITARIANISM BETWEEN SPOUSES
Relative hourly earnings (wife predicted wages)3
Husband primary provider 42.3 * 34.0
Equal providers 34.8 * 41.9
Wife primary provider 22.9 24.1
Relative education level4
Husband higher education 30.4 29.2
Equal education 55.5 52.9




15 to 24 8.9 * 12.2
25 to 29 14.8 17.7
30 to 34 22.7 23.5
35 to 39 24.6 23.9
40 to 44 14.2 13.5
45 to 60 14.9 * 9.2
Average age 35.8 * 34.0
Metro residence 81.4 * 76.6
Move during panel 27.9 * 36.5
Not working in wave 1 for full-time motherhood 81.8 81.7
Average number of waves in panel 9.5 * 10.8
N 1,242 933
Source: 1996 SIPP Panel. Unit of analysis is married mother with children under 15 at wave 1.
a Employed is defined as having a paid job and positive earnings.
1 Includes only labor force breaks for 6 or more months prior to the start of the panel (ie., Wave 1).
2 Excludes mother's earnings.
NOT EMPLOYED AT WAVE 1
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Event History Models Predicting Labor Force Entrance
Recall that the event history analyses use a sample of person waves of married 
mothers.  Table 6.2 presents the total sample at risk for a labor force entrance and the 
dependent variable, the first labor force entrance, to be used in the analyses of labor 
force entrances.  Table 6.2 shows that there are 21,325 waves where a married mother 
is not employed, or at risk of a labor force entrance during the SIPP panel, and in 
1,990 waves a married mother enters the labor force.  In 1,571 waves, married 
mothers enter employment from nonemployment for full-time motherhood reasons 
and in 419 waves, they enter from nonemployment for other reasons.  This section 
first presents a step-wise analysis of the determinants of married mother’s labor force 
entrances, tests interactions to gain a better understanding of the results, investigates 
further entrances into part- and full-time work, and then presents a multinomial event 
history regression comparing the reasons the mothers were not employed just prior to 
their labor force entrance.  Table 6.2 also shows that in 1,126 waves, married mothers 
enter into part-time employment and in 864 waves, they enter into full-time 
employment.   The chapter concludes with a discussion of key findings.
TABLE 6.1 CONTINUED
3 This measure follows Nock's (2001) classification of marriages of equally dependent spouses 
  (MEDS) where the husband is the primary provider if the wife earns less than 40 percent of the 
  combined wife and husband earnings; they are equal earners if the wife earns between 40 and 59 
  percent of the combined earnings; and the wife is the primary earner if she earns 60 percent or
  more of the combined earnings.
4 This measure is calculated using four education categories (less than high school, high school 
  degree, some college, and college degree) and comparing the wife's education with the husband's. 
* statistically significant difference between employed and not employed at the 90 percent 
  confidence interval.
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Step-wise analyses
Table 6.3 shows a series of four event history regression models predicting 
whether a married mother enters the labor force during the panel.  Model one predicts 
the effect of wife’s predicted relative earnings14 and wife’s relative education on labor 
force entrances, Model 2 adds the mother’s potential market value variables, Model 3 
adds family related variables, and Model 4 controls for demographic controls.  This 
analytical strategy allows the effect of wife’s predicted relative earnings and relative 
education to change as other co-variates are added to the model.
14 Recall from Chapter 4: Data and Analysis Plan, that the wife’s relative earnings with respect to labor 
force entrances uses the wife’s predicted hourly wages in relation to the husband’s actual hourly 
wages.




Total sample size, person-waves 21,235
Dependent variables
Labor force entrances
First labor force entrance 1,990
  From motherhood reasons 1,571
  From other reasons 419
Enter into:
  Part-time employment 1,126
  Full-time employment 864
Source: 1996 SIPP Panel.  Unit of analysis is person-wave.
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Table 6.3 Step-Wise Event History Analysis Predicting Labor Force Entrance Among Married Mothers with Children Under 15
Parameter Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
GENDER EGALITARIANISM BETWEEN SPOUSES
Relative hourly earnings (wife's predicted)1
Husband primary provider -0.309 *** -0.282 *** -0.199 *** -0.207 ***
Equal providers R R R R
Wife primary provider -0.020 0.024 -0.105 ** -0.056
Relative education level2
Husband higher education 0.049 0.063 0.097 * 0.083 *
Equal education R R R R




Less than high school -0.485 *** -0.502 *** -0.273 ***
High school degree R R R
Some college 0.239 *** 0.298 *** 0.104
College graduate 0.332 * 0.479 * -0.211
Predicted hourly wages -0.053 *** -0.017 0.072 ***
Labor force continuity
Break in LF for caregiving 6+months3
  No break in LF for caregiving R R R
  1 to 2 yrs with 6+ month break -0.077 -0.030 -0.045
  3 or more yrs with 6+ month break -0.457 *** -0.444 *** -0.406 ***
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Table 6.3 CONTINUED
Parameter Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4






Three or more 0.009 0.108
Age of youngest child
Less than 1 0.242 * 0.092
1 to 2 0.233 * 0.139
3 to 5 0.103 0.035
6 to 14 R R
Child enters household in previous or current wave
New baby -0.198 * -0.275 **
Older child enters 0.445 0.478
TIMING OF LIFE EVENTS
Age at first birth
Younger, under 22 0.170 *** 0.118 **
On-time, 22-28 R R
Older, 29 and over -0.097 * -0.032
Missing 0.208 * 0.116
FAMILY ECONOMICS
Other family income3
Log of other family income -0.039 * -0.022
Husband's work hours
Husband works 65+ hours per week 0.148 * 0.110
Child care costs
Log of predicted child care costs -1.062 *** -1.189 ***
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Table 6.3 CONTINUED
Parameter Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
DEMOGRAPHIC CONTROLS
Race and ethnicity 
Minority -0.056
White, not Hispanic R
Age




Move in previous or current wave 0.164 *
Intercept -2.241 *** -1.464 *** -1.173 *** -0.976 **
-2 Log Likelihood 13,188.369 13,054.934 12,916.608 12,870.408
X2 78.333 211.768 350.094 396.294
Degrees of freedom 4 10 23 27
Number of observations 21,235 21,235 21,235 21,235
Source: 1996 SIPP Panel.  Unit of analysis is person-wave.
1 This measure follows Nock's (2001) classification of marriages of equally dependent spouses (MEDS)
where the husband is the primary provider if the wife earns less than 40 percent of the combined
wife and husband earnings; they are equal earners if the wife earns between 40 and 59 percent 
of the combined earnings; and the wife is the primary earner if she earns 60 percent or more of
the combined earnings.
2 This measure is calculated using four education categories (less than high school, high school graduate,
some college, and college graduate) and comparing the wife's education with the husband's. 
3 Includes only labor force breaks for 6 or more months prior to the start of the panel (ie., Wave 1).
4 Excludes mother's earnings.
p-values: * p<.05    ** p<.01   *** p<.001               R= Reference group
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The results from Model 1 show that wives are less likely to enter the labor 
force if their husband has the comparative market advantage, supporting neoclassical 
economic theory.  The effect of a wife being the primary provider is negative, 
contrary to expectations based on neoclassical economic theory, but is not significant.  
The effect of relative education also provides mixed support for neoclassical 
economic theory.  Wives who have a higher education level relative to their husbands 
are more likely to enter the labor force, compared to wives with equal education 
levels.  The effect of the wife having a lower education level than her husband is also 
positive, but not significant.15
Model 2 adds the mother’s human capital and job characteristics variables.  
The effect of a wife’s relative earnings basically stays the same, with one exception.  
By controlling for indicators of a mother’s human capital, the effect of the wife being 
the primary provider becomes positive, although still not statistically significantly 
associated with a married mother’s labor force entrance, lending some support to 
neoclassical economic theory. The effect of having a husband as the primary provider 
on a mother’s labor force entrance remains negative.   With the addition of the work 
related variables in Model 2, the effect of wife’s relative education remains the same.  
Several of the mother’s human capital indicators are correlated with labor force 
entrances.  Having less than a high school education reduces the propensity that a 
married mother enters the labor force, while having some college or a college degree 
15 A correlation matrix revealed that several variables have correlations of 0.450 or higher, significant 
at the 0.05 level.  These include husband primary provider and log of other family income (-0.450); 
wife primary provider and other income less than $1,500 per month (0.497); log of child care costs and 
youngest child 1 to 2 (0.504); less than high school and predicted wage (-0.576); log of child care costs 
and youngest child 6 to 14 (-0.613); log of child care costs and once child (-0.613); and college 
graduate and predicted wage (0.830).  
178
increases it, consistent with the literature.  As a married mother’s predicted wages 
increase, the likelihood of a labor force entrance decreases, controlling only for work 
related variable.  Married mothers who have had several labor force breaks of 6 or 
more months prior to the start of the panel are less likely to enter the labor force.  
In Model 3, the family related variables are added.  As in the previous models, 
wives whose husbands are predicted to be primary providers are still less likely to 
enter the labor force than wives predicted to be equal providers.  However, wives 
predicted to be primary providers are now significantly less likely to enter the labor 
force.  With the inclusion of family related variables, the positive effect of the 
husband having a higher education becomes significant.  The coefficient for predicted 
hourly wages is no longer significant, suggesting that family related variables mediate 
the effect of potential wages.   
Mothers with a youngest child under the age of 1 or 1 to 2 years old face 
higher odds of a labor force entrance, but having a recent addition of a new baby 
decreases the likelihood of a labor force entrance, controlling only for work and 
family related variables.  Early child bearers are more likely to enter the labor force 
and late child bearers are less likely compared with mothers who began childbearing 
on-time (between the ages of 23 and 28). 
As other family income increases, married mothers are less likely to enter the 
labor force, consistent with the literature and neoclassical economic theory.  Net of 
the work and family co-variates (but not the demographic controls), mothers with 
husbands who work 65 or more hours per week are more likely to enter the labor 
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force.  Higher predicted child care costs decrease the risk of a labor force entrance for 
married mothers, consistent with the literature.   
In model 4, I add demographic controls.  Several of the effects of the co-
variates are changed by this addition, suggesting that the relationships between the 
demographic controls and labor force entrances are stronger than some of the 
relationships between work and family related characteristics, as the latter are 
mediated by the former.  (This was not the case for labor force exits shown in Table 
5.4, where the inclusion of the demographic controls introduced very few changes.)   
With the inclusion of the demographic controls, the negative effect of the wife being 
predicted to be the primary provider loses significance, suggesting that the effect of 
wife’s predicted relative earnings is mediated by one or more of the control variables.  
Net of the work, family, and demographic control variables, mothers who are married 
to husbands who are predicted to be the primary provider are less likely to enter the 
labor force.  This relationship holds steady over the four models and is consistent 
with neoclassical economic theory.  The demographic control variables did not 
change the effect of relative education on a married mother’s labor force entrances—
wives with higher or lower education levels than their husbands are more likely to 
enter the labor force than wives with equal education levels.
Model 4 shows that having some college or having a college degree lose 
significance with the inclusion of demographic controls.  However, married mothers 
with less than a high school degree are significantly less likely to enter the labor force 
relative to married mothers with a high school degree, all else equal.  In Model 4, the 
coefficient for the predicted wage gains significance and changes sign, becoming 
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positive.  As the mother’s predicted wage increases, she is more likely to enter the 
labor force, net of the all the co-variates in the model, consistent with the literature.  
Having several years (3 or more) with a labor force break of 6 or more months 
decreases the likelihood of a labor force entrance.  
Controlling for work, family, and demographic variables, the number children 
and the age of the youngest child is not significantly related to labor force entrances 
for married mothers with children under 15.  Yet, a recent new baby decreases the 
risk of a labor force entrance by 24 percent (odds ratio=0.76, see Appendix Table 
6.C).  Early child bearers are more likely to enter the labor force, but the inclusion of 
the demographic controls removed the significance of late child bearing on labor 
force entrances.
Model 4 shows that the chance of a labor force entrance decreases with higher 
levels of other family income, but the effect is no longer significant once controlling 
for demographic variables.  The effect of having a husband who works overtime (65 
or more hours per week) also loses significance once demographic controls are 
introduced into the model.  The strong negative effect of child care costs gains 
strength once demographic variables are controlled. 
Two of the demographic controls are significantly related to labor force 
entrances.  Experiencing a recent move is positively associated with a labor force 
entrance.  As age increases, married mothers are less likely to enter the labor force.
In sum, Model 4 in Table 6.3 suggests that married mothers’ labor force 
entrances are more about the mothers human capital attributes and labor force 
commitment than about family considerations.   A married mothers education level, 
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predicted wages, and labor force continuity all are determinants of a labor force 
entrance, consistent with neoclassical economic theory.  However, several of the 
family related variables—the number and age of children, other family income, and 
husband’s work hours—are not.  Only two family related variables are significant 
predictors of labor force entrances—having a recent addition of a new baby and 
higher child care costs discourage labor force entrances.  Wife’s predicted relative 
earnings are correlated with a married mother’s labor force entrance.  If the husband 
is predicted to be the primary provider, the wife stays out of the labor force.  
Although not significant, if the wife is predicted to be the primary provider, she also 
stays out of the labor force.  The relationship of the wife’s relative education level to 
labor force entrances is also not straightforward.  Wives with higher or lower 
education levels than their husbands are more likely to enter the labor force than 
wives who have the same education level as their husbands.  
The effect of other family income is in the anticipated direction (negative) but 
is not significant, controlling for the other co-variates in the model.  According to
neoclassical economic theory, as other family income rises, married mothers should 
be less likely to enter the labor force because the higher income allows greater 
“choice” and lowers the opportunity costs of not working.  Because of the possibility 
of a curvilinear relationship between other family income and labor force exits shown 
in Chapter 5, I reran the full model with four different specifications of other family 
income (see Table 6.4).  
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Table 6.4 shows that in model 1 the log of other family income has a negative, 
but not significant relationship with labor force entrances.  The second model 
includes four income groupings, with the reference group being the lowest category, 
less than $1,500 per month. Model 2 portrays a positive relationship between other 
family income and labor force entrances, since all three coefficients are positive, yet 
Table 6.4 Different Specifications of Other Family Income, Event History Analysis 
  Predicting Labor Force Entrances Among Married Mothers with Children Under 15
Standard
Parameter Coefficient Error
Different specifications of other family income1
MODEL 1
Log of other family income -0.022 0.019
Other family income categories
MODEL 2
Less than $1,500 R
$1,500 - $2,999 0.212 *** 0.050
$3,000 - $4,499 0.186 * 0.081
$4,500 or more 0.012 0.078
MODEL 3
Less than $1,500 -0.207 *** 0.051
$1,500 - $2,999 R
$3,000 - $4,499 R
$4,500 or more -0.184 ** 0.060
MODEL 4
Less than $1,500 -0.194 *** 0.050
$1,500 - $2,999 R
$3,000 - $6,249 R
$6,250 or more -0.308 *** 0.092
Source: 1996 SIPP Panel.  Unit of analysis is person-wave. 
1 Excludes mother's earnings.
Note: All models control for variables specified in Table 6.4, with only the specification of
  other family income changing.
p-values: * p<.05    ** p<.01   *** p<.001               R= Reference group
183
only the two middle categories are significant.  However, as shown in Chapter 5, 
there appears to be a curvilinear relationship between other family income and 
married mothers’ labor force entrances.  Model 3 and 4 show that mothers living with 
very low incomes (less than $1,500 per month) and mothers with high and very high 
incomes ($4,500 or more and $6,250 or more per month, respectively) have a lower 
propensity to enter the labor force.
Labor force entrance into part-time or full-time work
Some have speculated that mothers return to work part time as a way of easing 
back into the labor force after time away (Blank 1989).  While others contend that 
mothers rely on part-time work to ease the second shift, as a strategy to balance work 
and family (Spain and Bianchi 1996).  Given that the expectations and rewards 
associated with part- and full-time work differ, one would expect that varied factors 
would predict the time spent in market work for mothers who enter the labor force.  
Table 6.5 presents a discrete-time event history multinomial model predicting a labor 
force entrance into part-time or full-time employment versus not entering the labor 
force.
Predicted wife’s relative hourly wages are related to labor force entrances into 
full-time work, but not into part-time work.  Mothers married to men who are 
predicted to be the primary provider are less likely to enter the labor force full-time 
than mothers predicted to be equal providers.  The effect of a husband predicted to be 
the primary provider is also negative for part-time employment but is not statistically 
significant.  Taken altogether, this result indicates that the negative effect of a wife’s 
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lower earnings relative to her husband on her likelihood of entering the labor force 
shown in the full model in Appendix Table 6.C is being driven, in part, by this 
negative relationship to full-time employment as opposed to part-time employment.  
The effect of a mother predicted to be the primary provider is not significantly related 
to her labor force entrance compared with mothers predicted to be equal providers 
with their husbands.  Mothers who have a higher education level than their husbands 
are more likely to enter the labor force for full-time hours than to remain out of the 
labor force.
Married mothers who have less than a high school degree are less likely to 
enter into full-time employment.  The effect of having very low educational 
attainment is also negative for part-time employment but is not statistically 
significant.  On the whole, married mothers with less than a high school degree tend 
to remain out of the labor force.  On the other hand, married mothers with a college 
degree are less likely to enter into part-time employment.  The effect of having a 
college degree is positive for full-time employment but is not statistically significant.  
If mothers with a college degree do enter the labor force, they are more likely to enter 
into full-time employment than part-time employment (see Column 3).  However, the 
effect of predicted wages on part-time employment is positive, suggesting that 
married mothers who are predicted to attain higher wages may be able to use their 
higher market value as bargaining power to negotiate part-time employment.  Married 
mothers who have had a break in the labor force for at least six months for care-
giving for 3 or more years are less likely to enter the labor force for either part- or 
full-time hours.  This result is consistent with the literature.  The more time a married 
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mother spends out of the labor force to care for family, the less likely she is to enter 
again, regardless of the number of hours.  And if a mother who has had several breaks 
in employment does reenter, she is more likely to work part-time hours than full-time 
hours (see Column 3).  
Two family related variables—the number of children one has and the age of 
the youngest child—are not significantly statistically associated with a married 
mothers labor force entrance into either part- or full-time employment.  Having a 
recent new baby decreases the probability of a married mother entering the labor 
force for part-time employment.  Married mothers who began child bearing at early 
ages are more likely to enter the labor force full time than remain out of the labor 
force.
Other family income is not a significant predictor of labor force entrances into 
part- or full-time employment for married mothers.  Neither is having a husband work 
overtime hours.  Mothers who face higher child care costs have a lower propensity to 
enter the labor force for either part- or full-time work, and married mothers are more 
likely to work part-time hours than full-time hours as child care costs increase.  
Minority married mothers are more likely to enter the labor force for full-time 
hours. As age increases, married mothers are less likely to enter into part-time 
employment, but older mothers are less likely to enter into part-time employment 
than full-time employment if they do enter.  Married mothers who live in 
metropolitan areas are less likely to enter for part-time hours than full-time hours.
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Table 6.5 Discrete-time Event History Analysis Predicting Labor Force Entrance for Employed Married Mothers With Children









GENDER EGALITARIANISM BETWEEN SPOUSES
Relative hourly earnings (wife predicted)1
Husband primary provider -0.131 0.074 -0.334 *** 0.088 0.202 0.112
Equal providers R R R
Wife primary provider -0.120 0.099 0.010 0.100 -0.131 0.136
Relative education level2
Husband higher education 0.140 0.076 0.001 0.090 0.138 0.115
Equal education R R R




Less than high school -0.126 0.134 -0.469 ** 0.145 0.344 0.192
High school degree R R R
Some college 0.046 0.114 0.164 0.132 -0.118 0.170
College graduate -0.715 * 0.328 0.453 0.376 -1.168 * 0.485
Predicted hourly wages 0.133 *** 0.040 -0.005 0.046 0.139 * 0.059
Labor force continuity
Break in LF for caregiving 6+months3
  No break in LF for caregiving R R R
  1 to 2 yrs with 6+ month break 0.069 0.106 -0.182 0.126 0.250 0.159
  3 or more yrs with 6+ month break -0.217 ** 0.071 -0.667 *** 0.083 0.450 *** 0.106
Entrance into Part-time 
vs. No Entrancea
Entrance into Full-time  
vs. No Entrancea















One R R R
Two 0.079 0.079 0.058 0.088 0.021 0.114
Three or more 0.135 0.100 0.063 0.112 0.072 0.146
Age of youngest child
Less than 1 0.180 0.126 -0.020 0.144 0.200 0.185
1 to 2 0.105 0.134 0.203 0.151 -0.097 0.196
3 to 5 -0.023 0.104 0.122 0.117 -0.145 0.152
6 to 14 R R R
Child enters household in previous or current wave
New baby -0.380 ** 0.144 -0.139 0.156 -0.241 0.206
Older child enters 0.043 0.622 0.802 0.454 -0.759 0.742
TIMING OF LIFE EVENTS
Age at first birth
Younger, under 22 0.025 0.079 0.242 ** 0.089 -0.217 0.116
On-time, 22-28 R R R
Older, 29 and over -0.018 0.094 -0.060 0.117 0.042 0.147
Missing -0.069 0.119 0.358 ** 0.125 -0.428 * 0.167
FAMILY ECONOMICS
Other family income3
Log of other family income -0.018 0.031 -0.024 0.031 0.006 0.043
Husband's work hours
Husband works 65+ hours per week 0.070 0.099 0.168 0.111 -0.098 0.145
Child care costs
Log of predicted child care costs -0.952 *** 0.196 -1.541 *** 0.227 0.589 * 0.291
Entrance into Part-time 
vs. No Entrancea
Entrance into Full-time  
vs. No Entrancea













Race and ethnicity 
Minority -0.293 *** 0.084 0.194 * 0.088 -0.486 *** 0.118
White, not Hispanic R R R
Age
Continuous variable of age -0.042 *** 0.007 -0.014 0.007 -0.028 ** 0.010
Residence
Metro residence -0.194 0.105 0.153 0.121 -0.347 * 0.155
Move
Move in previous or current wave 0.116 0.105 0.236 * 0.113 -0.127 0.149
Intercept -1.723 *** 0.354 -1.603 *** 0.382 -0.120 0.149
-2 Log Likelihood 15,446.590
Degrees of freedom 56
Number of observations 21,235
Source: 1996 SIPP Panel.  Unit of analysis is person-wave.  p-values: * p<.05    ** p<.01   *** p<.001        R: Reference group
1 This measure follows Nock's (2001) classification of marriages of equally dependent spouses (MEDS) where the husband is the primary provider 
if the wife earns less than 40 percent of the combined wife and husband earnings; they are equal earners if the wife earns between 40 and 
59 percent of the combined earnings; and the wife is the primary earner if she earns 60 percent or more of the combined earnings.
2 This measure is calculated using four education categories (less than high school, high school graduate, some college, and college graduate) 
and comparing the wife's education with the husband's. 
3 Includes only labor force breaks for 6 or more months prior to the start of the panel (ie., Wave 1).            4Excludes mother's earnings.
Entrance into Part-time 
vs. No Entrancea
Entrance into Full-time  
vs. No Entrancea
Entrance into Part-time 
vs. Full-timea
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Labor force entrances for full-time mothers 
Table 6.6 presents the results from a multinomial discrete-time event history 
analysis predicting labor force entrances for full-time mothers versus no entrance and 
for mothers who are nonemployed for other reasons versus no entrance.  Recall that 
full-time mothers are nonemployed because they give as their primary reason for 
nonemployment either due to pregnancy/childbearing or for the care of 
children/others.  “Other mothers” are not employed for other reasons.   
Table 6.6 shows that full-time mothers and other mothers are less likely to 
enter the labor force if their husband is predicted to be the primary provider.  This 
finding is as expected, as full-time mothers are theorized to gain more from 
specialization and thus it makes sense that they would not enter the labor force when 
their husband has the comparative market advantage.  None of the coefficients for 
mother’s predicted to be the primary provider are statistically significant.  However, 
full-time mothers are more likely to enter the labor force if their husband has a higher 
education level or if they have a higher education level compared with married 
mothers who have an equal education level as their husband.  Mothers who are not 
employed for other reasons are more likely to enter the labor force if they have higher 
education levels than their husbands.
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Table 6.6 Discrete-time Event History Analysis Predicting Labor Force Entrance for Employed Married Mothers With Children 









GENDER EGALITARIANISM BETWEEN SPOUSES
Relative hourly earnings (wife predicted)1
Husband primary provider -0.195 ** 0.064 -0.253 * 0.127 0.058 0.140
Equal providers R R R
Wife primary provider -0.126 0.082 0.155 0.142 -0.280 0.160
Relative education level2
Husband higher education 0.130 * 0.066 -0.186 -0.092 0.222 0.144
Equal education R R R




Less than high school -0.390 *** 0.112 0.188 0.210 -0.578 * 0.233
High school degree R R R
Some college 0.118 0.099 0.050 0.186 0.068 0.206
College graduate 0.064 0.281 -1.328 * 0.535 1.392 * 0.593
Personal earnings
Predicted hourly wages 0.040 0.035 0.207 *** 0.063 -0.168 * 0.070
Labor force continuity
Break in LF for caregiving 6+months3
  No break in LF for caregiving R R R
  1 to 2 yrs with 6+ month break -0.060 0.092 0.012 0.176 -0.072 0.194
  3 or more yrs with 6+ month break -0.368 *** 0.061 -0.565 *** 0.116 0.197 0.129
Full-time Motherhood 
Reasonsa Other Reasonsb















One R R R
Two 0.146 * 0.067 -0.168 0.125 0.314 * 0.139
Three or more 0.159 0.086 -0.006 0.159 0.165 0.177
Age of youngest child
Less than 1 0.109 0.108 0.014 0.209 0.095 0.230
1 to 2 0.169 0.113 0.041 0.229 0.128 0.250
3 to 5 0.026 0.089 0.137 0.170 -0.111 0.188
6 to 14 R R R
Child enters household in previous or current wave
New baby -0.219 0.116 -0.607 * 0.284 0.388 0.302
Older child enters 0.311 0.472 0.764 0.574 -0.453 0.714
TIMING OF LIFE EVENTS
Age at first birth
Younger, under 22 0.071 0.068 0.265 * 0.127 -0.193 0.141
On-time, 22-28 R R R
Older, 29 and over -0.020 0.083 -0.032 0.160 0.012 0.177
Missing 0.090 0.097 0.243 0.192 -0.154 0.211
FAMILY ECONOMICS
Other family income3
Log of other family income -0.039 0.025 0.040 0.050 -0.079 0.054
Husband's work hours
Husband works 65+ hours per week 0.155 0.083 -0.067 0.171 0.222 0.187
Child care costs
Log of predicted child care costs -1.074 *** 0.166 -1.900 *** 0.349 0.826 * 0.380
Full-time Motherhood 
Reasonsa Other Reasonsb













Race and ethnicity 
Minority -0.077 0.069 0.006 0.127 -0.083 0.142
White, not Hispanic R R R
Age
Continuous variable of age -0.033 *** 0.006 -0.024 * 0.010 -0.009 0.012
Residence
Metro residence 0.029 0.091 -0.259 0.166 0.288 0.185
Move
Move in previous or current wave 0.221 ** 0.086 -0.104 0.192 0.325 0.206
Intercept -0.807 ** 0.299 -3.944 *** 0.542 3.137 *** 0.605
-2 Log Likelihood 14,782.880
Degrees of freedom 56
Number of observations 21,235
Source: 1996 SIPP Panel.  Unit of analysis is person-wave.  p-values: * p<.05    ** p<.01   *** p<.001        R: Reference group
1 This measure follows Nock's (2001) classification of marriages of equally dependent spouses (MEDS) where the husband is the primary provider 
if the wife earns less than 40 percent of the combined wife and husband earnings; they are equal earners if the wife earns between 40 and 
59 percent of the combined earnings; and the wife is the primary earner if she earns 60 percent or more of the combined earnings.
2 This measure is calculated using four education categories (less than high school, high school graduate, some college, and college graduate) 
and comparing the wife's education with the husband's. 
3 Includes only labor force breaks for 6 or more months prior to the start of the panel (ie., Wave 1).            4Excludes mother's earnings.
Full-time Motherhood 
Reasonsa Other Reasonsb
Full-time Motherhood    
vs. Other Reasonsb
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Having less than a high school degree is negatively associated with labor force 
entrances for full-time mothers—these mothers are more likely to remain as full-time 
mothers than enter the labor force.  This finding supports neoclassical economic 
theory as mothers with very low educational attainment have low employment 
prospects and as such their actual wages would likely be lower than their reservation 
wage.  The negative effect of very low education on labor force entrances shown in 
Model 4 in Table 6.3 appears to be driven by full-time mothers, as the effect of very 
low education has a positive and not statistically significant effect on labor force 
entrances among other mothers.  Higher predicted wages increase the likelihood of a 
labor force entrance for other mothers, but as their predicted hourly wages increase, 
full-time mothers are less likely to enter the labor force than other mothers.  That 
predicted hourly wages are not statistically significant predictors of labor force 
entrances for full-time mothers is contrary to neoclassical economic theory and 
suggests that full-time mothers do not place the same weight on their potential 
earnings when making work and family decisions.  Recall from Table 6.3 (Model 4) 
that higher predicted hourly wages are positively associated with labor force 
entrances.  By considering the determinants of labor force entrances for full-time 
mothers and other mothers, we can see that the positive effect of predicted earnings is 
driven by the other mothers.  Having three or more years in which the married mother 
had a labor force break of at least 6 months decreases the probability of a labor force 
entrance for both full-time and other mothers.  
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Having two children rather than one increases the likelihood that a full-time 
mother will enter the labor force than remain out, and full-time mothers with two 
children are more likely than other mothers with two children to enter the labor force.  
Having a recent new baby decreases the probability that other mothers will enter the 
labor force.  The relationship between having a new baby and labor force exits is also 
negative for full-time mothers, but not statistically significant.  The negative effect 
seen in Table 6.3 of having a new baby on married mothers labor force entrances 
seems to be driven by the other mothers.
Higher child care costs discourage labor force entrances for both full-time 
mothers and other mothers, but as child care costs increase full-time mothers are more 
likely to enter the labor force than other mothers.  As age increases, full-time mothers 
are less likely to enter the labor force.  Experiencing a move is positively associated 
with labor force entrances for full-time mothers.
Table 6.6 adds to our understanding of labor force entrances from full-time 
motherhood by clarifying several of the relationships found in the full model (Model 
4 in Table 6.3).  Full-time mothers do not seem to respond to high potential earnings 
with a labor force entrance as expected under neoclassical economic theory (the 
coefficient is positive but not significant).  Likewise, the addition of a new baby does 
not reduce the risk of a labor force entrance for full-time mothers (the coefficient is 
negative but not significant), suggesting that it is not the event of having a new baby 
that keeps full-time mothers away from the labor force, having any child is enough.
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Discussion
How do these analyses inform our discussion of married mothers labor force 
participation?  Married mothers labor force entrances are not determined by the 
wife’s (predicted) earnings relative to her husbands and her age at first birth to the 
same extent as labor force exits.  Mothers married to husbands who are the primary 
provider are less likely to enter the labor force, but the relationship between the wife 
as the primary provider and labor force entrances is not statistically significant.  
Labor force entrances appear to be based on the human capital attributes of the 
mother.  As her predicted wages rise, she is more likely to enter the labor force.  
Having a lower education level reduces the propensity of a labor force entrance.  
Several breaks in employment to care for children discourage employment.  These 
findings are consistent with neoclassical economic theory.  The number of children 
and age of youngest child are not significant predictors of a labor force entrance, 
however the addition of a new baby does decrease the likelihood of a labor force 
entrance.  Other family income and whether the husband works overtime hours are 
not correlated with labor force entrances, but the predicted cost of child care is 
negatively associated with labor force entrances.  
As predicted hourly wages increase, married mothers are more likely to enter 
the labor force, and they are more likely to enter part-time.  This suggests that higher 
wages may give married mothers more bargaining power when it comes to 
negotiating the terms of their entrance into market work.
Two determinants of labor force entrances for full-time mothers differ from 
those for all mothers.  Full-time mothers do not seem to respond to high potential 
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earnings in the same manner as all mothers.  Likewise, the addition of a new baby 
does not reduce the risk of a labor force exit among full-time mothers.
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Chapter 7:  Discussion and Conclusions
In this dissertation, I set out to investigate the determinants of married 
mothers labor force participation, in light of the recent downturn in married mothers 
employment rates and the apparent end in the growth of married mothers labor force 
participation by answering the questions, “which married women shed their worker 
role, and which married women take on employment?”  Despite the gains women
have made in achieving equality with men since the 1950s, women still fall short 
compared with men on several dimensions of market equality, and several researchers 
document a stalling out of women’s market equality to men during the 1990s.  I 
began this research wondering why married mothers leave the labor force, especially 
those who have invested heavily in developing their human capital and careers, and 
why mothers still find it difficult to balance work and family.  
This dissertation focuses on married mothers with children under 15 and 
examines their labor force transitions.  Using the 1996 panel of the Survey of Income 
and Program Participation (SIPP) longitudinal data, discrete-time event history 
models were run exploring labor force transitions.  Attrition may be a limitation in 
this research, as 35.5 percent of the sample is lost to attrition over the life of the 12-
wave panel.  Future research will include a sensitivity test to see whether attrition is 
an issue for my results.
To guide this research, I looked to three theoretical streams—neoclassical 
economic theory, the life course perspective, and the gender perspective—to interpret 
the findings.  Rather than set up a competition among the theories, I relied upon all 
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three to broaden the discussion and understanding of the dynamics involved in labor 
force decision-making among married couples.  
Several important findings emerge from the analyses reported on married 
mothers labor force exits (in Chapter 5) and on married mothers labor force entrances 
(in Chapter 6).  Chief among them is that wives who outearn their husbands are more 
likely to exit the labor force, net of family and work-related variables, and 
demographic controls.16  Under neoclassical economic theory, the expectation is that 
the highest earning spouse would specialize in market work.  Thus, neoclassical 
economic theory falls short in explaining this finding.  Drawing on the gender 
perspective however, a higher earning wife’s labor force exit can be interpreted as the 
enactment of gender—primary provider wives exit the labor force as an attempt to 
neutralize the couple’s gender deviance and failure to conform to the expected 
earnings display.  When the wife’s relative earnings are interacted with the log of 
other family income, the main effect of having the wife as a primary provider is large, 
negative and statistically significant.  But in these models, the effect for other family 
income is also negative and the interaction effect attenuates or softens these two 
negative main effects.  That is, the interaction effect is positive and significant.  This 
suggests that at very high income levels where wives are the primary earners—where 
one might expect very low exit rates—exit rates are no lower, indeed may be 
somewhat higher, than for primary earners with somewhat lower family income. 
These are the married mothers who in essence have the most choice as they can rely 
on their husbands’ earnings and still maintain a comfortable standard of living.  
16 Wives are classified as being the primary provider if they earn 60 percent or more of the total couple 
earnings, following Nock’s (2001) MEDS classification.  
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Mothers who outearn their husbands, but are in somewhat lower income families, 
remain employed.  Perhaps these high earning, higher other family income mothers 
prefer playing in the park with their children over board meetings, but anecdotal 
evidence (Crittenden 2001) and qualitative research (Blair-Loy 2003; Hays 2001; 
Hochchilds 1989; Wolf 2001) suggest that these decisions are made in the interest of 
children, within a rigid system that discourages part-time work, and within a marital 
relationship where roles and responsibilities along gender lines are sometimes 
contentious and frequently negotiated.  Several researchers note that these couples 
with primary provider wives did not even contemplate or discuss the possibility of a 
labor force exit on the part of the lower earning husband relative to the wife.  That 
wives who are the primary providers among the highest income families are more 
likely to exit the labor force to care for the next generation rather than attempt to 
break glass ceilings gives reason to pause and wonder—why?  This dissertation 
cannot definitively address the underlying reasons due to data constraints, the 
variables required to answer that question just are not in the SIPP.  Thus, I cannot 
distinguish whether the labor force exit is a display of gender or due to household
economics and affordability.
A question that readily follows, is do these high-earning wives who exit come 
back to the labor force?  The results presented in Chapter 6 are unfortunately 
inconclusive as mothers who are predicted to outearn their husbands exhibit a 
negative relationship with labor force entrances, but the relationship is not statistically 
significant.  What is not clear from my results is whether they returned to a job that 
compensated them at their predicted wage, or their pre-exit rate, or something lower?  
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Unknown from this research is whether women predicted to outearn their husbands 
who entered the labor force actually outearned their husbands or did they take a less 
demanding job or part-time work?  This is fertile ground for subsequent analyses.
However, results from Chapter 6 imply that labor force entrances are driven 
more by the human capital attributes and labor force commitment of the mother than 
by family considerations.  For example, having low educational attainment is 
negatively associated with labor force entrances, and higher predicted wages are 
positively associated with entrances, all else equal.  In addition, having several years 
with a labor force break to care for family decreases the likelihood of a labor force 
entrance.  These findings are consistent with the literature and neoclassical economic 
theory, and suggest that married mothers who have high market value and potentially 
outearn their husbands will return to the labor force, after a short time away.  Only 
two family related variables are correlated with labor force entrances—having a new 
baby and higher child care costs both discourage labor force entrances, the number of 
children and age of youngest child do not.
Another important finding from the labor force entrance models is that the 
effect of predicted wages on entrances into part-time employment is positive, 
suggesting that married mothers who are predicted to attain higher wages may be able 
to use their higher market value to negotiate part-time employment.
I also found that married mothers who begin child bearing at older ages are 
more likely to exit the labor force.  According to neoclassical economic theory, 
women who delay child bearing invest more in their market value through higher 
education and work experience, and have higher earnings, so they would be less 
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likely to exit the labor force because their actual wage would be higher than their 
reservation wage.  That delayed childbearers are more likely to exit the labor force is 
surprising because one would expect these women to be less committed to 
childbearing than women who began child bearing at earlier ages as they are expected 
to have strong ties to the market.  My results provide some support for the argument 
that this higher investment in market value leads married mothers who delay child 
bearing to believe that they can easily reenter the labor force and that they will not be 
disadvantaged by a labor force break (Blackburn et al. 1993; Tanigushi 1999).  By 
interacting the age of first birth with personal earnings and education level, I was able 
to see that mothers who delayed child bearing and were high earners were more likely 
to exit the labor force, but those with high education were less likely to exit than 
those with a high school degree.  These results lend some support to the notion that 
the timing of a life event, such as the birth of a first child, can have differential 
impacts on subsequent life events and transitions.  Missing from this analysis is 
whether delayed child bearers reenter the labor force without suffering downward 
mobility and whether their high market value actually translates into high earnings 
after “time off” from the labor force, as the theory speculates.  Future research should 
investigate this possibility.
These findings raise the issue that the process of delayed child bearing may be 
capturing another phenomena, other than investment in human capital.  It is possible 
to conceive of other reasons why women who postpone childbearing would exit the 
labor force.  Due to the high correlation between age at first marriage and age at first 
birth, many career-oriented women appear to be delaying both marriage and 
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childbearing, focusing first on career building and putting family building on the back 
burner.  But they hear the biological clock ticking.  Biologically, the likelihood of 
bearing children decreases with age, thus for women who postpone childbearing, 
despite their fertility desires and intentions to bear children, the path to attaining 
children may be paved with frustration, disappointment, and fertility treatments once 
they do decide to begin family building.  Also, the likelihood of twins is greater 
among older women and has been on the rise in America.  The process of delayed 
child bearing may make these mothers who have greater financial resources (their 
own and their husbands) have a strong desire to care for their child once it does 
arrive.  It is possible that delayed child bearers could be more committed to 
childbearing but they are waiting until they have the means to rely on one paycheck 
prior to family building, by increasing their savings for example.  These possibilities 
merit further investigation and will be explored in future research.
Central to a mother’s decision to work is the cost, quality, and availability of 
child care while she works.  This dissertation is only able to include one element of 
child care in the models—the estimated cost of child care.  My results are consistent 
with the literature, as child care costs rise, mothers are less likely to work outside the 
home.  High maternal earnings can buffer the taxing effect of child care on a mother’s 
earnings, but high earnings cannot buy quality care where it does not exist, and 
families do not seem to want to have their child(ren) in day care for long hours each 
day.  Both spouses in high-earning dual-career families are likely to have long work 
hours.  High earning mothers facing the prospect of long work hours, married to a 
high earning husband who also works long hours, may weigh the pros and cons of 
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long hours of day care and a hectic schedule against a short stint of nonemployment, 
and decide in favor of the family.  As Blair-Loy (2003) argues, the family devotion 
schema tugs at women and helps them orient their priorities along appropriate 
breadwinning and domestic roles for men and women.  Many of these high-powered 
women in Blair-Loy’s study did not even consider the possibility that their husband 
would stop working, despite their own higher earnings relative to their husband.
My results are consistent with the literature on the role of a mother’s market 
value (potential or realized) and her job characteristics.  Neoclassical economic 
theory argues that factors that increase the value of a mother’s market time, or her 
wages, increase the probability that she will participate in the labor force.  Therefore, 
factors such as higher education levels, full-time work, and continuous work 
experience are expected to be positively associated with labor force participation.  I 
find that higher wages decrease the probability of a labor force exit, and predicted 
higher wages increase the probability of a labor force entrance.  I also find the 
expected negative relationship between education level and labor force exits, but only 
a lower propensity of a labor force entrance among mothers with low education 
levels.  Taking more time away from the labor force for care-giving prior to the start 
of the panel increases the odds of a labor force exit and decreases the odds of an 
entrance.
According to neoclassical economic theory, jobs that are family friendly and 
flexible would increase the value placed on market work and decrease the reservation 
wage.  Consistent with this theory, I find that mothers who work in the private, not 
for profit sector, work for the government or are self-employed are less likely to exit 
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the labor force than their counterparts in the private, for profit sector.  Finally, I find 
that receiving health insurance through your current employer—a proxy for a good 
job with benefits—decrease the odds of a labor force exit by 68 percent.
Implications For Gender Equality
While my research does not directly examine gender roles and power within 
relationships, it opens the door for the possibility that marital power and gender may 
have an underlying role in labor force participation decisions of married mothers.  My 
results have important implications regarding gender equality in the market place and 
in the home.  If money equals power and potentially high-earning mothers are not in 
the market place, then the very women who are poised to bolster gender equality in 
the market are not doing it.  Thus, Blair-Loy’s (2003) viewpoint that the change must 
come from within the system, initiated by women holding top managerial positions 
who can advocate effectively for change, is faulty if the very women who need to 
initiate the change are throwing in the towel so to speak, and not there within the 
system to advocate for that change.  Ironically, women who could improve market 
equality exit the labor force, and low-earning women who maintain the status quo 
enter the labor force or remain in.  Future research will investigate whether those who 
exit the labor force return and how their post-labor force exit job compares with their 
pre-labor force exit job.  
However, it is important to keep in mind that although growing in numbers, 
primary provider wives are not a common family type.  I find that only 17 percent of 
the employed wives in wave 1 are primary providers.  Even less common are families 
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where the wife is the primary provider and their monthly other family income is 
$4,500 or more (only 1 percent of employed married mothers in wave 1).  Future 
research will explore the labor force patterns of primary providers wives.
Previous research suggests that the value placed on the work plays a role in 
whether employment translates into increased status.  On the macro level, it is the 
demand for female labor that appears to generate an increase in women’s status and 
gender equality, rather than the employment per se (Cotter, DeFiore, Hermsen, 
Marsteller Kowalewski, and Vanneman 1998).  On the micro or family level, the 
valuing of women’s paid work by both the husband and the wife has been found to be 
a necessary condition to achieving a more equitable relationship (Risman and 
Johnson-Sumerford 1998).  Future research should investigate whether gender 
ideology influences a mother’s labor force participation and whether the effect of a 
wife’s relative earnings on her labor force participation is mediated by the spouse’s 
gender ideology.
This research is important because of the relationship between specialization 
in marriage and familial inequity.  The wage penalty associated with motherhood has 
lasting repercussions in terms of decreased bargaining and marital power, increased 
dependency and marginalization, and overall power and influence in society.
Policy Implications
 This research points to the need for policies that offer mothers and families 
real choices.  If the goal is to facilitate work and family and encourage mothers to 
remain employed, there are several policy avenues to pursue.  I find that married 
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mothers who have a new baby are more likely to exit the labor force.  Paid maternity 
leave would allow mothers a continued income, decreasing their dependence and 
enabling them to maintain ties to the labor force, while also allowing them time to 
care for their newborn.  Equally important in maintaining mothers labor force 
participation is the availability of quality child care at affordable prices.  My results 
show that as child care costs rise, mothers are more likely to exit the labor force and 
less likely to enter.  Another important aspect is creating part-time jobs that offer real 
avenues for promotion and career advancement, rather than “mommy track” part-time 
jobs.  Mothers who today exit the labor force because they are confronted with the 
either/or “choice” of full-time or no time, may very well have opted for part-time 
employment if that option had been available to them. 
In sum, this research adds to the body of research on women’s labor force 
participation in important ways.  One key finding is an increased probability of a 
labor force exit among married mothers who outearn their husbands, with one 
possible interpretation relying on the gender perspective—wives may neutralize their 
gender deviance of being the breadwinner though a labor force exit.  This effect is 
mediated by other family income—primary provider wives living in high income 
families are more likely to exit the labor force than primary provider wives living in 
low income families.  This interaction suggests that families act in an economically 
rational way—wives who outearn their husbands only exit the labor force when the 
family can afford to live on the husband’s earnings.  This dissertation contributes to 
the debate on women’s labor force participation, marital power, and gender equality 
in the market place and the home.  
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Appendices
Appendix Table 4.A 1996 Panel, Survey of Income and Program Participation, Rotation Groups, 
Waves, and Reference Months 
Source: SIPP Users Guide
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Appendix Table 4B. Allocation Rates for Selected Variables, Wave File
Variable Allocation rate 
Dependent variable components
Paid job 4.4






Work history topical modulea 4.0
Class of worker 0.6
Occupation 2.2
Health insurance ownership 18.8
Age at first marriagea 9.8




a For these topical module data, rates reflect missing data rate.
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Appendix Table 4C. Dependent Variable Construction 
Dependent variables
Variables Used 




Paid job in any 
months of wave, 
EPDJBTHN
Did … have at least one job (that 
is, a job for an employer, a 
business, or some other work 
arrangement) during the reference 
period or interview month?
Looking longitudinally across all waves, 
when a mother goes from EPDJBTHN=1 
(working some months in wave) to 
EPDJBTHN=2 (not working any months in 





Paid job in any 
months of wave, 
EPDJBTHN
Did … have at least one job (that 
is, a job for an employer, a 
business, or some other work 
arrangement) during the reference 
period or interview month?
Looking longitudinally across all waves, 
when a mother goes from EPDJBTHN=2 
(not working any months in wave) to 
EPDJBTHN=1 (working some months in 







Paid job in any 
months of wave, 
EPDJBTHN; 





EMS; Child under 
15 in household, 
CLT15
EPDJBTHN question above &     
Main reason … did not have a job 
during the reference period
Looking longitudinally across all waves, 
when a mother goes from EPDJBTHN=1 
(working some months in wave) to 
EPDJBTHN=2 (not working any months in 
wave), and ERSNOWRK=5 or 6 (the main 
reason for not working being 
pregnancy/childbirth or taking care of 
children/others), and EMS=1 (married, 
spouse present), and CLT15=1 (children 
less than 15 years old), EXITSHM is coded 
as 1, otherwise coded 0
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Appendix Table 4C. Dependent Variable Construction (Continued)
Dependent variables
Variables Used 







Paid job in any 
months of wave, 
EPDJBTHN; 





EMS; Child under 
14 in household, 
CLT15
EPDJBTHN question above &     
Main reason … did not have a job 
during the reference period
Looking longitudinally across all waves, 
when a mother goes from EPDJBTHN=2 
(not working any months in wave), and 
ERSNOWRK=5 or 6 (the main reason for 
not working being pregnancy/childbirth or 
taking care of children/others), and EMS=1 
(married, spouse present), and CLT15=1 
(children less than 15 years old), 
ENTRSHM is coded as 1, otherwise coded 
0
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Appendix Table 4D. Independent Variable Coding 
Independent Variables Survey Question Coding Treatment of Missing
Work related measures
Mother's market value (realized and potential)
Education level 
EEDUCATE
What is the highest level of school … 
has completed or the highest degree 
… has received?
Created dummy variables: Less than high 
school, high school degree, some college, BA or 
higher; and to look more closely at highly 
educated mothers broke out BA or higher into 
BA and Master's or higher.
Recoded one missing value as 
less than high school because 
respondent  was 15 years old.
Usual hours worked per 
week EJBHRS1 & 
EHRSBS1
How many hours per week did … 
usually work at all activities for this 
job/business?
Created dummy variables: No hours, part-time 
hours (1-34), and full-time (35 or more).  
Monthly earnings  
TPEARN
Reaggreated total person's earned 
income for the reference month after 
topcoding.
Created dummy variables: Earns less than 
$1,500; earns $1,500 to 2,999; earns $3,000 to 
$4,499; and earns $4,500 or more.  Created 
continuous variable, log of monthly earnings. 
Predicted hourly wage
Estimated hourly wages using Heckman sample 
selection technique
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Appendix Table 4D. Independent Variable Coding Continued
Independent Variables Survey Question Coding Treatment of Missing Values
Number of years had 
break in labor force for six 
or more consecutive 
months  EYRSINC2
Created dummy variables: No break in labor 
force for at least 6 consecutive months; Break 
of at least 6 consecutive months for 1 to 2 years 
(not necessarily consecutive years); Break of at 
least 6 consecutive months for 3 or more years 
(not necessarily consecutive years).  Labor force 
experience is for the time prior to the start of 
the panel.
Job characteristics
Occupation TJBOCC1 & 
TBSOCC1 Occupation classification code
Created dummy variable coded 1 if occupation 
was Manager/Professional; coded 0 otherwise.
Created dummy variable coded 1 
if missing occupation; coded 0 
otherwise.
Class of worker 
ECLWRK1 Class of worker
Created dummy variable coded 1 if respondent 
works for a local, State, or Federal government, 
or is self employed at own business; coded 0 
otherwise.
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Appendix Table 4D. Independent Variable Coding Continued
Independent Variables Survey Question Coding Treatment of Missing Values
Health insurance coverage 
through current job 
EHEMPLY & 
EHIOWNER
Source of health insurance 
(EHEMPLY) What was the source of 
…'s health insurance? AND Covered 
by own plan or someone else's plan 
(EHIOWNER) Was the coverage in 
…'s own name or was … covered as 
a family member on someone else's 
plan, both or neither?
Created dummy variable coded 1 if source of 
health insurance was current employer or work 
(EHEMPLY=1) AND health insurance owner 
was covered in own name (EHIOWNER=1) or 
covered both in own name and by someone 
else's plan (EHIOWNER=3)
No health insurance 
coverage EHIOWNER
Covered by own plan or someone 
else's plan (EHIOWNER) Was the 
coverage in …'s own name or was … 
covered as a family member on 
someone else's plan, both or neither?
Created dummy variable coded 1 if health 




Number of children under 
15 years old NUMKIDS
Created continuous variable by counting number 
of related children less than 15 living in 
household.  Then created dummy variables no 
children; one child; two children; three or more 
children.
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Appendix Table 4D. Independent Variable Coding Continued
Independent Variables Survey Question Coding Treatment of Missing Values
Age of youngest child 
AGEYOUNG
Created continuous variable by comparing ages 
of all individuals living in household and 
selecting the youngest person's age.  Then 
created dummy variables: no children; youngest 
child less than 1; youngest child 1 to 2 years; 
youngest child 3 to 5 years; youngest child 6 to 
9 years; and youngest child 10 to 14 years.  
Collapsed categories when appropriate.
Birth occurred in previous 
or current wave
Looking month to month longitudinally and 
seeing if a new biological or adopted child under 
the age of 1 entered the family.
Child entered the 
household in previous or 
current wave (not 
including a new baby)
Looking month to month longitudinally and 
seeing if a new biological or adopted child over 
the age of 1 entered the family.
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Appendix Table 4D. Independent Variable Coding Continued
Independent Variables Survey Question Coding Treatment of Missing Values
Timing of events
Age first birth 
RAGFBRTH
Created continuous variable that used fertility 
history topical module age at first birth collected 
in Wave 2, then added in age for those who had 
a first birth in the panel. Then created dummy 
variables based on the mean age of first birth 
from NCHS vital statistics report for 1996, 
1997, 1998 and compared it to the mean age 
first birth for my sample, with consideration of 
the confidence interval.  Created dummy 
variables: young age first birth of less than 22; 
on-time first birth or 22 to 28, inclusive; and 
older first birth of 29 or older.
Created dummy variable 
(MISS_FB) coded 1 if missing 
fertility history topical module 
data because not in panel at 
Wave 2 or if missing age first 
birth data; coded 0 otherwise.
Family economics
Total other monthly 
family income, not 
including mothers 
earnings       TFTOTINC
Reaggreated total family income for 
the reference month after topcoding.
Subtracted mothers earnings from total family 
income.  Created dummy variables: less than 
$1,500; $1,500 to 2,999; $3,000 to $4,499; and 
$4,500 or more.  Created continuous variable, 
log of monthly family income.  
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Appendix Table 4D. Independent Variable Coding Continued
Independent Variables Survey Question Coding Treatment of Missing Values
Husbands work hours
Husband works 65 or 
more hours per week 
SPHRGE65
How many hours per week did … 
usually work at all activities for this 
job/business?
Created dummy variable coded 1 if husband 
worked 65 or more hours per week, coded 0 
otherwise.
Predicted child care costs
Estimated market child care costs using 
Heckman sample selection technique
Gender egalitarianism between spouses
Wife's relative earnings to 
husband TPEARN for 
wife and spouse
Created spouse variables.  Created continuous 
variable of wife's earnings to husband's earnings 
(TPEARN-SPEARN).  Then created dummy 
variables: wife primary provider (if she earns 
60% or more of the total couple earnings); 
equal providers (wife earns between 41 and 
59% of total couple earnings); husband primary 
provider (husband earns 60% or more of total 
couple earnings).
Predicted wife's hourly 
wage relative to husband
Created dummy variables similar to wife's 
relative earnings to husband using the wife's 
predicted hourly wage and the husband's actual 
hourly wage
217
Appendix Table 4D. Independent Variable Coding Continued
Independent Variables Survey Question Coding Treatment of Missing Values
Wife's relative education 
level to husband 
EEDUCATE for wife and 
spouse
Created spouse variables and recoded into 
LTHS, HS, SCOL, CGRAD.  Created dummy 
variables of wife's education to husband's 
education (EDUC categories relative to 
SPEDUC).  Then created dummy variables: 
wife lower education than husband; wife equal 
education to husband; and wife higher education 
than husband within the categories.
Controls
Minority ERACE & 
EORIGIN
Created Hispanic variable selecting EORIGIN 
IN (20-28).  Created several categorical 
variables of race: white, non-Hispanic; black, 
non-Hispanic; other, non-Hispanic; Hispanic.  
Then created dummy variable of minority 
choosing ERACE EQ Black (2), Am Ind, Aleut, 
Eskimo (3), or Asian/Pacific Islaner (4), or 
Hispanic.  Otherwise coded as 0, leaving as 
reference group White, non-Hispanics.
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Appendix Table 4D. Independent Variable Coding Continued
Independent Variables Survey Question Coding Treatment of Missing Values
Age TAGE Age as of last birthday, topcoded
Use continuous variable of age.  Created 
dummy variables of 5 year age groups: 15 to 24; 
25 to 29; 30 to 34; 35 to 39; 40 to 44; 45 to 60.
Nonmetro residence 
METRO
Created dummy variable for nonmetro residence 
(METRO = 0)
Move during the panel 
EENTAID & SHHADID
Created dummy variable comparing EENTAID 
(houshold ID when entered the panel) and 
SHHADID (current household ID).  If 
EENTAID NE SHHADID then family moved.
Note: All variables are created for created for current month and previous month.
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Appendix Table 5.A Event History Bivariate Models, Each Variable Alone as Predictor of






GENDER EGALITARIANISM BETWEEN SPOUSES
Relative monthly earnings1 286.206 ***
Husband primary provider 0.986 *** 0.065
Equal providers R
Wife primary provider 0.508 *** 0.086
Relative education level2 39.131 ***
Husband higher education 0.220 *** 0.057
Equal education R
Wife higher education -0.217 *** 0.061
TIMING OF LIFE EVENTS
Age at first birth 79.297 ***
Younger, under 22 0.328 *** 0.056
On-time, 23-28 R
Older, 29 and over 0.007 0.011
Missing 0.633 *** 0.082
WORK RELATED VARIABLES
MOTHER'S MARKET CHARACTERISTICS
Education level 211.740 ***
Less than high school 0.727 *** 0.073
High school degree R
Some college -0.134 * 0.060
College graduate -0.451 *** 0.068
Hours worked (2 separate specifications)
Hours worked categories 231.692 ***
Part-time 0.739 *** 0.048
Full-time R
Continuous variable of hours worked -0.029 *** 0.002 289.549 ***
Monthly personal earnings (3 separate specifications)
Earnings categories 618.563 ***
Less than $1,500 R
$1,500 - $2,999 -1.230 *** 0.065
$3,000 - $4,499 -1.396 *** 0.112
$4,500 or more -1.309 *** 0.150
Log of personal monthly earnings -0.639 *** 0.020 949.546 ***
Monthly earnings per hour worked -0.127 *** 0.005 1084.726 ***
Labor force continuity
Break in LF for caregiving 6+months3 57.691 ***
  No break in LF for caregiving R
  1 to 2 yrs with 6+ month break 0.054 0.085
  3 or more yrs with 6+ month break 0.401 *** 0.052
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Managerial/Proffesional -0.662 *** 0.058
Class of worker 202.237 *
Private for profit R
Private not for profit -0.525 *** 0.095
Government worker -0.778 *** -0.778
Own business 0.433 *** 0.068
Health insurance  894.964 ***
Health insurance through husband (or other) R
Health insurance through current job -1.528 *** 0.075
No health insurance 0.685 *** 0.058
FAMILY RELATED VARIABLES
CHILDREN
Number of children 35.933 ***
One R
Two -0.022 0.054
Three or more 0.348 *** 0.063
Age of youngest child 227.512 ***
Less than 1 0.950 *** 0.075
1 to 2 0.397 *** 0.064
3 to 5 0.258 *** 0.063
6 to 14 R
Child enters household in previous or current wave
New baby 0.367 *** 0.092
Older child enters 0.810 * 0.324
FAMILY ECONOMICS
Other family income4 (2 separate specifications)
Income categories 103.832 ***
Less than $1,500 R
$1,500 - $2,999 -0.467 *** 0.061
$3,000 - $4,499 -0.672 *** 0.070
$4,500 or more -0.501 *** 0.070
Log of other monthly family income -0.096 *** 0.013 45.761 ***
Husband's work hours
Husband works 65+ hours per week 0.373 *** 0.067 28.600 ***
Child care costs
Log of predicted child care costs 0.281 ** 0.080 12.070 **
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Race and ethnicity (2 categories)
Minority 0.233 *** 0.052 19.178 ***
White, not Hispanic R
Race and ethnicity (4 categories) 41.634 ***
White, not Hispanic R
Black, not Hispanic 0.099 * 0.084
Other, not Hispanic -0.076 0.114
Hispanic 0.439 *** 0.067
Age (3 separate specifications)
Age categories 227.156 ***
15 to 24 0.833 *** 0.089
25 to 29 0.388 *** 0.071
30 to 34 R
35 to 39 -0.244 *** 0.071
40 to 44 -0.378 *** 0.080
45 to 60 -0.272 ** 0.091
Continuous variable of age -0.045 *** 0.003 179.493 ***
Log of Age -1.642 *** 0.112 210.800 ***
Residence 1.825
Metro residence 0.080 0.060
Move 126.509 ***
Move in previous or current wave 0.877 *** 0.071
Source: 1996 SIPP Panel.  Unit of analysis is person-wave.
1 This measure follows Nock's (2001) classification of marriages of equally dependent spouses (MEDS)
where the husband is the primary provider if the wife earns less than 40 percent of the combined
wife and husband earnings; they are equal earners if the wife earns between 40 and 59 percent 
of the combined earnings; and the wife is the primary earner if she earns 60 percent or more of
the combined earnings.
2 This measure is calculated using four education categories (less than high school, high school degree,
some college, and college graduate) and comparing the wife's education with the husband's. 
3 Includes only labor force breaks for 6 or more months prior to the start of the panel (ie., Wave 1).
4 Excludes mother's earnings.
p-values: * p<.05    ** p<.01   *** p<.001        R: Reference group
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Appendix Table 5.B Full Model, Event History Analysis Predicting Labor Force Exit 
  Among Married Mothers with Children Under 15, Other Family Income Categories
Standard Odds
Parameter Coefficient Error Ratio
GENDER EGALITARIANISM BETWEEN SPOUSES
Relative monthly earnings1
Husband primary provider 0.285 *** 0.076 1.343
Equal providers R




Less than high school 0.367 *** 0.072 1.464
High school degree R
Some college -0.080 * 0.033 0.923
College graduate -0.111 * 0.053 0.908
Hours worked 
Part-time -0.087 0.051 0.924
Full-time R
Monthly personal earnings 
Log of personal earnings -0.450 *** 0.025 0.637
Labor force continuity
Break in LF for caregiving 6+months2
  No break in LF for caregiving R
  1 to 2 yrs with 6+ month break -0.086 0.068 0.923
  3 or more yrs with 6+ month break 0.252 *** 0.036 1.299
JOB CHARACTERISTICS
Occupation
Managerial/Professional -0.103 0.057 0.916
Class of worker
Private for profit R
Private not for profit -0.379 *** 0.042 0.683
Government worker -0.370 *** 0.072 0.877
Own business -0.132 * 0.060 0.688
Health insurance  
Health insurance through husband (or other) R
Health insurance through current job -1.152 *** 0.092 0.320





Two -0.205 *** 0.043 0.805




Parameter Coefficient Error Ratio
Age of youngest child
Less than 1 0.610 *** 0.174 1.820
1 to 2 -0.110 * 0.051 0.865
3 to 5 -0.120 0.072 0.869
6 to 14 R
Child enters household in previous or current wave
New baby 0.404 * 0.192 1.494
Older child enters 0.558 0.531 1.692
TIMING OF LIFE EVENTS
Age at first birth
Younger, under 22 -0.015 0.055 0.984
On-time, 23-28 R
Older, 29 and over 0.261 *** 0.040 1.299
Missing 0.254 ** 0.088 1.297
FAMILY ECONOMICS
Other family income3
Less than $1,500 0.235 *** 0.052
$1,500 - $6,249 R
$6,250 or more 0.210 *** 0.040 0.919
Husband's work hours
Husband works 65+ hours per week 0.293 *** 0.058 1.366
Child care costs
Log of predicted child care costs 0.483 *** 0.120 1.754
DEMOGRAPHIC CONTROLS
Race and ethnicity
Minority 0.220 *** 0.054 1.258
White, not Hispanic R
Age 
Continuous variable of age -0.020 *** 0.003 0.983
Residence
Metro residence 0.021 0.045 1.019
Move
Move in previous or current wave 0.516 *** 0.069 1.681
Intercept 0.088 0.181
-2 Log Likelihood 14,111.809
X2 1,845.216 ***
Degrees of freedom 33




Parameter Coefficient Error Ratio
Source: 1996 SIPP Panel.  Unit of analysis is person-wave. 
1 This measure follows Nock's (2001) classification of marriages of equally dependent spouses (MEDS)
where the husband is the primary provider if the wife earns less than 40 percent of the combined
wife and husband earnings; they are equal earners if the wife earns between 40 and 59 percent 
of the combined earnings; and the wife is the primary earner if she earns 60 percent or more of
the combined earnings.
2 Includes only labor force breaks for 6 or more months prior to the start of the panel (ie., Wave 1).
3 Excludes mother's earnings.  p-values: * p<.05    ** p<.01   *** p<.001        R: Reference group
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Appendix Table 5.C Event History Analysis Predicting Labor Force Exit Among 
Married Mothers with Children Under 15 With Interaction of Wife's Relative 
Earnings and Log of Other Family Income
Standard
Parameter Coefficient Error
GENDER EGALITARIANISM BETWEEN SPOUSES
Relative monthly earnings1
Husband primary provider -0.424 0.373
Equal providers R
Wife primary provider -0.796 ** 0.261
Interaction with log of other family income
Husband primary * log other family income 0.099 * 0.045




Less than high school 0.376 *** 0.070
High school degree R
Some college -0.077 * 0.035




Monthly personal earnings 
Log of personal earnings -0.444 *** 0.025
Labor force continuity
Break in LF for caregiving 6+months2
  No break in LF for caregiving R
  1 to 2 yrs with 6+ month break -0.086 0.070





Private for profit R
Private not for profit -0.375 *** 0.042
Government worker -0.381 *** 0.072
Own business -0.130 * 0.058
Health insurance  
Health insurance through husband (or other) R
Health insurance through current job -1.139 *** 0.090
No health insurance 0.182 *** 0.048
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Two -0.216 *** 0.043
Three or more -0.220 *** 0.057
Age of youngest child
Less than 1 0.593 ** 0.182
1 to 2 -0.153 ** 0.050
3 to 5 -0.145 0.079
6 to 14 R
Child enters household in previous or current wave
New baby 0.401 * 0.188
Older child enters 0.519 0.522
TIMING OF LIFE EVENTS
Age at first birth
Younger, under 22 -0.018 0.053
On-time, 23-28 R
Older, 29 and over 0.263 *** 0.042
Missing 0.254 ** 0.089
FAMILY ECONOMICS
Other family income3
Log of other family income -0.221 *** 0.031
Husband's work hours
Husband works 65+ hours per week 0.312 *** 0.060
Child care costs
Log of predicted child care costs 0.577 *** 0.102
DEMOGRAPHIC CONTROLS
Race and ethnicity 
Minority 0.225 *** 0.054
White, not Hispanic R
Age 
Continuous variable of age -0.017 *** 0.003
Residence
Metro residence 0.020 0.045
Move
Move in previous or current wave 0.513 *** 0.070









Source: 1996 SIPP Panel.  Unit of analysis is person-wave. 
1 This measure follows Nock's (2001) classification of marriages of equally dependent spouses (MEDS)
where the husband is the primary provider if the wife earns less than 40 percent of the combined
wife and husband earnings; they are equal earners if the wife earns between 40 and 59 percent 
of the combined earnings; and the wife is the primary earner if she earns 60 percent or more of
the combined earnings.
2 Includes only labor force breaks for 6 or more months prior to the start of the panel (ie., Wave 1).
3 Excludes mother's earnings.  p-values: * p<.05    ** p<.01   *** p<.001        R: Reference group
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Appendix Table 5.D Event History Analysis Predicting Labor Force Exit Among  
Married Mothers with Children Under 15 With Interaction of Wife's Relative 
Earnings and Other Family Income Categories
Standard
Parameter Coefficient Error
GENDER EGALITARIANISM BETWEEN SPOUSES
Relative monthly earnings1
Husband primary provider 0.332 *** 0.098
Equal providers R
Wife primary provider 0.797 *** 0.110
Interaction with other family income categories
Husband primary * other income less than $1,500 -0.071 0.109
Husband primary * other income $6,250 or more 0.168 0.288
Wife primary * other income less than $1,500 -0.651 *** 0.154




Less than high school 0.361 *** 0.071
High school degree R
Some college -0.076 * 0.034




Monthly personal earnings 
Log of personal earnings -0.448 *** 0.025
Labor force continuity
Break in LF for caregiving 6+months2
  No break in LF for caregiving R
  1 to 2 yrs with 6+ month break -0.091 0.068





Private for profit R
Private not for profit -0.380 *** 0.042
Government worker -0.369 *** 0.070
Own business -0.131 * 0.061
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Appendix Table 5.D CONTINUED
Standard
Parameter Coefficient Error
Health insurance  
Health insurance through husband (or other) R
Health insurance through current job -1.153 *** 0.092





Two -0.195 *** 0.043
Three or more -0.187 ** 0.065
Age of youngest child
Less than 1 0.603 *** 0.175
1 to 2 -0.110 * 0.052
3 to 5 -0.118 0.073
6 to 14 R
Child enters household in previous or current wave
New baby 0.402 * 0.191
Older child enters 0.545 0.532
TIMING OF LIFE EVENTS
Age at first birth
Younger, under 22 -0.022 0.055
On-time, 23-28 R
Older, 29 and over 0.263 *** 0.040
Missing 0.252 ** 0.088
FAMILY ECONOMICS
Other family income3
Less than $1,500 0.414 *** 0.086
$6,250 or more 0.060 0.259
Husband's work hours
Husband works 65+ hours per week 0.292 *** 0.058
Child care costs
Log of predicted child care costs 0.468 *** 0.125
DEMOGRAPHIC CONTROLS
Race and ethnicity 
Minority 0.212 *** 0.053
White, not Hispanic R
Age 
Continuous variable of age -0.020 *** 0.003
Residence
Metro residence 0.024 0.045
Move
Move in previous or current wave 0.514 *** 0.070
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-2 Log Likelihood 14,096.022
X2 1,861.002
Degrees of freedom 37
Number of observations 51,150
Source: 1996 SIPP Panel.  Unit of analysis is person-wave. 
1 This measure follows Nock's (2001) classification of marriages of equally dependent spouses (MEDS)
where the husband is the primary provider if the wife earns less than 40 percent of the combined
wife and husband earnings; they are equal earners if the wife earns between 40 and 59 percent 
of the combined earnings; and the wife is the primary earner if she earns 60 percent or more of
the combined earnings.
2 Includes only labor force breaks for 6 or more months prior to the start of the panel (ie., Wave 1).
3 Excludes mother's earnings.  p-values: * p<.05    ** p<.01   *** p<.001        R: Reference group
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Appendix Table 5.E Event History Analysis Predicting Labor Force Exit Among 
Married Mothers with Children Under 15 With Interaction of Wife's Relative 
Earnings and Age of Youngest Child
Standard
Parameter Coefficient Error
GENDER EGALITARIANISM BETWEEN SPOUSES
Relative monthly earnings1
Husband primary provider 0.531 *** 0.101
Equal providers R
Wife primary provider 0.436 *** 0.130
Interactions 
Husband primary * age of youngest child -0.042 *** 0.012




Less than high school 0.372 *** 0.075
High school degree R
Some college -0.055 0.034




Monthly personal earnings 
Log of personal earnings -0.453 *** 0.024
Labor force continuity
Break in LF for caregiving 6+months2
  No break in LF for caregiving R
  1 to 2 yrs with 6+ month break -0.097 0.067





Private for profit R
Private not for profit -0.371 *** 0.042
Government worker -0.382 *** 0.078
Own business -0.127 * 0.058
Health insurance  
Health insurance through husband (or other) R
Health insurance through current job -1.137 *** 0.094
No health insurance 0.182 *** 0.049
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Two -0.178 *** 0.035
Three or more -0.127 ** 0.040
Age of youngest child
Continuous variable 0.015 0.014
Child enters household in previous or current wave
New baby 0.686 *** 0.121
Older child enters 0.822 0.422
TIMING OF LIFE EVENTS
Age at first birth
Younger, under 22 -0.023 0.051
On-time, 23-28 R
Older, 29 and over 0.271 *** 0.045
Missing 0.267 ** 0.081
FAMILY ECONOMICS
Other family income3
Log of other family income -0.075 *** 0.014
Husband's work hours
Husband works 65+ hours per week 0.325 *** 0.061
Child care costs
Log of predicted child care costs 0.185 * 0.094
DEMOGRAPHIC CONTROLS
Race and ethnicity 
Minority 0.186 *** 0.055
White, not Hispanic R
Age 
Continuous variable of age -0.018 *** 0.002
Residence
Metro residence 0.087 * 0.037
Move
Move in previous or current wave 0.505 *** 0.066






Appendix Table 5.E CONTINUED
Standard
Parameter Coefficient Error
Source: 1996 SIPP Panel.  Unit of analysis is person-wave. 
1 This measure follows Nock's (2001) classification of marriages of equally dependent spouses (MEDS)
where the husband is the primary provider if the wife earns less than 40 percent of the combined
wife and husband earnings; they are equal earners if the wife earns between 40 and 59 percent 
of the combined earnings; and the wife is the primary earner if she earns 60 percent or more of
the combined earnings.
2 Includes only labor force breaks for 6 or more months prior to the start of the panel (ie., Wave 1).
3 Excludes mother's earnings.  p-values: * p<.05    ** p<.01   *** p<.001        R: Reference group
234
Appendix Table 5.F Step-Wise Event History Analysis Predicting Labor Force Exit Among Married Mothers with Children 
Under 15 Showing Change in Age at First Birth
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Parameter Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
TIMING OF LIFE EVENTS
Age at first birth
Younger, under 22 0.266 *** 0.024 0.024 -0.016
On-time, 23-28 R R R R
Older, 29 and over 0.017 0.196 *** 0.180 *** 0.262 ***




Less than high school 0.332 *** 0.400 *** 0.381 ***
High school degree R R R
Some college -0.003 -0.064 -0.080 *
College graduate 0.076 -0.078 -0.096
Hours worked 
Part-time -0.069 -0.099 -0.079
Full-time R R R
Monthly personal earnings 
Log of personal earnings -0.464 *** -0.441 *** -0.450 ***
Labor force continuity
Break in LF for caregiving 6+months1
  No break in LF for caregiving R R R
  1 to 2 yrs with 6+ month break -0.078 -0.068 -0.081
  3 or more yrs with 6+ month break 0.097 ** 0.209 *** 0.261 ***
JOB CHARACTERISTICS
Occupation
Managerial/Proffesional -0.086 -0.087 -0.088
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Appendix Table 5.F CONTINUED
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Parameter Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Class of worker
Private for profit R R R
Private not for profit -0.398 *** -0.392 *** -0.373 ***
Government worker -0.418 *** -0.383 *** -0.381 ***
Own business -0.145 * -0.160 ** -0.131 *
Health insurance  
Health insurance through husband (or other) R R R
Health insurance through current job -0.951 *** -0.192 *** -1.137 ***





Two -0.201 *** -0.217 ***
Three or more -0.208 ** -0.219 ***
Age of youngest child
Less than 1 0.762 *** 0.599 **
1 to 2 0.064 -0.145 **
3 to 5 0.005 -0.141
6 to 14 R R
Child enters household in previous or current wave
New baby 0.454 * 0.401 *
Older child enters 0.582 0.525
FAMILY ECONOMICS
Other family income2
Log of other family income -0.096 *** -0.084 ***
Husband's work hours
Husband works 65+ hours per week 0.315 *** 0.312 ***
Child care costs
Log of predicted child care costs 0.431 *** 0.561 ***
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Appendix Table 5.F CONTINUED
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Parameter Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
GENDER EGALITARIAN COUPLE
Relative monthly earnings3
Husband primary provider 0.292 *** 0.295 ***
Equal providers R R
Wife primary provider 0.218 ** 0.299 ***
DEMOGRAPHIC CONTROLS
Race and ethnicity 
Minority 0.229 ***
White, not Hispanic R
Age 




Move in previous or current wave 0.518 ***
Intercept -3.118 *** 0.310 *** 0.257 0.694 ***
-2 Log Likelihood 15,877.73 *** 14,471.00 *** 14,185.93 *** 14,110.24 ***
X2 79.30 *** 1,486.03 *** 1,771.09 *** 1,846.78 ***
Degrees of freedom 3 16 28 32
Number of observations 51,150 51,150 51,150 51,150
Source: 1996 SIPP Panel.  Unit of analysis is person-wave.  p-values: * p<.05    ** p<.01   *** p<.001        R: Reference group
1 Includes only labor force breaks for 6 or more months prior to the start of the panel (ie., Wave 1).
2 Excludes mother's earnings.
3 This measure follows Nock's (2001) classification of marriages of equally dependent spouses (MEDS) where the husband is the primary provider 
if the wife earns less than 40 percent of the combined wife and husband earnings; they are equal earners if the wife earns between 40 and 59 
percent of the combined earnings; and the wife is the primary earner if she earns 60 percent or more of the combined earnings.
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Appendix Table 5.G Event History Analysis Predicting Labor Force Exit Among 
Married Mothers with Children Under 15 With Interaction of Age at First 
Birth and Log of Mother's Earnings 
Standard
Parameter Coefficient Error
TIMING OF PREVIOUS LIFE EVENTS
Age at first birth
Younger, under 22 -0.491 0.387
On-time, 23-28 R
Older, 29 and over -0.663 * 0.277
Missing -0.165 0.664
Interactions 
Young first birth * log of earnings 0.073 0.054
Old first birth * log of earnings 0.139 *** 0.042




Less than high school 0.382 *** 0.068
High school degree R
Some college -0.079 * 0.034




Monthly personal earnings 
Log of personal earnings -0.508 *** 0.027
Labor force continuity
Break in LF for caregiving 6+months2
  No break in LF for caregiving R
  1 to 2 yrs with 6+ month break -0.086 0.073





Private for profit R
Private not for profit -0.371 *** 0.042
Government worker -0.382 *** 0.072
Own business -0.133 * 0.059
Health insurance  
Health insurance through husband (or other) R
Health insurance through current job -1.142 *** 0.090
No health insurance 0.198 *** 0.049
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Two -0.217 *** 0.042
Three or more -0.220 *** 0.054
Age of youngest child
Less than 1 0.596 *** 0.179
1 to 2 -0.144 ** 0.048
3 to 5 -0.139 0.075
6 to 14 R
Child enters household in previous or current wave
New baby 0.402 * 0.189
Older child enters 0.528 0.523
GENDER EGALITARIANISM BETWEEN SPOUSES
Relative monthly earnings1
Husband primary provider 0.299 *** 0.087
Equal providers R
Wife primary provider 0.296 *** 0.069
FAMILY ECONOMICS
Other family income3
Log of other family income -0.085 *** 0.013
Husband's work hours
Husband works 65+ hours per week 0.308 *** 0.059
Child care costs
Log of predicted child care costs 0.563 *** 0.098
DEMOGRAPHIC CONTROLS
Race and ethnicity 
Minority 0.228 *** 0.056
White, not Hispanic R
Age 
Continuous variable of age -0.017 *** 0.003
Residence
Metro residence 0.017 0.045
Move
Move in previous or current wave 0.517 *** 0.068
Intercept 1.075 *** 0.279
-2 Log Likelihood 14,104.030
X2 1,852.995
Degrees of freedom 33
Number of observations 51,150
Source: 1996 SIPP Panel.  Unit of analysis is person-wave.    R: Reference group
Note: Footnotes same as Appendix Table 5.C            p-values: * p<.05  ** p<.01 *** p<.001                          
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Appendix Table 5.H Event History Analysis Predicting Labor Force Exit Among 
Married Mothers with Children Under 15 With Interaction of Age at First 
Birth and Mother's Education
Standard
Parameter Coefficient Error
TIMING OF PREVIOUS LIFE EVENTS
Age at first birth
Younger, under 22 R
On-time, 23-28 R
Older, 29 and over 0.406 ** 0.144
Missing R
Interaction with education
Old first birth * less than high school -0.085 0.290
Old first birth * some college -0.048 0.179




Less than high school 0.387 *** 0.082
High school degree R
Some college -0.088 0.067




Monthly personal earnings 
Log of personal earnings -0.449 *** 0.027
Labor force continuity
Break in LF for caregiving 6+months2
  No break in LF for caregiving R
  1 to 2 yrs with 6+ month break -0.088 0.088





Private for profit R
Private not for profit -0.376 *** 0.099
Government worker -0.384 *** 0.086
Own business -0.129 0.074
Health insurance  
Health insurance through husband (or other) R
Health insurance through current job -1.140 *** 0.081
No health insurance 0.211 ** 0.069
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Two -0.220 *** 0.060
Three or more -0.226 ** 0.078
Age of youngest child
Less than 1 0.604 *** 0.094
1 to 2 -0.141 0.106
3 to 5 -0.141 0.083
6 to 14 R
Child enters household in previous or current wave
New baby 0.394 *** 0.096
Older child enters 0.535 0.341
GENDER EGALITARIANISM BETWEEN SPOUSES
Relative monthly earnings1
Husband primary provider 0.290 *** 0.074
Equal providers R
Wife primary provider 0.298 ** 0.102
FAMILY ECONOMICS
Other family income3
Log of other family income -0.084 *** 0.020
Husband's work hours
Husband works 65+ hours per week 0.311 *** 0.070
Child care costs
Log of predicted child care costs 0.581 *** 0.151
DEMOGRAPHIC CONTROLS
Race and ethnicity 
Minority 0.233 *** 0.061
White, not Hispanic R
Age 
Continuous variable of age -0.018 *** 0.004
Residence
Metro residence 0.031 0.067
Move
Move in previous or current wave 0.563 *** 0.076
Intercept
-2 Log Likelihood 1,843.569
X2 14,113.455
Degrees of freedom 33
Number of observations 51,150
Source: 1996 SIPP Panel.  Unit of analysis is person-wave.    R: Reference group
Note: Footnotes same as Appendix Table 5.C            p-values: * p<.05  ** p<.01 *** p<.001                          
Standard errors do not control for within cluster correlations as model did not converge. 
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Appendix Table 6.A Event History Bivariate Models, Each Measure Alone as Predictor 








GENDER EGALITARIANISM BETWEEN SPOUSES
Relative hourly earnings (wife predicted)1 48.317 ***
Husband primary provider -0.340 *** 0.053
Equal providers R
Wife primary provider -0.016 0.063
Relative education level2 42.653 ***
Husband higher education 0.008 0.055
Equal education R
Wife higher education 0.398 *** 0.062
WORK RELATED VARIABLES
MOTHER'S MARKET CHARACTERISTICS
Education level 38.946 ***
Less than high school -0.270 *** 0.068
High school degree R
Some college 0.133 * 0.059
College graduate -0.134 0.069
Predicted hourly wages -0.005 0.006 0.738
Labor force continuity
Break in LF for caregiving 6+months3 88.154 ***
  No break in LF for caregiving R
  1 to 2 yrs with 6+ month break -0.046 0.082
  3 or more yrs with 6+ month break -0.452 *** 0.050
FAMILY RELATED VARIABLES
CHILDREN
Number of children 29.436 ***
One R
Two -0.138 * 0.054
Three or more -0.330 *** 0.061
Age of youngest child 17.072 ***
Less than 1 0.076 0.075
1 to 2 -0.159 ** 0.061
3 to 5 -0.180 ** 0.061
6 to 14 R
Child enters household in previous or current wave 0.946
New baby -0.017 0.101
Older child enters 0.366 0.365
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TIMING OF LIFE EVENTS
Age at first birth 25.877 ***
Younger, under 22 0.172 ** 0.055
On-time, 22-28 R
Older, 29 and over -0.139 * 0.070
Missing 0.187 * 0.085
FAMILY ECONOMICS
Other family income4 (2 separate specifications)
Income categories 61.347 ***
Less than $1,500 R
$1,500 - $2,999 0.134 * 0.065
$3,000 - $4,499 -0.045 0.073
$4,500 or more -0.348 *** 0.071
Log of other monthly family income -0.092 *** 0.016 30.358 ***
Husband's work hours (2 separate specifications)
Husband works 65+ hours per week 0.158 * 0.072 4.706 *
Continuous variable of husband's hours 0.002 0.001 3.669
Child care costs
Log of predicted child care costs -0.671 *** 0.076 80.511 ***
DEMOGRAPHIC CONTROLS
Race and ethnicity 
Minority -0.016 0.051 0.104
White, not Hispanic R
Race and ethnicity (4 categories)
White, not Hispanic R 36.055 ***
Black, not Hispanic 0.470 *** 0.090
Other, not Hispanic -0.147 0.109
Hispanic -0.139 * 0.061
Age (3 separate specifications)
Age categories 58.603 ***
15 to 24 0.369 *** 0.086
25 to 29 0.169 * 0.074
30 to 34 R
35 to 39 -0.104 0.070
40 to 44 -0.104 0.078
45 to 60 -0.298 *** 0.090
Continuous variable of age -0.023 *** 0.003 60.792 ***
Residence 8.579 **
Metro residence -0.176 ** 0.059
Move 12.077 ***
Move in previous or current wave 0.273 *** 0.076
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Appendix Table 6.A CONTINUED
Source: 1996 SIPP Panel.  Unit of analysis is person-wave.
1 This measure follows Nock's (2001) classification of marriages of equally dependent spouses (MEDS)
where the husband is the primary provider if the wife earns less than 40 percent of the combined
wife and husband earnings; they are equal earners if the wife earns between 40 and 59 percent 
of the combined earnings; and the wife is the primary earner if she earns 60 percent or more of
the combined earnings.
2 This measure is calculated using four education categories (less than high school, high school graduate,
some college, and college graduate) and comparing the wife's education with the husband's. 
3 Includes only labor force breaks for 6 or more months prior to the start of the panel (ie., Wave 1).
4 Excludes mother's earnings.
p-values: * p<.05    ** p<.01   *** p<.001               R= Reference group
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Appendix Table 6.B Full Model, Event History Analysis Predicting Labor Force 
Entrance Among Married Mothers with Children Under 15
Parameter Standard Odds
Coefficient Error Ratio
GENDER EGALITARIANISM BETWEEN SPOUSES
Relative hourly earnings (wife predicted)1
Husband primary provider -0.207 *** 0.040 0.812
Equal providers R
Wife primary provider -0.056 0.044 0.946
Relative education level2
Husband higher education 0.083 * 0.041 1.087
Equal education R




Less than high school -0.273 *** 0.071 0.760
High school degree R
Some college 0.104 0.092 1.111
College graduate -0.211 0.255 0.813
Predicted hourly wages 0.072 *** 0.022 1.074
Labor force continuity
Break in LF for caregiving 6+months2
  No break in LF for caregiving R
  1 to 2 yrs with 6+ month break -0.045 0.060 0.956





Two 0.073 0.063 1.075
Three or more 0.108 0.078 1.113
Age of youngest child
Less than 1 0.092 0.099 1.097
1 to 2 0.139 0.093 1.150
3 to 5 0.035 0.075 1.035
6 to 14 R
Child enters household in previous or current wave
New baby -0.275 ** 0.089 0.760
Older child enters 0.478 0.270 1.613
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Appendix Table 6.B CONTINUED
Parameter Standard Odds
Coefficient Error Ratio
TIMING OF LIFE EVENTS
Age at first birth
Younger, under 22 0.118 ** 0.040 1.126
On-time, 22-28 R
Older, 29 and over -0.032 0.050 0.968
Missing 0.116 0.091 1.127
FAMILY ECONOMICS
Other family income3
Log of other family income -0.022 0.019 0.978
Husband's work hours
Husband works 65+ hours per week 0.110 0.067 1.116
Child care costs
Log of predicted child care costs -1.189 *** 0.150 0.304
DEMOGRAPHIC CONTROLS
Race and ethnicity 
Minority -0.056 0.054 0.945
White, not Hispanic R
Age
Continuous variable of age -0.029 *** 0.004 0.971
Residence
Metro residence -0.040 0.057 0.962
Move
Move in previous or current wave 0.164 * 0.070 1.184
Intercept -0.976 ** 0.304
-2 Log Likelihood 12810.221
X2 417.819
Degrees of freedom 30
Number of observations 21280
Source: 1996 SIPP Panel.  Unit of analysis is person-wave.
1 This measure follows Nock's (2001) classification of marriages of equally dependent spouses (MEDS)
where the husband is the primary provider if the wife earns less than 40 percent of the combined
wife and husband earnings; they are equal earners if the wife earns between 40 and 59 percent 
of the combined earnings; and the wife is the primary earner if she earns 60 percent or more of
the combined earnings.
2 This measure is calculated using four education categories (less than high school, high school graduate,
some college, and college graduate) and comparing the wife's education with the husband's. 
3 Includes only labor force breaks for 6 or more months prior to the start of the panel (ie., Wave 1).
4 Excludes mother's earnings.
p-values: * p<.05    ** p<.01   *** p<.001               R= Reference group
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